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The impetus for this book began a decade ago, with panel presentations at the 
Association for Asian Studies by graduate students who were studying social 
movements in Japan that had used lawyers and support groups to make legal chal-
lenges. As the publication project took shape, we added scholars who had done 
research on other interesting cases, and Daniel Foote graciously agreed to reprise 
his role as panel discussant to provide a legal perspective on the case studies. 
Alas, it has taken even longer to get this book into print than the usual lengthy 
gestation period for an edited volume, and the graduate students who listed this 
forthcoming publication on job applications are now tenured professors. Most 
of our authors have written elsewhere about their social movement research, but 
without the central focus on lawyers, support groups, and litigation that character-
izes their chapters for this volume. The chapter by Karen Nakamura is a substan-
tial revision and rearticulation of chapter 6 of her monograph Deaf in Japan: Sign-
ing and the Politics of Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). Some 
of the background segments of chapter 1 are adapted from my “Doing the Defen-
dant’s Laundry: Support Groups as Social Movement Organizations in Contem-
porary Japan,” Japanstudien, Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts für Japanstudien 
11 (1999). We thank the publishers for permission to use these materials. 
My introduction provides a basic overview of the Japanese legal system at 
the time these studies were conducted. Since then the Japanese government has 
introduced an array of legal changes concerning issues raised in the case studies, 
which did not affect any of the cases directly. Conversely, some of the creative 
legal strategies used in these cases may have indirectly affected subsequent legal 
changes, although of course the Japanese authorities would resist that interpre-
tation. Foote’s concluding chapter describes these recent legal reforms and dis-
cusses what impact they have had to date. Despite the reforms, social movements 
today still have to contend with most of the same problems as they use the courts 
to try to change Japan.
My thanks to the anonymous reviewers who provided constructive com-
ments, and to Bruce Willoughby for getting it into print at last. I hope this volume 
will raise awareness of the many ways that social movements in Japan work with 
support groups and lawyers to bring about change, and will inspire others to do 








This book examines the relationship between social movements and the law in 
bringing about social change in Japan. Six fascinating case studies take us inside 
social movements that have taken up causes as disparate as death by overwork, 
the rights of the deaf, access to prisoners on death row, consumer product safety, 
workers whose companies go bankrupt, and persons convicted of crimes they 
did not commit. Each chapter chronicles many attempts to bring about change 
through use of the courts and assesses their frequent failure and occasional suc-
cess. Along the way we learn much about how the law operates in Japan as well 
as how social movements mobilize and innovate to pursue their goals using legal 
channels.
To those unfamiliar with Japan’s judicial system and more familiar with the 
Anglo-American system, many regular practices of the Japanese judicial system 
are quite shocking. Japan’s modern system was initially crafted during the Meiji 
era based on German and French models; hence, it followed the Continental legal 
tradition to produce comprehensive criminal and civil law codes and codes of 
procedure that were designed to be administered by elite bureaucrats to protect 
the interests of the emperor-centered state over its subjects. In contrast, a read-
ing of Japan’s current Constitution, enacted during the Allied Occupation, would 
suggest that contemporary Japanese have the same legal rights and protections as 
people in countries following the Anglo-American legal system, which is based 
on the common law tradition of protecting the rights of citizens in relation to the 
state. 
In fact, however, when the war ended, most of Japan’s prewar law codes 
were carried over along with virtually all of the personnel who administered them. 
Consequently, major aspects of the old system have remained in practice up to the 
present. For example, the 1922 Code of Criminal Procedure was revised in 1948 in 
an effort to shift from an inquisitorial system to a more Anglo-American adversary 
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system, but it remains strongly inquisitorial, with judges and prosecutors far more 
powerful than defense lawyers (Abe 1957). Foote (2010) argues that the Japanese 
judiciary has shaped criminal justice policy by interpreting the Constitution and 
code changes very narrowly in deference to prosecutors, “granting broad authority 
to the prosecution and limiting rights and protections for suspects and defendants, 
often in the face of rather explicit language in the Constitution, at times buttressed 
by even more detailed language in the Code.”
Similarly, some changes were made to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1948, 
also with the purpose of making the adjudication of civil claims more adversarial, 
but practice quickly reverted back toward the earlier practice of an inquisitorial 
judge dominating the proceedings. Even today, many civil actions are brought by 
parties without legal counsel (Taniguchi 2007). Reflecting this elite bureaucratic 
orientation, Japan did not even have an administrative procedures law until the 
mid-1990s, despite some earlier attempts to produce one (Uga 2007) 
The Penal Code of 1907 remained in force with only minor changes until 
the 1990s, despite several unsuccessful efforts to draft a new one (Matsuo 2007). 
The Civil Code of 1896 has also remained in force along with the Commercial 
Code that was partially amended in 1950, and there was little change in the way 
contracts were written and treated in Japan until well into the 1980s (Uchida and 
Taylor 2007). Certainly there were specific laws passed over the years, but the ba-
sic framework of both civil and criminal law, and the way disputes were resolved 
and crimes were prosecuted, remained relatively unchanged until reform efforts 
began to take shape in the 1990s. 
Although very recent reforms to the judicial system have been enacted that 
promise to alter some of these practices, they are just coming into effect, and 
their impact will not be known for some time. The research for the studies in this 
volume was conducted under the rules and practices that prevailed throughout the 
postwar period and into the first decade of the twenty-first century. The follow-
ing are the distinctive features of the Japanese system as of the period of study, 
emphasizing those that differ from Anglo-American expectations and practices as 
they relate to the studies presented here.
ProfeSSional PerSonnel: JudgeS, ProSecutorS, and lawyerS
 
The two main types of bureaucratic officials in the prewar Japanese judicial sys-
tem, judges and procurators (renamed prosecutors), carried over to the postwar 
system quite directly. Lawyers had somewhat marginal status and roles in the 
prewar system but were elevated to formal parity with judges and prosecutors in 
the deliberate effort to create an adversarial system for postwar Japan. All three 
receive the same types and levels of training in postwar Japan, and then they move 
into different types of positions.
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Law is an undergraduate major in Japan, intended to prepare students as gen-
eralists to enter the government bureaucracy or private corporations and not to fill 
positions in the judicial system. Until the introduction of Western-style graduate 
law schools in 2004, all judges, prosecutors, and lawyers in postwar Japan fol-
lowed the same route to enter their careers. They first had to pass the Legal Ex-
amination, for which, similar to university entrance exams, “passing” was limited 
to the number of places available in the Legal Training and Research Institute, an 
agency of the Supreme Court that provided a two-year apprenticeship program 
(reduced in the late 1990s to one and a half years). The program provides practical 
training for future judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, with courses taught by active 
professionals and rotating paid apprenticeships in courts, prosecutors’ offices, and 
law offices. 
The number of applicants passing the Legal Examination grew from 265 in 
1949 to about 500 by the early 1960s, and it remained at that level until the begin-
ning of the 1990s, at which time various pressures led to a doubling of the number 
passing over the course of the decade. These numbers were sufficient to fill avail-
able slots for judges and prosecutors, but they severely constrained the number of 
lawyers in Japan. In the late 1980s and 1990s, business interests in Japan began 
pressing for an increase in the number of lawyers. Some suggest that the initial 
increases in numbers came about because it was becoming harder to fill the avail-
able slots for prosecutors, which also implies that more candidates wanted to be-
come lawyers. Until the institution of the new system of legal education, the pass 
rate had hovered at around two to three percent of applicants since the mid-1960s; 
most of those passing had taken the exam several times and were in their late 
twenties or older when they succeeded (Rokumoto 2007). Upon completion of the 
legal training program, candidates must sit for a final examination, but typically 
the vast majority of trainees pass that examination. At that point, all successful 
candidates are officially considered to be trained lawyers and officers of the court, 
certified to become judges at the district court level, prosecutors in the national 
bureaucracy, or to practice law. (There are also positions at the lowest level of 
the judiciary: summary court judges, filled by persons who have not attended the 
legal training institute who cannot move up to become judges at district, family, 
or other higher courts.)
The first two positions, judge and prosecutor, are elite positions in the na-
tional bureaucracy, under separate bodies. Instructors assigned from these bodies 
to teach in the legal training institute use their posts to recruit promising new 
candidates. Prosecutors are career bureaucrats within the Ministry of Justice, 
where they enjoy status and salary levels equal to judges and a high level of 
independence. They are assigned to various positions in prosecutors’ offices in 
major cities that change as part of the regular rotation of bureaucratic officials, 
and they also may rise to fill top-level positions in the ministry (Johnson 2002; 
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Tachi 2003). Judges are part of an independent bureaucracy under the authority 
of the Supreme Court. They are appointed for renewable ten-year terms, but most 
remain in the judiciary until they retire at the age of sixty-five, moving from post 
to post within the judiciary just like career bureaucrats in other parts of the Japa-
nese government (Haley 2007). The fact that all judges and prosecutors belong to 
two elite bureaucracies in a unified national judicial system facilitates a high level 
of uniformity and predictability in the way prosecutorial and judicial decisions are 
made. Those who do not take positions in these two bureaucracies may practice 
law independently, and persons who resign or retire from positions as judges or 
prosecutors may also work as lawyers. 
The environment in which Japanese lawyers work is very different from 
that in the United States. The Japanese Civil Code does not allow for punitive 
damages, and there are no juries to make unpredictable awards, so lawyers do 
not undertake civil lawsuits on a contingency fee basis in hopes of winning big 
settlements. Until the 1980s there were virtually no large business law firms in 
Japan providing legal advice to business clients (Nagashima and Zaloom 2007). 
In addition, large corporations did not employ in-house lawyers because the na-
ture of contracting in Japan and the way companies operated did not require 
such legal expertise until Japanese businesses began to work in a multinational 
environment. Except for the few large business law firms that have emerged in 
the past two decades, most independent law firms in Japan are very small general 
practices. 
However, since very early in the postwar era many lawyers have worked for 
labor union federations and other organizations affiliated or loosely allied with the 
major opposition political parties in Japan, the Socialist Party and the Communist 
Party, which were highly attuned both to Constitutional issues and to the adver-
sarial use of the courts to bring about social change. As a result of this combina-
tion of factors, the very small pool of practicing lawyers in Japan also contains 
a relatively high proportion of what in the United States would be called “cause 
lawyers” (Sarat and Scheingold 1998), who are willing to take on some cases 
from a commitment to social justice, in addition to the regular legal practice that 
pays their bills. 
how trialS are conducted
Trials in Japan are not continuous. Both criminal trials and civil lawsuits are con-
ducted through half-day or whole-day sessions about once a month until they con-
clude, often with a gap of some months between the end of the trial and the formal 
decision. There are no juries, and all except summary proceedings are heard by a 
panel of three judges at varying levels of seniority. Because both judges and pros-
ecutors are professional bureaucrats subject to routine transfers, it is not uncom-
introduction
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mon for the judges in civil and criminal trials, and even the prosecutors in crimi-
nal trials, to change midway through the trial because they have been reassigned.
Despite what the Constitution says and the early postwar efforts to make oral 
pleadings and witness testimony the centerpiece of trials, they remain heavily 
centered on the paper documents that are entered into the trial record. At least 
until recent amendments aimed at streamlining trials by implementing rather strict 
pretrial adjustment procedures, plaintiffs and defendants in civil trials, and pros-
ecutors and defense lawyers in criminal trials, have prepared for just the next 
few sessions of the trial, beginning with the submission of documents and their 
acceptance or rejection by the judges. Typically, judges also have focused their at-
tention mainly on the upcoming sessions of a trial based on the new sets of docu-
ments that have been submitted for those sessions. The discontinuous nature of 
trials and the possibility that judges may be transferred in the middle of trial pro-
ceedings greatly increase the judges’ dependence on written documents. The final 
decisions may be rendered by judges who were not in court or assigned to the case 
when witnesses testified, and therefore can only rely on the documentary record. 
Moreover, until the very recent reforms that are just beginning to be imple-
mented, rules of discovery have been extremely limited in both civil and criminal 
cases. Essentially, lawyers and defendants only learn what evidence the other side 
has to offer when it is submitted to the court piecemeal, document by document, 
throughout the intermittent trial. They have had no right to learn what other con-
flicting or exculpatory evidence the other side might hold that it does not choose 
to present to the court. They can only see what evidence is going to be presented 
when it is added to the documentary record, often just one trial session in advance 
of when it will be utilized, and they must then scramble to rebut or defend against 
it. 
Even under the newly revised procedures for discovery, one must request 
specific items in the possession of the other side. If the defense does not know 
what those items might be, it cannot ask the court to compel the other side to dis-
close them (Soldwedel 2008). The lack of discovery hobbles the defense in both 
civil and criminal cases, but it is particularly damaging to criminal defense. How-
ever, there are many other peculiarities of the Japanese criminal justice system 
that shock observers accustomed to the Anglo-American system with its strong 
presumption of innocence and protections for criminal defendants.
the JaPaneSe criminal JuStice SyStem
Criminal law and criminal procedure textbooks and judicial precedents proclaim 
that the presumption of innocence is a basic tenet of Japanese law, yet nowhere 
in such basic documents as the Constitution, the Penal Code, and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure is there a clear stipulation that a person is innocent until 
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proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution spells out a number 
of protections for defendants, but not this most basic of protections. The Penal 
Code spells out crimes and punishments, while the Code of Criminal Procedure 
describes the procedures for treating “the accused” and accords to prosecutors the 
determination of whether there is sufficient evidence of guilt to charge the person 
with a crime. The judges are then required to set forth the evidence on which the 
person was found guilty. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person 
can be found “not guilty” if the court finds that there was no crime committed, 
and the possibility that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt is offered 
as an afterthought. In short, if a person is formally charged with a crime and goes 
to trial, there is a strong presumption that the defendant must be guilty. The court 
assumes that it is the prosecutor’s duty to bring a case to trial only if the evidence 
clearly establishes the defendant’s guilt. The presumption of guilt is so strong that 
a person who is found not guilty is entitled to restitution from the state, and there 
are informal punishments for prosecutors who have made the error of taking a 
case to trial that they might lose (Johnson 2002). 
In a clear continuation from its Continental inquisitorial roots, Japan’s crimi-
nal justice system remains very heavily oriented to confession, which is regarded 
as the pinnacle of evidence and also as the key to subsequent remorse and reha-
bilitation. Although confession alone is not sufficient for conviction, confession 
is overwhelmingly the primary focus of criminal investigation. Both police and 
prosecutors have very wide latitude in highly “enabling” circumstances to obtain 
confessions. They may hold suspects for up to twenty-three days of interrogation 
in a police jail before formally charging them with a specific offense or releasing 
them. Most suspects confess within the first three days, before it is even neces-
sary to take the suspect before a judge to obtain permission for additional time for 
interrogation. And although the official limit is two ten-day periods of additional 
interrogation, that time can be extended seemingly indefinitely by the simple ex-
pedient of charging someone with one offense at the end of the twenty-three days, 
and then immediately rearresting the person on suspicion of another crime.
Although suspects are constitutionally entitled to a lawyer, the state does not 
provide lawyers for indigent persons until after charges have been filed (although 
the recent reforms attempt to rectify this with a new state system that many de-
fense lawyers mistrust). Even when a suspect does have a lawyer, access to the 
client is severely restricted, and lawyers are never permitted to observe interroga-
tions, which may be conducted for up to twelve or fourteen hours a day. 
A major feature of the Japanese criminal justice system that seems very 
strange to those accustomed to the Anglo-American system is that the suspect or 
defendant does not actually write his or her own confession statement. Instead, 
these are documents constructed and written up by police and prosecutors from 
the interrogation and other evidence, which the person is then urged to sign. Such 
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constructed “confessions” are admitted into the court record in evidence as the per-
son’s own signed confession document. After days of interrogation, the exhausted 
arrestee may be cajoled, coerced, or tricked into signing a false confession state-
ment, often with the argument that the document’s contents may be denied later 
when the person goes to court. And although the Constitution states clearly that 
“confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or 
detention shall not be admitted in evidence,” (Article 38) in fact courts routinely 
accept such confession statements even when the defendant testifies vigorously in 
court that the statement was coerced after prolonged arrest and detention. In the 
same manner, written statements constructed by prosecutors from questioning of 
witnesses are often entered into the documentary court record instead of calling 
the witness to testify in court and be subject to cross-examination. 
One further feature of Japanese criminal justice that is common to Conti-
nental legal systems but differs substantially from the Anglo-American system 
is the interpretation of double jeopardy. Following the initial decision in District 
Court, both the prosecution and the defense are allowed to appeal the decision, 
and the appeals court can retry the facts of the case anew. The prosecution fre-
quently appeals if the sentence is regarded as too light, or in the rare instance 
when a defendant has been found not guilty. Article 39 of the Constitution states, 
“No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time 
it was committed, or of which he had been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in 
double jeopardy.” However, Japanese courts do not follow the Anglo-American 
understanding of double jeopardy, but have interpreted an appeal of the first deci-
sion to be a continuation of the original trial process; thus, it is not regarded as 
double jeopardy for the prosecution to appeal an acquittal. Double jeopardy does 
not apply until a case has been fully appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, 
and the Supreme Court has confirmed a final decision.
reSearch on law and Society in JaPan
There is now a substantial body of literature in English on the subject of law and 
society in Japan. We have come a very long way from the work by Kawashima 
Takeyoshi (Kawashima 1963) that suggested the Japanese people were culturally 
predisposed not to take their claims to court. That position has been refuted ef-
fectively by scholars of Japanese law who have pointed out several structural bar-
riers to pressing claims through the Japanese legal system (Haley 1978; Ramsey-
er 1988; Miyazawa 2001) and have shown why such claims are often pursued 
through alternative means. More recently, Eric Feldman (2007) has provided a 
more nuanced reading of Kawashima’s work as not exclusively culturalist but as 
based on modernization theory expectations about how Japan would change in 
the future. He traces the wide range of subsequent studies of dispute resolution in 
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Japan as part of Kawashima’s broad legacy, whether they take a cultural, institu-
tional, law and economics (rational choice), or case studies approach. He sees the 
recent efforts to change the Japanese legal system as consistent with Kawashima’s 
basic predictions about the future of Japanese dispute resolution. 
Similar debates have colored the English language literature on the use of the 
courts for criminal cases. The Japanese criminal justice system attracted attention 
in the 1970s and 1980s because the rates of crime and prosecution appeared very 
low in comparison to U.S. statistics, although they were not out of line with other 
European countries. Several studies argued that because the Japanese criminal 
justice system emphasizes confession, and police and prosecutors have great free-
dom to obtain confessions through lengthy interrogations without the presence of 
a defense lawyer, very few criminal cases ever go to court for a full trial (Castberg 
1990; Westermann and Burfeind 1991; Thornton and Endo 1992). While it is true 
that the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved with a confession and a single 
court session, there are still many contested cases that require a full trial, plus ap-
peals and requests for retrial, that keep the criminal courts busy. The best studies 
of the criminal justice system (Miyazawa 1992; Johnson 2002) have taken a close 
look at the daily practices of the police and prosecutors that underlie the statistics 
and have shown us why it produces these results.
uSing the courtS to Produce Social change
The studies in this volume point out that in addition to ordinary civil and criminal 
matters, cases are also contested through Japanese courts for the explicit purpose 
of producing social change. Although such cases are indistinguishable in official 
statistics, they are sustained through the legal system by social movement groups 
working in concert with cause lawyers. The phenomena of cause lawyering and 
of social movements supporting lawsuits in order to bring about social change 
are well-known in other countries (Sarat and Scheingold 1998; Sarat and Schein-
gold 2001; Scheingold and Sarat 2004; Sarat and Scheingold 2005). The present 
volume contributes to our understanding of how cause lawyers and social move-
ments undertake such activities in the particular circumstances of the Japanese 
legal system.
In a seminal study, Frank Upham (1987) demonstrated that after a series of 
legal disputes had pushed for social change in several disparate fields, Japanese 
courts crafted solutions that regularized the claims process into administrative 
arrangements. The hallmark of these arrangements was the flexibility they left to 
bureaucratic discretion, rather than creating firm rights and remedies, a situation 
Upham termed “bureaucratic informality.” Upham focused primarily on the legal 
processes and their outcomes, but a close reading of his case studies makes it clear 
that in addition to the individuals whose claims made up the actual legal cases, 
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cause lawyers and social movement organizations provided the driving force that 
brought about social change. 
The studies contained in this volume aim to broaden our understanding of the 
use of the courts to bring about social change in Japan by focusing on the social 
movement component in the equation. In my own research on Japanese New Left 
groups that ran afoul of the law because of their confrontational political actions, 
I discovered that they brought their struggles into the courts with the aid of trial 
support groups. In reading the accounts of other scholars who had done field work 
in Japanese social movements, it seemed that such support groups constituted a 
much broader form of social movement activity. 
This volume is intended to test that idea, by inviting other scholars who have 
done extensive fieldwork on a particular social movement to look at how their 
movement has used legal cases to pursue its goals. For some, this was already a 
main thrust of their work; for others, it required going back into their field notes 
to think about their movement in a new way. Some of the cases we document 
stretch back to the 1960s, while others are more recent in origin, and many con-
tinue today. All of the case studies are based on extensive participant observation 
and interviews with the social movement organizations, but they rely equally on 
the newsletters and other print materials that social movements produce, in order 
to document the complexities of long-running legal actions and extend the time 
frame of the research. Each study also provides some background on the Japa-
nese legal context that underlies the case, which supplements the basic outline 
provided above.
The resulting studies have expanded the original focus on individual trial 
support groups to encompass the role of larger social movement organizations and 
labor unions as institutionalized support groups that back extensive, long-running 
legal campaigns, and to highlight the critical role of cause lawyers in helping 
social movements utilize the courts. The authors of the six case studies are social 
scientists, not lawyers: three are sociologists, two anthropologists, and one a po-
litical scientist. To balance the presentation of the case studies with appropriate 
legal expertise, noted Japanese legal scholar Daniel Foote has provided a com-
mentary that also highlights recent and pending changes in the basic structure of 
the Japanese legal system itself.
Each of the case studies stands on its own as a detailed account of how a so-
cial movement has persisted against heavy odds to pursue a cause through the use 
of the courts. The studies are linked through common themes, and the ordering of 
the chapters reflects some of these. The first of these themes is the great difficulty 
that individuals or small groups in Japan have in mounting legal challenges in the 
face of strong social expectations and the overwhelming power of their adver-
saries, be they corporations or the state itself. While cause lawyers provide the 
necessary expertise to navigate the legal system, social movement organizations 
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and trial support as a form of social movement activity provide the energy and 
constant dedication that keeps the principals in the legal case from giving up the 
fight or accepting a partial solution. Every chapter details legal cases that stretch 
for years or even decades, requiring patience and dogged determination to keep 
the momentum going against heavy odds.
A second, related theme is that despite very generous protections in the Jap-
anese Constitution and in various bodies of law, Japanese citizens tend not to 
know about their rights and thus do not believe they have a chance to succeed 
against more powerful adversaries. Hence, the first task of cause lawyers and so-
cial movements is to teach clients their rights and thereby persuade them to pursue 
redress. This is no easy task, as the case studies document eloquently. For many 
of these participants, rights-consciousness is an entirely new and radically differ-
ent way of thinking about themselves, their social relations, and their place in the 
wider society. Social movement organizations can mediate between the formal 
and technical realm of the law and the everyday social experience of individuals 
who are faced with a specific problem. They help to transform the individual’s 
private problem into an example of a broader social issue that can be addressed 
through a combination of collective action and legal strategy. This transformation 
does not happen quickly, and it must be constantly reinforced through the per-
sonal relationships and steady support that the social movement members provide 
to the criminal defendant or civil plaintiff. 
The studies pay particular attention to the relationship between the social 
movement and the lawyers who handle their cases. These relationships range 
from major labor union federations that donate their staff lawyers to assist a small 
union with its legal challenges, to a social movement that uses a hotline to recruit 
cases for its cause lawyers to pursue, and one that produced its own homegrown 
lawyer out of the movement itself. Unlike the American situation in which many 
large, national social movement organizations have staff lawyers who pursue the 
group’s agenda, most of the studies in this volume involve cause lawyers who 
work for very modest fees or pro bono and can only handle these cases by us-
ing the social movement participants as unpaid paralegal assistants. Students of 
social movements have long pointed out that volunteer labor is a prime resource 
that makes social advocacy possible, but the range of tasks that social movement 
activists perform for these Japanese legal cases goes well beyond the standard ar-
ray of social movement activities that require willing hands.
The chapters also point to the rewards that trial support for legal cases brings 
to the social movement as a whole and to its participants. Some of the authors 
point to changes in laws or legal practices that have resulted from the social 
movement’s challenges, while others claim only small victories in individual le-
gal cases. In some cases the social movement was actually created by the need 
for trial support, while other groups got involved in it as a secondary activity that 
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related in some way to their main purpose. Yet underlying all of the studies is the 
sense that the social movement itself has been invigorated and enhanced by its 
foray into the legal system, and that social movement members who participate in 
support for a legal case have found their involvement to be personally rewarding 
and even life changing. 
Despite these common themes running through the volume, each of the case 
studies puts us inside the world of one particular movement, with its own unique 
problems and specific legal context. Only when all the studies are brought to-
gether does it become apparent that they reflect some broader characteristics of 
Japanese society and the Japanese legal system. The volume as a whole thus con-
tributes to our understanding of both law and society, but the reader’s greatest 
pleasure will come from the fascinating glimpse that each author gives us of a 
hidden pocket of contemporary Japan.
Chapter 1, “No Helmets in Court, No T-Shirts on Death Row: New Left Trial 
Support Groups” by Patricia Steinhoff, examines how New Left student move-
ments and their supporters in the late 1960s refashioned existing elements into a 
trial support system that permitted them to move their fight from the streets into 
the courts, after a major crackdown on violent protests produced mass arrests and 
indefinite detentions. The chapter identifies the major organizational features of 
the resulting institution of trial support groups and thus provides a foundation for 
several of the other chapters. It then shows how one trial support group, whose 
defendants received death penalties in 1979 and 1980 that have not yet been car-
ried out, has found innovative ways to use the courts to maintain contact with 
their prisoners and to bring about broader changes in the treatment of prisoners 
awaiting the death penalty in Japan.
Chapter 2, “Karōshi Activism and Recent Trends in Japanese Civil Society: 
Creating Credible Knowledge and Culture” by Scott North, follows with a quite 
different social movement that supports the surviving family members of per-
sons who have died suddenly from overwork. He shows how a substantial social 
movement has grown out of the efforts of cause lawyers, medical professionals, 
and small support groups to find and pursue individual cases of karōshi, or death 
by overwork. Along the way, they have produced changes in the official defini-
tions and criteria for karōshi and have established a number of legal precedents. 
In this instance, the trial support group for one case led to a national movement 
using some methods that are similar to the New Left cases. However, instead of 
having a continuous hotline that responds to arrests, this movement opens a well-
advertised hotline for a short time each year in order to find new cases to pursue, 
a practice that has been now replicated in other social movements. North also 
shows how karōshi lawyers and support groups must battle company and labor 
union resistance in order to obtain critical evidence and must pursue their cases 




In Chapter 3, “Courting Justice, Contesting ‘Bureaucratic Informality’: The 
Sayama Case and the Evolution of Buraku Liberation Politics,” John Davis ex-
amines one of the famous enzai or false prosecution cases, in which a member of 
the Buraku minority was apparently falsely convicted of murder. A major national 
social movement, the Buraku Liberation League (BLL), took up the case when 
they suspected that the defendant had been singled out and charged with the crime 
solely because of his minority status. Davis shows us how strong BLL support 
challenged what would otherwise have been a simple murder case that the police 
had quickly solved. He traces not only how the case itself has progressed but also 
how it has been used within the BLL and has attracted widespread support outside 
the organization. His account captures the symbolic aspects that energize social 
movements, and provides a lively sense of what it is like to participate in social 
movement rallies and demonstrations in Japan. Legal efforts to improve the status 
of the Buraku minority also constituted one of Upham’s case studies. While Davis 
supports and utilizes Upham’s work, his analysis provides a strikingly different 
view that foregrounds the role of the BLL in pursuing one iconic legal case that 
has ramifications well beyond the Buraku movement. 
Chapter 4, “Becoming Unforgettable: Leveraging Law for Labor in Strug-
gles for Employment Security” by Christena Turner, examines how strong labor 
laws enabled the workers in a small shoe factory to fight back when the parent 
company drove their small subsidiary into bankruptcy. With support and guid-
ance from large labor unions, the workers took legal actions that enabled them 
to take control of the factory and its materials and continue production while 
the bankruptcy proceeded slowly through the courts. Turner shows how the re-
sources of a major union federation helped the workers learn how to organize and 
become a social movement in their own right, while their control of the factory 
kept them employed so they could continue to fight their legal battles in court. 
Although Turner has written a monograph about the same case and another simi-
lar one (Turner 1999), this chapter focuses more directly on the lengthy sequence 
of legal actions that the workers took with the aid of the larger labor unions and 
labor lawyers. The case is intriguing because of the highly unusual situation of 
workers gaining control of production while their company was in bankruptcy, 
but it also raises important legal issues concerning the status of workers in sub-
sidiary firms.
Then in Chapter 5, “Suing for Redress: Japanese Consumer Organizations 
and the Courts,” Patricia Maclachlan chronicles the efforts of a consumer organi-
zation of housewives to improve product safety through a series of legal challeng-
es using cause lawyers. As in the karōshi case, the group had to battle administra-
tive agencies to change their focus and policies, as well as suing manufacturers. 
Their efforts raised questions of who has legal standing to bring cases to court 
introduction
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and resulted in changes in the ability of organizations to bring something similar 
to class action lawsuits. She also shows how this activity involved legal efforts to 
gain access to information about faulty consumer products that was held by gov-
ernment bureaucracies, and thus led into the freedom of information movement 
of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Chapter 6 rounds out the case studies with Karen Nakamura’s study, “No 
Voice in the Courtroom: Deaf Legal Cases in the 1960s.” Nakamura traces the 
roots of activism within the deaf community to the same late 1960s protest gen-
eration examined by Steinhoff, but with a rather different trajectory. She shows 
how the early period of activism produced the first deaf lawyer in Japan, who 
then led a series of legal challenges to overturn highly restrictive and paternalistic 
regulations that prevented deaf and hard-of-hearing adults from participating in 
the normal activities of Japanese society. Like Maclachlan, she emphasizes the 
important role of cause lawyers in making it possible for social movement orga-
nizations to pursue social change through the courts. Nakamura also shows how 
the organization she studied won several court battles and then turned away from 
the legal strategy as it became a nonprofit organization (NPO) providing services 
through government contracts.
The volume concludes with a chapter by Daniel Foote, “Cause Lawyering 
in Japan: Reflections on the Case Studies and Justice Reform.” A legal scholar of 
Japan who now teaches at the University of Tokyo, Foote brings his legal perspec-
tive to bear on the social movement case studies, highlighting the connections 
among the different cases and pointing to ways these movements make creative 
use of legal resources. He emphasizes how many times these efforts fail, but that 
they also sometimes win. And as each of the case studies suggests, sometimes 
these efforts do result in social changes that go well beyond the specific individual 
case that was taken to court. It is more difficult to achieve such general changes 
in Japan, both because the legal system itself relies less on precedent, and because 
the bureaucratic orientation Upham pointed out also makes it more difficult to 
trace the connection between individual cases that challenge the system and the 
eventual social changes that may come about indirectly. Foote’s chapter goes be-
yond analysis of the case studies, to contribute additional information about many 
recent and some still-pending changes in the Japanese legal system that may af-
fect the ability of social movements to bring such challenges in the future.
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No Helmets in Court, No T-Shirts on Death Row:
New Left Trial Support Groups1
Patricia G. Steinhoff
At the entrance to every district court building in Japan, and outside every court-
room inside these buildings, a sign lists the rules of behavior for trial observers. 
The current version for Tokyo District Court translates as follows:











on	guns,	 explosives,	 cameras,	 and	 recording	equipment,	 fully	half	of	 the	pro-
hibitions relate to protest activities and protest paraphernalia. The helmets in 
question	have	nothing	 to	do	with	motorcycles;	 they	are	part	of	 the	distinctive	
uniform of New Left student protest groups from the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The prohibition on helmets in courtrooms stands as a historical marker, literally 
1. Much of the research for this article was conducted under three Fulbright Senior Research Fel-
lowships	in	Tokyo	in	1982–83,	1990–91,	and	1998–99,	during	which	I	was	affiliated	with	the	
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. I wish to thank both the Fulbright Commission 
and the Institute of Social Science for their support. Some segments of this paper have appeared 




part of the New Left movement at that time, the trial support group (shienkai or 
kyūenkai). 
Like the signs outside Japanese courtrooms, shienkai	still	exist	today	and	have	
become an essential element of movements for social change in Japan. Sooner or 
later, anyone conducting research in Japan on a social movement that uses the 
courts to press its claims will probably stumble onto such a support group. I had 
been working in and around them for years as I followed various social move-
ments,	before	I	realized	that	these	trial	support	groups	were	sociologically	inter-
esting	in	their	own	right.	The	reasons	for	their	existence	as	a	form	of	social	move-
ment activity, and the distinctive range of activities they perform, shed light on 
the routine practices of the Japanese legal system and the criminal justice system. 
More broadly, shienkai reveal how small, powerless groups of ordinary Japanese 
have learned to use the courts to contest state power. 
This	chapter	will	briefly	review	the	history	of	shienkai and their reinvention 
as	part	of	an	escalating	conflict	between	New	Left	protesters	and	the	state	in	the	





the invention and Reinvention of tRial SuppoRt GRoupS 
The	concept	of	mobilizing	outside	support	for	political	prisoners	and	politically	
significant	 legal	cases	 is	certainly	not	unique	 to	Japan,	as	 the	French	Dreyfuss	






In contrast, the hallmark of the Japanese support groups of interest here is 
their intimate involvement with the legal case and its principals. They may also 
conduct some of the same kinds of publicity and fund-raising activities as other 
social movements concerned with the status of political prisoners, and they may 
also have a substantial number of passive supporters who only send monetary 
contributions.	But	their	activities	go	well	beyond	such	arm’s-length	support.	The	
core support group members work directly with the lawyers handling the case 
to provide paralegal assistance, and they monitor the progress of the legal case 
closely. They also meet and communicate regularly with the criminal defendants 
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or civil plaintiffs involved, and provide a wide range of personal support services 
to those individuals and their families. They care for, protect, and help the princi-
pals in unusually intimate ways.
The Origins of the Japanese Support Group System
These	personalized	support	groups	have	developed	and	evolved	in	Japan	out	of	a	
particular constellation of political, legal, and social conditions. The most basic 
element	of	that	context	is	the	heavy	emphasis	on	confession	and	submission	to	
state authority in the Japanese criminal justice system. For persons engaged in po-
litical	activity,	the	coercive	techniques	used	to	induce	confession	are	inextricably	
associated	with	the	1925	Peace	Preservation	Law	and	the	subsequent	pressure	on	
persons arrested under that law to renounce their political beliefs through a prac-
tice known as tenkō	 (change	of	 ideological	direction)	 (Mitchell	1976;	Mitchell	
1992;	Steinhoff	1991;	Takizawa	1993).	As	a	consequence	of	this	historical	legacy,	




The Peace Preservation Law was struck down in 1945, and the postwar Japa-
nese	constitution	gave	new	rights	and	protections	 to	all	citizens.	The	new	con-
stitution	 included	 specific	 protections	 for	 those	 accused	 of	 a	 crime,	making	 it	
somewhat easier at least in theory to mount a vigorous defense or to challenge 
the state in court. These changes enabled the major political parties of the left to 
institutionalize	the	provision	of	legal	assistance	for	individual	cases	whose	cause	
they supported on ideological grounds. Despite the constitutional changes, both 
the	continuing	practices	of	the	justice	system	and	ordinary	social	expectations	of	
compliance with authority have discouraged individuals from claiming their new 
rights or making direct challenges to authority. Hence, the cases taken up by the 
organized	left	often	required	not	only	legal	assistance	but	also	a	broad	range	of	
social	support	to	keep	the	challengers	from	giving	up	the	fight.	
The	newly	 legal	political	parties	of	 the	 left	had	 the	experience	and	 the	re-
sources to provide legal support for their own party members and members of 
affiliated	unions	and	 issue	organizations.	The	Japan	Communist	Party	(JCP)	 in	
particular developed a model of trial support groups working with socially con-




People’s Support Group). This system was established early in the postwar era 




under new political and social conditions.
The New Left Reinvents Support Groups
Although	in	the	early	postwar	years	student	organizations	were	closely	allied	with	
the	Japanese	Communist	Party,	by	the	late	1950s	a	number	of	student	organiza-
tions had broken with the parties of the Old Left to form a more radical and inde-
pendent New Left, which was very active in the large, multifaceted protest wave 
of	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	(Steinhoff	1999b;	Takazawa	and	Takagi	1981).	
By	1967,	New	Left	student	protests	began	escalating	into	violent	clashes	with	the	
riot police both on and off campuses, leading to injuries and arrests. In 1968 the 
state	moved	to	control	the	rapidly	escalating	violence	by	criminalizing	previously	
tolerated protest activities with mass arrests and indictments on felony charges. 
Over 6,000 students were arrested for protest activities in 1968, and 13,000 more 







caught in the crackdown and arrested indiscriminately.
The New Left’s rhetoric was revolutionary, but its adherents also believed 
(along with a substantial minority of other Japanese) that both the causes they 
were	fighting	for	and	the	means	they	were	using	were	constitutional;	from	their	
perspective, the Japanese government was violating the constitution by its poli-
cies.	They	viewed	the	mass	arrests	and	indefinite	holding	of	students	as	analogous	
to the prewar arrests under the Peace Preservation Law because they aimed to 
suppress ideas and social movements that in postwar Japan were supposed to 
be constitutionally protected. If students were arrested for protest in the streets, 
they would take their resistance into the courts. To do so, however, they needed 
lawyers.
The	major	New	Left	student	organizations,	or	“sects,”	operated	under	a	for-
mal structure adopted from that of the JCP. They had already established their 
own	internal	support	organizations	on	the	JCP	model	to	provide	support	for	their	
own arrested members, and they usually had their own lawyers on retainer. How-
ever,	“non-sect”	students	who	did	not	officially	belong	to	these	organizations	did	
not	have	access	to	lawyers	or	organized	support	groups.	The	JCP	strongly	disap-
proved of the violent New Left students and refused to provide its lawyers and 
support system to them when they were arrested. Most other lawyers also refused 
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to take on the student cases, which promised to be very time-consuming and unre-
warding	financially,	as	well	as	being	politically	and	morally	distasteful.	
A	small	group	of	university	professors	and	others	who	sympathized	with	the	
New Left students stepped into the breach and adapted the basic idea of the sup-
port	group	to	address	the	emergency	situation.	Drawing	upon	the	expertise	of	some	
sympathetic	lawyers	and	activists	with	prior	experience	in	support	groups	from	
earlier political cases, they created a new support system coordinated through a 
clearing	house	called	Kyūen	Renraku	Sentā	(hereafter	Kyūen).	In	explicit	reac-





wives to provide support to the great majority of the 31,000 students arrested 
from 1968 to 1971 for what was called in government publications of the time 
“student	group	violence.”	Overall,	the	state’s	policy	of	controlling	violent	protest	
through mass arrests and the prosecution of students divided the mass protest 
movement and reduced the scale of street demonstrations, but it also pushed a 
small	segment	of	the	New	Left	underground,	producing	more	extreme	and	less	
predictable	violence	throughout	the	1970s	(Zwerman	and	Steinhoff	2005;	Zwer-
man, Steinhoff, and della Porta 2000). As they were arrested and accused of more 
serious	crimes	of	violence,	these	suspects	also	called	upon	the	Kyūen	system	for	
support.	 Some	of	 these	 cases	 involved	 “frame-ups”	 in	which	 innocent	 people	





number of students arrested and tried, I have estimated this number at 25,000 to 
50,000 (Steinhoff 1999a). A much smaller number of volunteers have remained 
active in trial support groups through the 1980s and up to the present, support-
ing New Left defendants who were still in the criminal justice system. In these 
complex,	long-running	cases,	the	trial	support	group	frequently	became	involved	
in civil lawsuits related to the same defendants, including suits over living condi-
tions in unconvicted detention and support group members’ access to the defen-
dants. Some participants had joined a support group because of their personal 
affiliations	with	a	defendant,	while	others	were	ready	to	participate	wherever	they	
were	needed	as	an	expression	of	their	commitment	to	the	movement.	Over	time,	





the SuppoRt SyStem and CRiminal JuStiCe SyStem pRaCtiCeS
The	support	system	developed	by	Kyūen	responded	to	specific	practices	of	 the	
Japanese criminal justice system, which in turn has devised more severe poli-
cies to circumvent the resistance of suspects and defendants who use the support 
system.	This	process	can	best	be	understood	as	a	 sustained	conflict	 interaction	
between the two systems. Over the past three decades the Japanese criminal jus-
tice system has become steadily more punitive and no longer merits its image 
as benign and oriented to rehabilitation. The increasing severity of the criminal 
justice	system	can	be	viewed	as	an	unintended	negative	consequence	of	the	trial	
support system for New Left defendants. Certain criminal justice system prac-
tices	first	escalated	in	response	to	the	activities	of	those	who	participated	in	trial	
support	 as	 a	 social	movement	 activity.	Later,	 those	practices	were	 extended	 to	
ordinary criminal defendants, until today they are routinely applied in a very pu-
nitive and overbearing way to any arrested person who refuses to cooperate fully 
with	the	criminal	justice	system	authorities	and	instead	tries	to	exercise	his	or	her	
legal rights. In the face of this bureaucratic intransigence, participants in the trial 
support	movement	have	been	 incredibly	persistent	 and	creative	 in	finding	new	
ways	to	support	their	particular	prisoners.	Thus,	at	one	level	this	conflict	can	be	
regarded as a long-running continuation of the repression of the New Left move-
ment	in	the	1960s	and	early	1970s;	at	another	level	it	has	led	to	criminal	justice	
system practices that are widely regarded as out of step with international human 
rights	standards	and	that	violate	the	usual	expectations	of	criminal	justice	proce-
dures in democratic states. To anyone who is not familiar with these contemporary 
Japanese practices, they are shocking.
Emergency Support for Arrested Persons
As described in the introduction to this volume, the Japanese criminal justice 
system is heavily oriented to confession, although the confession must be cor-
roborated with other evidence in order to obtain a conviction (Foote 1995). Mi-
yazawa	(1992)	describes	the	system	as	“enabling”	for	police,	since	they	may	hold	
a	suspect	in	a	police	station	“substitute	jail”	(daiyo kangoku) for up to three weeks 
of interrogation, with no lawyer present and no outside contact, in order to induce 
the	suspect	 to	confess.	The	first	element	of	Kyūen’s	support	strategy	 is	 thus	 to	
try to keep the arrested person from succumbing to police pressure to confess, 
primarily	by	exercising	 the	 right	 to	 remain	silent	during	 the	 interrogation.	Un-
fortunately, this strategy also virtually guarantees that the suspect will be held in 
jail for further interrogation. This form of support is triggered when an arrested 
suspect	identifies	the	Kyūen	official	lawyer	as	his	or	her	legal	counsel.	Arrested	
persons are not allowed to make their own phone calls, so they give a phone num-
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ber to the police, who make the call for them. During the peak of the protests, tens 
of	thousands	of	students	memorized	the	mnemonic	for	the	Kyūen	hotline	number,	
Goku iri, imi ōi (going to jail has much meaning) or 591-1301, and a surpris-
ing number of people from that generation can still reproduce the number today. 
Kyūen	then	sends	a	lawyer	to	the	police	jail	to	inform	the	person	of	his	rights	and	
how to protect them, and to collect basic information. 
During	the	peak	protest	period	Kyūen	developed	a	system	of	volunteers	as-
signed	 to	 particular	 local	 police	 stations.	Kyūen	would	 call	 a	 volunteer,	who	
would then go to the police station and deliver basic supplies to the prisoner, who 
would	be	identified	only	by	a	booking	number	because	he	or	she	would	be	refus-
ing	to	talk.	In	this	way,	Kyūen	could	meet	the	arrestee’s	initial	needs	for	clean	
clothing, personal supplies, and supplemental food, all of which an unindicted 
suspect is entitled to receive from outside, but which can be manipulated by the 
police during the interrogation period if the person does not have strong outside 
support.
Trial Support and Support during Unconvicted Detention
Once the person has been indicted, with or without a confession, a team of law-
yers is designated for the case, and a trial support group is formed from fam-
ily	members,	friends,	and	other	volunteers,	often	including	“regulars”	associated	
with	Kyūen,	who	have	the	skills	to	organize	and	sustain	a	support	group.	All	kinds	
of people participate in these groups as volunteers, for a wide variety of personal 
reasons. They include students, professors, housewives, retirees, and persons who 
work	flexible	hours	and	are	available	to	attend	court	sessions	or	visit	prisoners	
during the day, while others may only be able to contribute time in the evenings 
and on weekends. This group assists the lawyers with paralegal, investigative and 
secretarial support, provides personal support to the defendant for the duration of 
the trial and appeals, and publishes informational materials about the case, usually 
in the form of a regular newsletter. Political cases often involve multiple defen-
dants, and a single support group normally supports all or most of the defendants 
in one case. Support group members meet each other during the monthly trial 
sessions, chat and share snacks during the breaks, and often hold a short meet-
ing with the lawyers after the session adjourns. They may also hold other private 
organizational	meetings	and	host	public	events,	just	as	any	social	movement	or-
ganization	would.
New Left defendants who do not confess and do not accept the prosecu-
tion’s statement of the case as presented in the indictment are invariably held 
in unconvicted detention (miketsu shobun) rather than being released on bail to 




were usually released as soon as the trial began, nowadays even for minor charges 
they are usually held until the prosecution has completed its case, and more often 
than not until the trial is completed and the sentence determined. Defense lawyers 
routinely and repeatedly seek to have their clients released on bail, but the pros-
ecution always objects and the court goes along with the prosecutors. The reasons 




sentence permitted for the charges.
Japanese trials are not continuous, and usually meet for one or two half-day 
sessions a month. A trial in which the defendant contests the prosecution’s case 
is likely to last from several months to several years, and even longer if the ini-
tial decision is appealed. Political offenders who have mounted a strong defense 
routinely appeal any decision that includes a prison sentence, because doing so 
maintains the small communications privileges of being held in unconvicted de-
tention. Technically, Japanese courts regard the appeals process as part of the de-
termination of whether the person is guilty, so defendants who appeal continue to 
be held in unconvicted detention during the appeal, but that time counts as part of 
the	final	sentence.	Although	it	is	incomprehensible	by	American	standards,	these	
individuals	spend	extended	periods	of	time—often	years	or	even	decades—in	un-
convicted detention under very harsh conditions. The personal attention provided 
by support group members is essential to the prisoner’s survival during this long 
period of isolation.
Persons in unconvicted detention are held in a special prison for this purpose, 
but since they have not yet been convicted of any crime, they enjoy some privi-
leges that convicted felons serving sentences in regular prisons do not have. They 
are held day and night in solid walled isolation cells and let out of the cell only for 
a	short	period	of	exercise	or	a	bath	once	or	twice	a	week.	Meals	are	delivered	to	
their cells through a small slot in the steel door. They are not supposed to speak to 
other	prisoners	(ostensibly	to	keep	first-time	offenders	from	being	contaminated	
by hardened criminals), but they wear their own clothing and are permitted to 
receive sashi-ire (items sent in from outside). Sashi-ire may include books, maga-
zines,	and	clothing,	as	well	as	food	and	flowers	purchased	from	special	stores	in	
or near the prison. If they have money, the prisoners may purchase items from 
these stores themselves. Since persons in unconvicted detention do not perform 
prison work and thus have no regular source of income, they are also dependent 
on the support group’s donations in order to purchase small items such as stamps, 
postcards, and packaged food items from the prison store. There is a strict limit 
on how many items of clothing and bedding a prisoner may keep in the cell, and 
there is no facility for doing laundry inside the prison, other than washing small 
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items by hand in the cell’s washbasin. Support group members help with the sea-
sonal	exchange	of	clothing,	and	frequently	take	out	the	prisoner’s	dirty	laundry	
and return it clean. They may also provide new clothing for long-term residents. 
Under normal circumstances, prisoners held in unconvicted detention are 
permitted one twenty minute visit per day and may send and receive letters and 
telegrams through the regular postal service, although both incoming and outgoing 
mail passes through a censor. Support groups try to maintain as much communica-
tion as possible to keep up the defendant’s spirits during the trial and to prevent 
or alleviate detention disease (kōkin-byō),	a	recognized	syndrome	of	mental	and	
physical symptoms brought on by the prolonged and severe isolation of uncon-
victed detention. For some prisoners, however, the isolation is even more severe. 
While	it	 is	fairly	routine	for	police	and	prosecutors	to	obtain	a	court	order	
restricting a suspect’s communications (sekken kinshi) during the initial phase of 
the interrogation prior to indictment, in certain cases from as early as 1970, and 
routinely since the late 1980s, political defendants have been held incommuni-
cado until midway through their trial when the prosecution has completed the 
presentation of its case. The ostensible rationale for such a prolonged restriction 
of communications is to prevent the defendant from interfering with witnesses or 
destroying	evidence,	 the	 same	 justifications	used	 for	denying	prisoners	 release	
on bail. In addition to restricting the defendant’s legitimate efforts to assist in his 
own defense, this puts additional pressure on anyone who resists the prosecution’s 
version of the case. These conditions for persons not yet convicted of a crime are 










the prison fears that this severe isolation increases the risk that the prisoner will 
commit suicide, persons being held incommunicado in unconvicted detention are 
placed in special suicide watch cells that are smaller than ordinary isolation cells, 
with sealed windows, and are monitored 24 hours a day by a security camera. 
During the period of communications restrictions the support group members 
cannot visit the prisoner in unconvicted detention or communicate by mail, but 
can usually send in sashi-ire	 items	such	as	flowers	and	food	to	let	 the	prisoner	
know that people outside are still paying attention. All communications with 
the prisoner must take place through the lawyers, whose visits to prisoners in 
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unconvicted detention cannot be prohibited even when other communications are 
barred.
Persons Awaiting the Death Penalty
Persons	whose	 death	 sentence	 has	 been	 confirmed	by	 the	Supreme	Court	 also	
continue to be held in the special prisons for persons in unconvicted detention, 
often on the same corridor. Until the mid-1980s they were treated essentially as 
persons in unconvicted detention, but since then they have been kept under severe 
communications restrictions that amount to permanent and total incommunicado 
status,	except	for	designated	family	members	who	are	permitted	to	visit,	write,	
and send in some sashi-ire. The new restrictions on prisoners awaiting the death 
penalty were instituted shortly after several persons who had received death pen-
alty sentences for ordinary criminal offenses won new trials after many years and 
were	subsequently	found	not	guilty.	These	persons	were	convicted	of	nonpolitical	
criminal offenses but had attracted support groups through their tireless insistence 
on	their	innocence	and	the	presence	of	serious	questions	regarding	the	evidence	
used	to	convict	them	(Foote	1992;	Foote	1993).	Perhaps	coincidentally,	the	new	
restrictions also were put in place shortly before the death sentences were con-
firmed	for	four	prominent	New	Left	political	defendants	who	already	had	active	
support groups. 
The formal rationale for the restrictions, as set forth in a 1963 administrative 
order that was not enforced until twenty years later, is that prisoners awaiting the 
death	penalty	are	supposed	to	be	“calming	their	spirits”	in	preparation	for	death.	
But	 because	 the	 severe	 isolation	 causes	other	 psychological	 effects,	 the	prison	
also puts them in suicide watch cells. Normally the death penalty is not carried 
out while any legal proceedings are pending. Since a variety of civil suits and peti-
tions	for	a	new	trial	may	still	be	filed,	prisoners	may	remain	in	this	status	for	many	
years awaiting the death penalty in near-total isolation. They become increasingly 
withdrawn and angry, sometimes taking out their frustration against the family 
members who provide their only contact with the outside world.
Support for Civil Actions 
The	support	system	devised	by	Kyūen	was	designed	to	address	conditions	in	the	
Japanese criminal justice system that affected arrested social movement activ-
ists, and participating in support groups also became a form of social movement 
activity. As the protest wave receded, New Left activists moved into a wide range 
of new social movements, including the women’s movement, antipollution move-
ments, the antinuclear movement, minority rights movements, and consumer 
movements.	Kurita	(1993)	has	shown	that	the	generation	of	Japanese	who	were	
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students during the protest wave of the late 1960s and early 1970s still maintains 
a distinctive attitude toward politics and society, and that those who protested as 
students have remained much more involved in social and political movements 
subsequently.	A	significant	subset	of	that	activist	generation	had	personal	experi-
ence not only of participating in protest activities, but also of involvement in trial 
support groups for arrested students. 
In	addition	to	 the	more	general	organizational,	publishing,	and	fundraising	
skills they learned through participation in an active student protest movement, 
support	 group	participants	 acquired	 specific	 skills	 and	 attitudes	 that	 reflect	 the	
intertwined components of legal support and personal support. New Left support 
group participants developed a detailed understanding of how the Japanese legal 
system and the criminal justice bureaucracies work in practice. One aspect of this 
is	an	understanding	of	legal	procedures	and	how	to	utilize	them	to	achieve	small	
gains through patience and persistence. Another is an acute awareness of the dif-
ficulties	faced	by	any	individual	in	Japan	who	wants	to	insist	on	his	or	her	rights,	
or wants to reverse arbitrary bureaucratic decisions. In addition, people with this 
experience	are	not	afraid	of	using	the	legal	system	and	confronting	the	bureaucra-
cy to right an injustice, even as they understand the pressures in Japanese society 
that	prevent	others	from	doing	so	easily.	Their	expertise,	their	tenacity,	and	their	
fearlessness are all resources they can contribute to various social movements, 
by providing the direct personal and legal support that enables the victim of an 
injustice to pursue some form of redress. 
These skills have been applied to a wide range of civil lawsuits and adminis-
trative procedures, as a form of social movement activity aimed at bringing about 
social change. Support groups assist the plaintiffs in a civil lawsuit, or help press 
claims against employers, corporations, or government agencies through admin-
istrative procedures. This broad category of support group activity encompasses 
preexisting	social	movement	organizations	that	turn	to	the	courts	and	administra-
tive	proceedings	to	pursue	their	collective	goals,	social	movement	organizations	
that solicit potential legal cases through hotlines or other channels and then de-
velop and support the cases, support groups initiated by advocacy lawyers to help 
them pursue certain kinds of cases, and support groups that pursue civil lawsuits 
arising out of what are initially criminal cases. 
My research concentrates on support groups and the criminal justice sys-
tem;	however,	the	support	provided	to	the	East	Asia	Anti-Japanese	Armed	Front	
bombing group illustrates both criminal and civil support group activity over 
more	than	thirty	years.	We	now	turn	to	examine	the	network	of	support	groups	
that have worked with and for the small underground group. This account has 






material published in the newspaper Kyūen and the journal Impaction.
pRovidinG SuppoRt foR the hanniChi BomBeRS
After the main wave of New Left protest had subsided in the early 1970s, a few 
small groups went underground to begin new campaigns of clandestine violence. 
In	1974	and	1975	a	previously	unknown	group	called	the	East	Asia	Anti-Japanese	
Armed	Front	(Higashi	Asia	Hannichi	Busō	Sensen,	nicknamed	Hannichi)	claimed	
credit for a series of bombings. Their targets were companies that had been im-
plicated	in	the	Japanese	mistreatment	of	Asian	laborers	during	the	Second	World	
War.	Most	of	the	bombings	took	place	at	night	when	the	company	site	was	unoc-
cupied. In the most devastating incident, two time bombs left in a shopping bag 
at	 the	entrance	of	Mitsubishi	Heavy	Industries	headquarters	 in	 the	Marunouchi	
district	of	Tokyo	exploded	during	the	lunch	hour,	raining	glass	shards	down	on	the	
narrow	street	crowded	with	people	going	to	lunch.	Eight	people	were	killed	and	
over two hundred injured. As the bombings continued and police were unable to 
find	the	perpetrators,	they	became	the	object	of	a	massive	nationwide	search	and	
were arguably the most feared and hated persons in Japan.
None of the members were known to the police, because prior to beginning 
their underground bombing campaign they had done little more than participate in 
the	Zenkyōtō	movement	on	their	own	university	campuses	and	in	other	fairly	in-
nocuous	protest	movements.	The	central	figures	had	come	together	as	a	study	group	
interested in Japan’s colonial and wartime behavior in Asia and its treatment of 
internal minorities, turning to direct action only after most other groups had given 
it	up.	Their	approach,	developed	as	a	direct	critique	of	the	Red	Army’s	flamboy-
ant public style, was to keep their regular jobs and carry on ordinary lives, while 
secretly carrying out a symbolic bombing campaign against the Japanese compa-
nies whose wartime activities they had researched. They were almost completely 
unknown even within the New Left, since their writings were limited to cryptic 
communiqués	issued	after	their	bombing	attacks	and	a	small	pamphlet	series	called	
Hara Hara Tokei (The Ticking Clock). The second issue of the pamphlet series was 
a bomb manual and how-to book on conducting clandestine revolutionary activity 
that invited others to form their own underground cells. It was not widely circulated, 
and possessing a copy was cause for arrest in the tense mid-1970s.
Believing	they	were	the	only	active	revolutionaries	left	in	Japan,	they	viewed	
arrest nihilistically as the death of their revolutionary movement, and they car-
ried cyanide capsules so they could commit suicide when the police caught up 
with them. As fringe participants in the protest movements of the time, they were 
aware	of	the	Kyūen	support	system	but	did	not	think	it	was	relevant	to	their	situ-
ation. They never imagined that they would be captured alive and would have to 
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stand trial for their bombing campaign, or that they could continue to resist the 
state	after	they	were	arrested.	When	the	police	did	arrest	nearly	all	of	them	in	a	
coordinated sweep on 19 May 1975, only one member was able to swallow his 
cyanide before the police discovered and removed the capsules.
Activating the Support Network 









heavy mass media and police pressure on everyone remotely connected to the 
case, the support group’s public statements carefully noted that they did not sup-
port Hannichi’s policies and actions, but were providing support to the defendants 
as	a	form	of	resistance	against	state	oppression.	The	expression	they	used,	Nittei 
no chian dan’atsu ni taisuru tatakai,	literally	“the	fight	against	imperial	Japan’s	
oppression	of	public	peace,”	evokes	strong	connections	to	prewar	Japan	and	the	
Peace	Preservation	Law	(Chian	Iji	Hō)	(Kyūen	#75,	p.	3).	It	took	a	great	deal	of	
courage and commitment even to participate in the support group in the face of 
strong public hostility toward the defendants that carried over to anyone who ap-
peared sympathetic to them.  
Meanwhile, the Hannichi defendants were held completely incommunicado 
in police station jails and interrogated daily for long periods, while being rear-
rested and indicted several times on new charges. The initial arrest warrants were 
for their most recent bombing and included charges of destruction of a building 
and	violation	of	the	Explosives	Control	Law	(Bakuhatsubutsu	Torishimari	Hō),	a	
Meiji era (1868–1911) statute originally directed against anarchists, which carries 
the death penalty. The group was composed of three different cells that some-
times acted independently. As more evidence was developed, the charges were 
expanded	 to	 cover	 the	whole	 bombing	 campaign.	Murder	 charges	were	 added	
for some defendants as a result of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries bombing, and 
attempted murder for other defendants in connection with a different bombing in 
which a watchman was injured. However, they were all potentially liable for the 
death	penalty	from	the	outset	under	the	Explosives	Control	Law.	
They were eventually moved to Tokyo House of Detention, where they con-
tinued to be held in unconvicted detention, incommunicado and in suicide watch 
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cells. Although some members had talked to interrogators immediately after their 
arrest,	they	proved	to	be	quick	studies	in	the	art	of	prison	resistance.	The	three	
women in the group in particular established a reputation for militant resistance. 
Their	hunger	 strikes,	 refusal	 to	 comply	with	prison	 regulations,	 and	 loud	defi-
ance (a violation of the rule of silence maintained within the prison) aroused so 
much internal support among other women prisoners that they were eventually 
transferred	out	of	 the	women’s	section	of	 the	prison	and	onto	a	vacant	floor	of	
the	men’s	quarters	to	isolate	them.	The	defendants	remained	in	incommunicado	
status for two years and three months, allowed only limited communication with 
their	lawyers.	Even	after	the	communications	ban	was	formally	lifted	by	the	court,	
they were not permitted to have regular visiting privileges because they remained 
under nearly continuous punishment restrictions for their resistance to prison au-
thority and regulations. 
Most remarkable was the resistance of a woman named Arai Mariko, who 
had simply been a friend of some of the other defendants and had not participated 
in	any	of	the	bombings,	although	she	may	have	shared	her	expertise	as	a	pharma-
cist. She was also the younger sister of a woman who had been very marginally 
involved in the group, and who committed suicide shortly after the other members 
were arrested. Their parents became central members of the support group and 
helped sustain the other parents.
Since the defendants were being held incommunicado, there was little that 
a	support	group	could	do	for	them	except	help	the	lawyers	and	send	in	flowers.	
They did not publish a regular support group newsletter, but supporters attended 
the	trial	sessions	and	sometimes	participated	in	trial	disruptions.	Both	the	events	
in court and the defendants’ resistance in prison were reported regularly in the 
Kyūen	newspaper.	The	support	group	also	published	several	pamphlets	contain-
ing legal documents and other communications that the lawyers had received 
from the defendants. In addition, the defendants received considerable moral 
support from other prisoners who were involved in political resistance and had 
organized	an	informal	prisoners’	union	with	assistance	from	supporters	outside,	
by	utilizing	 their	mail	and	visit	privileges.	Just	 three	months	after	 the	arrest	of	
the	Hannichi	bombers,	the	Japanese	Red	Army	staged	a	high	profile	international	
hostage-taking	incident	in	Kuala	Lumpur	and	won	the	release	of	several	prisoners	
from Japanese custody, including one male Hannichi defendant, Sasaki Norio. As 
trial	preparations	began	for	the	remaining	six	Hannichi	defendants,	three	women	
and three men, the court announced that they would be split into three groups to 
stand	trial	separately	based	on	the	specific	charges	against	them,	a	common	court	
tactic at the time for New Left defendants. The lawyers and defendants objected 
and the defendants began a hunger strike, while both lawyers and defendants boy-
cotted	the	split	trial.	The	court	then	relented	and	agreed	to	try	all	six	defendants	
in a single trial.
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Support for Hannichi Broadens
During this period, news leaked out that the time bombs used to such deadly ef-
fect in the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries bombing had actually been recycled and 
re-deployed after a failed attempt to blow up the emperor’s train as it crossed a 
railway bridge. The group had seriously underestimated both the power of the 
bombs and the effect they would have on the glass facade of the high rise building. 
They had made a warning telephone call to get people out of the building, but the 
call	was	not	taken	seriously.	While	these	facts	did	not	mitigate	their	responsibil-
ity	 for	 the	human	 toll	of	 the	explosion,	 they	generated	 some	sympathy	among	




Majesté	giving	special	protection	 to	 the	emperor	were	abolished	 in	1947,	both	
High	Treason	trials	had	also	involved	violation	of	the	same	Explosives	Control	
Law with which the Hannichi defendants were charged. 
There were several more sideshows, legal and otherwise, as the trial went on. 
This account is taken largely from a detailed chronology published in a special 
issue of Impaction	magazine	 (1985)	and	cross-checked	with	articles	 in	Kyūen. 
In March 1976, the defendants and lawyers sued the state for damages because 
the prosecutors had lied to the defendants and slandered their lawyers during the 
investigation.	A	month	later,	the	lawyers	filed	a	complaint	against	two	jailors	for	
having physically tortured and injured Arai Mariko after she was moved into the 
men’s section of the prison. A few months later a lawyer and a court observer 
were given contempt of court sentences for protesting the violent treatment of the 
defendants, and the defendants themselves received several days of punishment 
for	the	same	offense,	whereupon	they	refused	to	attend	the	next	court	session	in	
protest.
 At the end of 1976, the judge announced that he was speeding up the court 
schedule to the unusual pace of four sessions per month. The defendants and 
lawyers	boycotted	the	next	court	session	in	protest.	When	the	judge	enforced	his	
ruling and held court in their absence, the entire legal team resigned, saying they 
could not properly defend their clients under those conditions. After the Tokyo 
Bar	Association’s	committee	in	charge	of	selecting	court-appointed	lawyers	also	
weighed in with the opinion that holding court four times a month was an interfer-
ence with the defendants’ right to legal representation, the judge relented and the 
original legal team returned to duty. Court sessions resumed in late August 1976, 





hijackers was alleged to be Sasaki Norio, the Hannichi member who had been 
released to the Japanese Red Army two years earlier.
The following winter Arai Mariko, the one woman from Hannichi left in 
the men’s section of the prison, was again subjected to violence by guards. This 
incident led to a coordinated campaign in which prisoners at all of the detention 
prisons	in	Japan	sent	official	protests	to	the	Tokyo	prosecutors’	office.	Meanwhile,	
one	of	the	male	defendants,	Kurokawa	Yoshimasa,	began	suffering	severe	asthma	
attacks from spending nearly three years in a dank suicide prevention cell with no 
air circulation, but neither the court nor the prison responded to the lawyers’ pleas 
for medical relief. 
As	the	first	trial	drew	to	an	end	in	1979,	there	were	several	police	searches	
of	the	support	group’s	offices	on	various	pretexts.	Four	people	were	arrested	for	
pasting support group stickers on telephone poles in San’ya, the day laborer dis-
trict	of	Tokyo	where	some	of	the	defendants	had	previously	worked.	By	then	the	
Hannichi case was attracting much broader attention because the prosecution had 
called for the death sentence for the two men involved in the Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries	bombing,	Daidōji	Masashi	and	Kataoka	Toshiaki,	and	a	life	sentence	
for	Kurokawa.	
On the day the decision was to be announced, all other court sessions at To-
kyo District Court were dismissed, and the three judges in the case were placed 
under round the clock VIP security. General security in the vicinity of the court 
was	heavy,	and	everyone	entering	the	court	was	searched,	questioned	individu-
ally,	and	required	to	show	identification.	The	three	male	defendants	received	the	
anticipated sentences, and Arai Mariko received an eight-year prison sentence for 
her	“spiritual	support”	of	the	group.
Providing Support for Prisoners on Death Row
The	severity	of	 the	sentences,	and	particularly	 the	first	death	sentences	handed	
down for political offenses in postwar Japan, aroused even broader support. A 
Christian group began a petition campaign to protest the sentences, and a number 
of	rallies	were	held	as	the	defendants	prepared	to	appeal.	By	early	1981,	several	
church	groups	and	anti-death	penalty	organizations	and	a	number	of	prominent	
intellectuals had joined the original support group, which was reconstituted as an 
association	of	support	groups	with	a	very	long	name,	Higashi	Asia	Hannichi	Busō	
Sensen	e	no	Shikei,	Jūkei	Kōgi	Funsai,	Kōsō	Shin	o	Tatakau	Shien	Renraku	Kaigi	
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cal groups carrying out semi-independent activities that are loosely coordinated 
by	Kyūen. During the two appeal trials, Shienren conducted a continuing series 
of	 public	 lectures	 and	 discussion	 sessions	 that	 attracted	 quite	 large	 audiences.	
Shienren remains active to this day, publishing a monthly newsletter called Shien-
ren Nyūsu, managing a variety of support activities on behalf of the Hannichi 
prisoners, working for new trials for three of them, and maintaining a website. 
Shienren	organizes	several	public	meetings	each	year	and	is	financially	solvent.	
Its	members	are	also	involved	in	other	social	movement	organizations	pursuing	
related issues, including the anti-death penalty movement.
During the early 1980s, while their sentences were being appealed and the 
defendants remained in unconvicted detention, they could receive visitors and 
also	began	writing	books	about	 their	 life	experiences	and	their	 ideas.	They	be-
came	minor	celebrities	in	the	left,	attracting	supporters	for	their	personal	qualities	
as	well	as	 their	political	 ideas.	While	 their	 lawyers	and	supporters	 fought	hard	
to have their sentences reduced, no one had any illusions that it would actually 
happen. However, since codefendants of the two people with death sentences re-
mained	at	large	in	exile,	with	their	trials	incomplete,	the	general	assumption	of	
lawyers and supporters has been that the death sentences would not be carried out 
for some time. In anticipation of the severe isolation they would face once the 
death	sentences	had	been	confirmed	by	the	Supreme	Court,	the	two	death	penalty	
defendants	and	their	supporters	began	making	arrangements	to	maintain	external	
contact and support. The measures they took illustrate the lengths to which Japa-
nese	support	group	members	go	to	provide	personal	support	for	“their”	prisoners.	
Since only immediate family members can maintain contact with prisoners await-
ing the death sentence, their strategy was to create family relationships, primarily 
by marriage and by using the Japanese practice of family adoption. Since both 
marriage	and	adoption	are	formalized	legally	in	Japan	by	entering	the	name	of	the	
new member into a person’s family register and removing it from its former loca-
tion in a different family register, this can be done even when a person is in prison, 
if other family members agree to change the family registers involved. 
Initially,	Kataoka	Toshiaki	married	a	woman	supporter.	His	elderly	parents	
were unable to visit him, so with the cooperation of his parents, another older 
woman supporter named Masunaga adopted him into her family as her son. The 
adoption was carried out with the full support of Mrs. Masunaga’s own daughter, 
who was also an active member of his support group, and her grandson. After 
Kataoka’s	death	sentence	was	confirmed,	all	four	(the	wife,	the	adoptive	mother	
and her daughter and grandson) applied for visitation rights as family members. 
The prison, well aware that all of them were highly political supporters, rejected 
all four.




originally a codefendant in the case, was released to the Japanese Red Army in a 
hostage	exchange	in	1977.	Since	she	remains	in	exile,	he	cannot	marry	another	




in order to be able to visit him regularly. 
Initially,	the	prison	certified	Daidōji’s	mother	as	a	family	visitor	but	refused	
to	recognize	any	of	the	three	legally	adopted	sisters.	The	one	who	had	moved	to	




but the prison only permits her to write letters and to visit him twice a month, rather 
than the daily visits that family members are normally allowed. She has legally 
taken his family name and is known by it in the Tokyo support group, where she 
has been an active member. She puts out a newsletter based on the letters he sends 
out, which are written with that public purpose in mind. In 2004 Daidoji’s mother 
died,	so	this	woman	and	a	cousin	who	was	later	certified	became	his	only	regular	
link	to	the	outside	world	until	the	relaxation	of	the	restrictions	on	death	row	visitors	
in late 2009. However, other members of his wide support network handle his legal 
and	financial	affairs	and	are	pursuing	the	possibility	of	a	new	trial.
Forced	to	choose	only	one	of	his	four	family	members,	Kataoka	chose	the	
wife, but after some years the relationship weakened and she divorced him. The 
prison initially rejected the petition of his adoptive mother Mrs. Masunaga and 
her family to visit him but allowed him to correspond with his natural parents. 
With	 their	cooperation,	 the	adoptive	 family	puts	out	a	newsletter	based	on	 let-
ters he sends to his parents. His adoptive mother, Mrs. Masunaga, continues to 
be an active support group member who is always introduced as his mother at 
public functions. In support group circles and publications the prisoner is known 
by his adoptive family’s name, Masunaga Toshiaki, although the court and prison 
continue	 to	use	his	original	name,	Kataoka.	After	 the	prisoner’s	wife	divorced	
him, the Masunaga family sued the prison to obtain visiting rights. The prison 
permitted Mrs. Masunaga to have restricted rights, but denied the other members 
of the adoptive family. However, in 2007 after several years of petitioning, Mrs. 
Masunaga’s daughter was allowed to take over the visits because of her mother’s 
advancing age and residence far from Tokyo. 
All	of	these	family	adoptions,	as	well	as	Kataoka’s	marriage,	were	carried	out	
by	members	of	the	support	group	explicitly	in	order	to	provide	continuing	support	
to a prisoner awaiting the death penalty, and they entail no traditional obligations 
to other family members. Although they are legal adoptions under the Japanese 









trial	 for	 the	Hannichi	bombings	picked	up	where	 it	 had	 left	 off.	Ekita’s	 return	
posed an unusual problem because although she had originally been a member 
of Hannichi, after her release in 1977 she had become a member of the Japanese 
Red	Army	in	exile.	She	was	therefore	a	candidate	for	support	also	from	a	separate	
support group that was formed in the late 1980s to handle assistance for a series 
of persons who were on international wanted lists because of their connections 
to	 the	Japanese	Red	Army	in	 the	Middle	East	but	who	had	been	arrested	upon	
re-entering the country (usually after being found abroad and deported to Japan 
under	guard	by	Japanese	officials).	This	group,	Kikokusha	no	Saiban	o	Kangaeru	
Kai	(Organization	to	Consider	the	Trials	of	Returnees	to	Japan)	and	nicknamed	
Kikokusha,	put	out	a	newsletter	called	Za Pasupōto (The Passport). 
The	 two	 support	 groups	met	 and	 agreed	 to	 handle	Ekita’s	 support	 jointly.	
They	formed	a	new	group	nicknamed	Yuki	Q,	which	put	out	a	separate	newsletter	
called Yuki Rin Rin.	However,	news	of	Ekita’s	trial	and	her	letters	from	jail	were	




Once her visitor privileges were restored, she was visited nearly every day by a 
support group member until she began serving her twenty-year prison sentence in 
2004.	As	is	customary,	a	member	of	the	support	group	handled	Ekita’s	visit	cal-
endar	to	ensure	that	someone	went	to	see	her	every	day	except	when	her	lawyers	
were scheduled to visit, and that supporters did not make the trip out to the prison 
only	to	find	that	they	could	not	see	her	because	someone	else	had	already	taken	
her one visit for the day. The support groups continue to publish her letters from 
prison in their newsletters. 
An even larger problem for this little cluster of support groups arose in 1996, 
when	another	 Japanese	Red	Army	member,	Yoshimura	Kazue,	was	 arrested	 in	
Peru and immediately deported to Japan. It turned out that she had been rais-
ing	Ekita’s	fourteen-year-old	son	in	Peru	under	an	assumed	name.	He	had	been	




members, who had been born and raised overseas in unusual circumstances, the 
boy	was	stateless.	However,	he	had	a	claim	to	Japanese	citizenship	if	his	parent-
age	could	be	established.	Kyūen	Renraku	Sentā	 staff	 and	 the	 lawyers	 for	both	
women worked with the Japanese Foreign Ministry to obtain temporary papers 
for the boy and bring him to Japan, while the combined support groups tried 
to	figure	out	what	to	do	after	he	arrived—and	how	to	pay	for	it.	Since	both	his	










and	Masunaga	are	 technically	Ekita’s	 codefendants,	 they	could	 legitimately	be	
called	as	witnesses	in	her	trial,	and	the	lawyer	wanted	to	capitalize	on	this	situa-
tion to test the prison’s regulations. As it turned out, the prosecution called the two 
men as witnesses in the fall of 1998, but when the judge ordered them to appear in 
court, the prison refused to allow them to leave the prison and offered instead to 
hold closed sessions of the trial at the prison. The prosecution then advanced the 
prison’s	arguments	that	it	was	too	dangerous	to	let	Daidōji	travel	to	Tokyo	District	
Court because he had an active support group involved in the anti-death penalty 
movement that might cause court disruptions, the Japanese Red Army might kid-
nap him on his way to and from court, and allowing him to appear in court would 
disturb	his	spiritual	preparation	for	death.	Ekita’s	lawyer	argued	that	closing	the	
trial sessions was a violation of Article 82 of the Constitution, which mandates 
that	in	political	cases	there	is	an	absolute	requirement	for	trials	to	be	held	in	open	
court,	and	that	the	usual	exceptions	do	not	apply.	
The judge ruled in the prosecution and the prison’s favor, with the noncom-
mittal observation that closing individual sessions did not constitute closing the 
trial.	Ekita’s	lawyer	immediately	appealed	directly	to	the	Supreme	Court	for	a	rul-






mony in their original trial had been limited by the departure of three of the code-
fendants.	Ekita	wrote	about	these	closed	trial	sessions	in	her	letters	to	the	news-
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letters, where they served not only as accounts of her own trial, but as reports to 
the support groups on the current condition of the two isolated men on death row. 
Innovative Efforts to Reduce Isolation of Death Row Inmates 
In	addition	to	this	attempt	to	utilize	Ekita’s	trial	to	crack	the	wall	of	silence	sur-
rounding prisoners awaiting the death penalty, their supporters have used other 
inventive tactics to maintain contact. Since Shienren is actually a loose confedera-
tion of several groups with an interest in supporting the case, different groups of 
people have pursued various tactics independently. These separate activities are 






ments and get his signature on them, but they would not permit the support group 
member to attend these meetings.
The most ambitious of these efforts to contest the isolation of persons await-
ing the death sentence is a series of civil lawsuits known as the T-shirt trials. 
Shortly	before	the	two	death	sentences	for	Daidōji	and	Masunaga	were	upheld	by	
the Supreme Court, when the prisoners were still entitled to receive sashi-ire from 
anyone,	a	group	of	supporters	 in	a	Kyushu	group	called	Umi	no	Kai	 (The	Sea	
Club)	sent	Daidōji	and	Masunaga	a	small	amount	of	cash,	two	small	handmade	
dolls embroidered with their names, and white T-shirts on which they had signed 
their names and written messages of support. Tokyo House of Detention rejected 
the sashi-ire	gifts	and	sent	them	back	to	the	supporters,	whereupon	Umi	no	Kai	





sophisticated group of supporters wanted to challenge the prison’s authority to 
prohibit the prisoners from speaking on their own behalf in such lawsuits. They 
therefore	filed	a	suit	in	which	they	and	the	prisoners	were	co-plaintiffs,	and	they	
insisted	on	trying	the	case	themselves	without	benefit	of	legal	counsel.	Their	strat-
egy was intended both to highlight the fact that prisoners awaiting the death pen-
alty were not being permitted by the prison authorities to communicate directly 
with the court in their own lawsuits, and to create a situation in which the support-
ers, as co-plaintiffs acting without formal legal counsel, would have to be allowed 
to communicate with their co-plaintiffs in prison. 
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After considerable effort, they were able to persuade a sympathetic judge 
in	Kyushu	District	Court	to	let	them	try	the	case	without	a	lawyer.	The	judge’s	
sympathy was reinforced by the prison’s intransigent refusal to obey the judge’s 
orders to permit a court session to be held inside the prison for a civil case, even 
after direct mediation from the Justice Ministry in Tokyo. Under the judge’s or-
ders,	 arrangements	were	finally	made	 for	 court	 documents	 and	other	materials	
concerning the trial to be transferred back and forth between the co-plaintiffs as 
long	as	 they	went	 through	 the	Kyushu	District	Court.	 In	defending	against	 the	
suit, the prison and state argued that receiving the sashi-ire items would disrupt 
the prisoners’ spiritual preparation for death, and also that the supporters had sent 
in	 the	money	for	 the	purpose	of	filing	a	political	 lawsuit.	By	 the	 time	the	case	
was concluded, the original judge had moved on to a different post and was not 
involved in writing the decision, but his successor found partially in the plaintiffs’ 
favor, ruling that it was illegal for the prison to prohibit gifts of money sent in to 
prisoners and awarding the plaintiffs the token sum of ¥3,000 each (about $30 at 
the time). 
The state, on behalf of the prison, immediately appealed the decision, largely 
reiterating its original arguments about the special status of persons awaiting the 
death penalty and the political purpose of the senders of the rejected money. Ironi-
cally,	the	same	judge	who	originally	allowed	the	Kyushu	support	group	to	pursue	
their	lawsuit	as	co-plaintiffs	without	a	lawyer	had	returned	to	the	Kyushu	High	
Court and presided over the appeal, which was legal because he had not been 
involved in the initial trial decision. In addition to reiterating their earlier argu-
ments,	the	Umi	no	Kai	plaintiffs	brought	in	a	law	professor	to	testify	that	the	se-
vere Japanese restrictions on persons awaiting the death sentence were a violation 
of the International Covenant on Human Rights that the Japanese government had 
signed	and	was	therefore	required	to	uphold	under	international	law,	an	argument	
that was also being made in other cases at the time. 
The appeal decision handed down in December 1999 upheld the original de-
cision in favor of the plaintiffs, but in even stronger language (Kyūen #369, p. 3). 
It rejected the state’s argument that the special status of prisoners awaiting the 
death penalty conferred on the prison the absolute authority to restrict their con-
tacts	with	the	outside,	noting	that	such	restrictions	could	not	exceed	reasonable	
limits.	It	also	held	quite	firmly	that	it	was	unlawful	for	the	prison	to	restrict	gifts	of	
money to either defendants or prisoners serving sentences (including those await-
ing the death sentence), regardless of the purpose for which the money was sent. 
This	expands	the	outside	contact	of	prisoners	awaiting	the	death	sentence	and	re-
stricts the prison’s ability to reject sashi-ire from politically motivated supporters. 
The only area in which the plaintiffs did not succeed was in their attempt 
to invoke international human rights doctrine. The appeal decision cited a 1999 
Supreme Court decision to the effect that international human rights law did not 
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apply to the rights of people in prison and therefore could not serve as a basis for 
arguing	that	the	prison’s	actions	were	illegal.	Since	in	the	first	decision	the	court	
appeared	to	leave	to	the	prison	officials	themselves	the	final	judgment	of	whether	





second	 lawsuit,	with	 thirty	 co-plaintiffs	 including	Daidōji	 and	Masunaga,	over	
the prison’s rejection of the T-shirts and dolls, the withholding of court docu-
ments, and restrictions on visits to death penalty inmates. That suit, known as the 
Second	T-Shirt	Trial,	concluded	in	2004	with	reconfirmation	of	the	right	to	send	
money into the prison, a partial victory on documents that had been withheld, 
and an award of ¥10,000 to each of the two imprisoned plaintiffs. Twenty-four 
plaintiffs	including	the	two	prisoners	immediately	filed	a	third	T-shirt	lawsuit	over	
the prison’s refusal to hand over other items they had sent in such as stamps and 
newspaper clippings, the restrictions on visits to death penalty inmates, and the 
prison’s refusal to let the outside co-plaintiffs participate in trial sessions held 
within the prison. This suit concluded in 2008 with a decision that small items 
such as stamps could be sent in by anyone to any prisoner, including those await-
ing the death penalty. Shienren immediately began a coordinated campaign of 
sending in sheets of stamps to the prisoners on death row, reporting in the newslet-
ter when the prisoners received them.
Meanwhile, new revised prison regulations went into effect in June 2007 that 
are supposed to broaden the range of persons who are permitted to correspond 
with and visit persons awaiting the death sentence to include nonfamily members 
with legitimate business ([Nagai] Jin 2007). Although the authorities would never 
admit it, it seems highly probable that the vigorous efforts of the Hannichi support 
groups to contest the prison’s restrictions on death row inmates through repeated 
civil lawsuits, along with repeated international criticism, have contributed to the 
change. Initially Tokyo House of Detention dragged its feet on implementing the 
new	 rules,	 except	 to	 reduce	 the	 length	 of	 time	 for	 regular	 visits	 to	 persons	 in	
unconvicted	detention	to	eight	minutes	(later	expanded	to	fifteen	minutes)	on	the	
grounds that they were going to be handling so many more visits. Various groups 
in the trial support and anti-death penalty movements have been monitoring the 
application of the new rules for correspondence and visits with persons serving 








lations of the new rules. They learned that application of the rules was being left 
to the discretion of the administration at each prison, and that Tokyo House of De-
tention	was	limiting	requests	for	visits	to	three	persons	per	prisoner	awaiting	the	
death penalty, on the old grounds that visits would disturb the prisoners’ spiritual 
preparations for death. Then, in October 2009 the prison suddenly lifted all limits 
on the number of people who could apply for permission to visit persons await-
ing the death penalty. Shienren responded with a new campaign for its members 
to seek permission to visit the two prisoners on death row. Forty supporters and 
old friends immediately applied to visit Daidoji, and thirty-two applied to visit 
Masunaga. Only two of the seventy-two persons were given permission for visits, 
one for each prisoner, but some of the others received permission to correspond 
with	them.	The	reports	of	the	first	two	visits	to	the	death	row	inmates	after	twenty-
three years of nearly total isolation were published in the January 2010 issue of 




Mitsubishi Heavy Industries bombing, and therefore would also face the possi-
bility of a death sentence if they were returned to Japan and their trials resumed. 
New trials for the two prisoners currently awaiting the death sentence and for a 
third	serving	a	 life	sentence	remain	possible,	albeit	unlikely.	Both	of	 the	death	
penalty prisoners are now suffering from severe, chronic medical conditions, so 
the support groups have turned their attention to getting better medical care for 
prisoners. They continue, however, to seek ways to use the Hannichi case to re-
duce the isolation of all persons awaiting the death penalty. 
the hanniChi CaSe and tRial SuppoRt in ContempoRaRy Japan
This	complex	and	long-running	case	illustrates	the	wide	range	of	functions	per-
formed by trial support groups in Japan as a form of social movement activity. 
At	its	inception	this	was	a	standard	case	for	the	Kyūen	system	of	support,	note-
worthy	only	for	the	extreme	nature	of	the	crimes	and	the	general	public	hostility	
toward the defendants, which made participation in the support group itself an 
act of strong political commitment. The initial small support group did all of the 
standard things support groups do: helped the lawyers, attended trial sessions, 
published reports on the case, and provided personal support to the defendants. 
The	 severity	 of	 the	 sentences	 handed	 down	 in	 the	 first	 trial,	 plus	 greater	
familiarity with the ideas, personalities, and prison behavior of the defendants, 
attracted much broader support for Hannichi in the early 1980s. Through the 
formation of Shienren, support for the Hannichi defendants became part of the 
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anti-death penalty movement and the anti-emperor movement, and more broadly, 
began	to	resonate	with	the	left’s	critique	of	Japan’s	colonial	and	wartime	behavior	
in Asia and the treatment of minorities within Japan. Although these movements 
are small and far removed from the mainstream of Japanese society, they do enjoy 
considerable currency within the left. Shienren itself is widely known in New Left 




political commitment and a form of social movement activity, yet they provide a 
powerful	illustration	of	the	level	of	intimate	personal	support	that	characterizes	
Japanese	trial	support	groups.	By	tracing	the	origins	of	the	Kyūen	support	system	
as a direct response to the routine practices of the Japanese criminal justice sys-





broad array of social movement causes that have nothing to do with the criminal 
justice system but seek to change Japan through legal challenges mounted by 
individuals and small groups, trial support groups have become an essential com-
ponent of social movement activity. Understanding how and why they act as they 
do provides a new perspective on both social movements and the legal system in 
contemporary Japan. In a recent comparative study, Gilda Zwerman and I have 
found	that	quite	similar	forms	of	direct	personal	involvement	also	characterized	
the legal support system for Americans facing criminal charges for their New Left 
political activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s, although there are still varia-
tions	because	of	 the	quite	different	 legal	systems	and	 legal	cultures	of	 the	 two	
countries (Zwerman and Steinhoff 2012)
At an even broader level, the Hannichi political defendants fall within con-
temporary	definitions	of	 terrorists,	although	 their	original	acts	were	committed	
in the 1970s and the term was not applied to them at the time. In both Japan 
and	the	United	States,	the	term	“terrorist”	was	applied	retroactively	to	criminal	
defendants from the New Left in the 1980s (Zwerman and Steinhoff 2012). More-
over, from the perspective of the post-9/11 world, the practices that the Japanese 
criminal justice system applies to such defendants bear striking similarities to 
the	extraordinary	procedures	 the	United	States	has	been	applying	 to	persons	 it	
defines	as	“enemy	combatants.”	Thus,	although	the	Kyūen	trial	support	system	
arose	as	a	response	to	specific	practices	that	the	Japanese	criminal	justice	system	
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Karōshi Activism and Recent Trends in Japanese Civil 
Society: Creating Credible Knowledge and Culture1
Scott North
Karōshi is one concrete manifestation of the many paradoxes born in 
the course of Japan’s abnormal economic growth. Your movement has 
great meaning, for, in considering those paradoxes, it aims to rectify 
the course of Japanese society.
(Mainichi Shinbun reporter Fujita Satoru, in a letter to
Hiraoka Chieko, plaintiff in a karōshi suit, November 16, 1993)
Understanding the social epidemiology of karōshi in Japan, that is, how the or-
ganization of work leads to overwork and the deaths of workers, requires some 
explanation. At the macrolevel it is useful to think along the lines of the French 
sociologist Emile Durkheim (1964), who postulated that increasingly frequent 
social interactions, stemming from the increasingly complex social division of 
labor, will give rise to regulatory law. Properly regulated, complementarity in 
social relations of production results in social solidarity and well-being. In a par-
ticularly well-governed state, the ever-finer grained division of labor might even 
lead to Adam Smith’s “universal opulence.” However, Durkheim also postulated 
that the speed of differentiation of functions could be so great that regulatory law 
would not be able to keep up. In such cases, pathological forms of the division of 
labor may emerge. 
Such was arguably the case during Japan’s era of high-speed economic 
growth. In the postwar rush to catch up with the West, powerful techniques for 
1. The author is grateful to the International Agreements Fund of the University of Hawaii at Manoa 
for a fellowship that supported the initial fieldwork for this study. I also wish to thank the Japan 
Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation’s Berkeley Center for Working Families for fel-
lowship support during the preparation of the article upon which this chapter is based. It was 
published in Japanstudien, Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts für Japanstudien 11 (1999).
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getting the most out of labor and increasing production became diffused through-
out Japanese industries. Microlevel analysis of the work process reveals how man-
agement’s coordinated manipulation of an invented “traditional” family ideology 
emphasized the naturalness of hierarchical rather than horizontal alignments. The 
conflicts that Durkheim’s theory predicts will lead to the development of enforce-
able regulation of the relations between capital and labor were thus suppressed. 
Anti-karōshi activism aims to redress this manifest imbalance of power and 
Japanese workers’ limited access to law. Defendants in criminal trials (Steinhoff), 
consumer groups (Maclachlan), and union members (Turner) share with karōshi 
activists many of the same institutional and practical obstacles to organizing and 
litigating in pursuit of their interests. As in these other cases, karōshi litigants are 
not so much reluctant to litigate as turned away by the difficulties, low rewards, and 
risks of doing so. One problem is plaintiffs’ general ignorance of complex adminis-
trative and legal procedures, including how and where claims can be brought, who 
has legal standing to sue, and who can be sued. Another is a marked predisposition 
to avoid conflict, with a special reluctance to challenge social superordinates; most 
plaintiffs are wives whose social identities are a poor fit with aggressive social 
activism. Third, there is the fear that litigation may damage one’s reputation. This 
is all the more frightening because the consequences may not be immediate or 
flow directly from the issue. Fourth, legal and administrative procedures are often 
vague, opaque, or subjective; disclosure and discovery rules are biased in favor of 
elite insiders and major social actors. Finally, there is the sheer length of admin-
istrative processes and trials and the costs associated with waging legal battles. 
Recent attempts to make trials speedier and more intensive notwithstanding, the in-
frequency and brevity of trial sessions in Japanese courts mean that claimants must 
bear protracted financial and emotional burdens while trials drag on year after year. 
Overcoming these obstacles to litigated solutions requires collective organization, 
as well as an inexhaustible supply of individual resolve and pluck. 
This chapter argues that the long duration and difficulties inherent in fighting 
karōshi cases are, paradoxically, resources that give activists time to make facts 
and spur them to build civic movements that can support the plaintiffs, put pres-
sure on bureaucrats and judges, and change the conventional wisdom of employ-
ers and employees regarding work and health. 
origiNs aNd overview of Karōshi activism
Karōshi, directly rendered in English as death due to overwork, is a term coined 
by Dr. Uehata Tetsunojō (1978, 250). It describes the relationship he observed 
between work environments, stress, and the sudden deaths of Japanese workers. 
Movement activists do not elongate the “ro” of karōshi when using the term in 
English language documents. It is their stated intent to do what they can to have 
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the term become part of the international lexicon (Karōshi Bengōdan Zenkoku 
Renrakukai 1990).2 In a later work, Dr. Uehata (1990, 98) defines karōshi as a 
sociomedical phenomenon characterized by “a permanent disability or death 
brought on by worsening high blood pressure or arteriosclerosis resulting in dis-
eases of the blood vessels in the brain such as cerebral hemorrhage, subarach-
noid hemorrhage and cerebral infarction and acute heart failure and myocardial 
infarction induced by conditions such as ischemic heart disease.” By coining the 
term karōshi and publishing widely on the links between work, stress, and death, 
Dr. Uehata, a specialist in occupational medicine and cardiovascular diseases and 
former head of the Adult Disease Department at the National Institute of Public 
Health, became one of the founding figures of the anti-karōshi movement. 
Similar in organization to the health-related activism concerning pollution-
caused mercury poisoning (Minamata-byō), cadmium poisoning (Itai-itai-byō), 
and PCB poisoning (Kanemi yushō), the anti-karōshi movement originated from 
the combined efforts of professionals in medicine, law, and academia. To a greater 
extent than in these famous environmental pollution cases, labor unions sometimes 
play prominent roles in karōshi cases. However, as in the environmental cases, no 
karōshi movement is possible without victims and their families. In the words of 
economist Morioka Koji (1993), a leading authority on Japanese working hours and 
karōshi, “To create a social problem in Japan, it is necessary to have a death and a 
trial with lawyers. This functions as a refuge (kakekomidera) for other sufferers.”
Karōshi victims come from all walks of life, all classes, and all occupational 
categories. Most victims are men, although a few women have also succumbed. 
Enduring links between work and self-worth in the gender ideology of Japanese 
men make reducing work or taking time off tantamount to diminishing one’s 
masculinity. 
Company size does not predict the frequency of karōshi, nor does employ-
ment in the public sector provide protection. Many teachers, doctors, and nurs-
es have been victims. The lead investigator in the notorious Wakayama Curry 
Incident died during the investigation of that nationally publicized case; his death 
was recognized as karōshi, and his family was awarded compensation. One of 
the overworked Ministry of Labor investigators I interviewed during my research 
made a point of showing me his day planner, in which he carefully noted the num-
ber of hours he worked each day so that his family might have this record to use 
as evidence in the event of his untimely passing. 
Perhaps the most likely candidates for karōshi are middle-aged men from 
crowded metropolitan areas, who must endure long commutes to jobs in companies 
whose fortunes are often determined by sudden and unpredictable market shifts. 
Often they are subject to heavy work quotas, which rob them of occupational 
2. Karoshi (without the macron) was added to the Oxford English Distionary in 2002.
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autonomy and require them to make unstinting efforts. Karōshi risk is greatest 
for those whose work deprives them of adequate sleep and nutrition, starves them 
of psychological satisfaction, and denies them opportunities for physical and 
spiritual renewal. 
Guided by the lawyers of the National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karōshi 
(hereafter Karōshi Bengōdan) and supported by medical and other professionals, 
fellow sufferers, labor activists, and growing numbers of sympathetic citizens, 
the anti-karōshi movement has made some progress in winning relief for victims’ 
families. Based ultimately on constitutional guarantees of equal protection and 
“minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living,” civil litigation and 
administrative lawsuits have proven to be effective tools for persuading the 
Ministry of Labor to revise the standards for recognizing and compensating work-
related illness and death. Because of these revisions, work-induced depression 
and suicides are now compensated, adding to the growing tally.
For example, only about 15 percent of the just over 500 applications for 
karōshi compensation filed in 1995 were approved. These 500 applications rep-
resented only 5 percent of the estimated 10,000 annual cases of karōshi in Japan 
at that time (Kawahito 1991, 150). Press coverage of these victories stimulated 
public attention. In an insurance company poll of 500 Tokyo office workers, 46 
percent responded that karōshi was a possibility for them, with 9 percent saying 
the possibility was high (Keizai Kikaku Chō 1994, 8). 
In contrast, 2006 saw 1,757 claims filed for circulatory disease, death, or 
major depression caused by overwork. That year 560 claims were approved, in-
cluding 66 for suicide or attempted suicide, and 355 for circulatory ailments such 
as stroke and heart disease. Nearly all the recognized claims concerned men (94 
percent). The majority of claims for psychological problems, including suicides, 
concerned men in their thirties. Recognized claims for psychological distress 
caused by work increased 61.4 percent over 2005 (Nikkei Shinbun 2007). Due to 
revisions in the standards for recognizing these claims and the large backlog of 
cases, we can expect to see further increases in the ratio of claims to compensated 
cases in the future. It is clear that the courts and the medical profession, as well as 
the general public, accept karōshi as a cause of death.
But despite the tide of increasing recognition that overwork is bad for health, 
many firms (and workers) remain in purposeful denial about overwork and the toll 
it takes. Attempts to survey corporate attitudes toward karōshi produce very low 
response rates. On the other hand, public awareness has increased. So much so 
that the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare website devoted to overwork was 
overwhelmed and crashed when it first came online in 2003 (Morioka 2005, 2–3).
 Anti-karōshi activism has increased the visibility of the problem, but the 
large and growing number of cases indicates that the movement still has a long 
way to go to reach its two goals of relief for all victims’ families and the elimina-
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tion of working conditions that cause karōshi. Still, in comparison with the United 
States, Japan has a well-articulated and relatively advanced concept of corporate 
responsibility for the relationship between work stress and illness. 
In the United States, workaholism and its attendant diseases are not as clear-
ly linked to inhumane corporate cultures and practices, nor are organized anti-
overwork movements evident. Diana Fassel’s (1990) book, Working Ourselves 
to Death: the High Cost of Workaholism and the Rewards of Recovery, equates 
overwork with addictions like alcohol abuse: an individual affliction, treatable 
through a twelve-step program. Death may be the ultimate result, but she does 
not try to establish epidemiological links or inspire either collective action or 
litigation. To my knowledge, there is no comparable development of a movement 
to name death from overwork, elaborate cause and effect, seek compensation for 
victims, pursue revision of labor laws, or demand corporate responsibility for 
worker exploitation and work illness in the United States. 
Overwork in the United States is not generally seen as symptomatic of cor-
porate malaise or skewed social priorities. Individual bosses, rather than the cor-
porate system, get the blame. A website, bullybusters.org, which gives abused 
employees advice on how to deal with bullying bosses, has been receiving as 
many as 100,000 hit per month, and I have seen advertisements in which recov-
ering workaholics testify to the benefits of counseling. On the other hand, social 
crusaders like Noam Chomsky and Ralph Nader, who, like their anti-karōshi ac-
tivist Japanese counterparts, argue that unaccountable concentrations of corporate 
power are undermining individual freedom, ethics, the environment, and health, 
have been characterized as political extremists. A comparative investigation of 
why an anti-karōshi movement can exist in Japan but not in the United States is a 
tantalizing question for future research.
Karōshi Activism and Japanese Civil Society
The movement’s limited progress toward its distant goal of eradicating karōshi 
notwithstanding, this paper argues that anti-karōshi protest is an example of two 
emergent trends representative of contemporary civil society. The first is common 
to most, if not all, the industrialized democracies. The second may have func-
tional equivalents abroad; however, this paper will be concerned with a specific 
Japanese variant.
Elaborated by sociologist Steven Epstein (1995) and other theorists of “new” 
social movements, the first trend is the development of health-related social 
movements, or disease constituencies, in which diverse lay activists amass varied 
forms of credibility. With this credibility, they are able to take increasingly vis-
ible roles in fact making and the construction of scientific knowledge. Epstein’s 
study of American AIDS activism argues that credibility is a system of political 
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and cultural authority. This authority endows those who exercise it with power 
to “transform[ing] the very definition of what counts as credibility” and, con-
sequently, to provide new moral ground for the organization of group identities 
(Epstein 1995, 409–10 [italics in original]).  
Epstein’s notion of credibility as authority is useful for understanding how 
collective action by lawyers, housewives, unionists, educators, reporters, doctors, 
and union members in karōshi cases has the power to compel Ministry of Labor 
bureaucrats and employers to acknowledge the perspectives of karōshi victims as 
credible knowledge. The central tenet of this knowledge is the necessity of seeing 
the work-stress relationship from the point of view of each worker and his or her 
individual abilities. From this follows new medical knowledge of the relationship 
between work, stress, and disease, new legal doctrines regarding the burden of re-
sponsibility for employee health, and moral claims with far-reaching implications 
for how a humane (ningen rashii) society should be organized.
The second trend, identified by Patricia G. Steinhoff (1999 and elsewhere 
in this volume), is a pattern of voluntary participation in Japanese civil society 
with direct antecedents in the student movement of the 1960s and other, earlier 
criminal trials of people on the Japanese left. According to Steinhoff, this form 
of social movement organization has fairly standardized practices and activities. 
It has been carried into the post-1970s by veterans of those student protests and 
become institutionalized as the vehicle for a variety of social movements that 
support individuals and groups fighting extended legal battles amid the terrific 
pressures of Japan’s conformist cultural system. 
Clearly a descendant of the same lineage, karōshi activism has inherited 
most of these same organizational characteristics. These include the use of hot-
lines, provision of free legal assistance, creation of volunteer support groups 
to help central figures weather lengthy trials, and reliance on litigation to bring 
about changes in social policy. It also displays some of the factionalism and 
conflicts particular to the contest for control of limited resources on the Japanese 
left.
The landmark karōshi case of Mr. Hiraoka Satoru and his family, which is 
described in detail below, illustrates the ways in which karōshi protest is a mani-
festation of the two trends sketched above. It was the first case in the nation re-
cruited through the Karōshi Bengōdan’s “karōshi 110 ban” emergency hotline, 
the first to be explicitly recognized as a case of death due to overwork, and the 
first to pursue corporate responsibility via a civil trial. It adds to our understand-
ing of new institutions of Japanese civil society by illuminating the central role of 
lawyers and other professionals in directing the activities of the lay participants in 
citizens’ movements. Finally, the Hiraoka case serves as an example of how the 
epidemiology of disease is socially constructed. It gives insights into the politics 
of scientific knowledge construction in the contentious arena of labor law and 
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occupational health and reminds us that constitutional “guarantees” depend on an 
informed and active citizenry.
 
The Bureaucratic-Legal Context of Karōshi Struggles 
A brief outline of Japan’s labor and social welfare laws is a necessary prelude 
to understanding why karōshi cases require the support of a social movement. 
The following account is not a comprehensive overview of these laws, but deals 
only with those aspects relevant to karōshi. Since brevity carries the risk of over-
simplification, interested readers may wish to consult additional sources, such 
as Upham (1987), Ueyanagi (1990), Hanami (1985), and Sugeno (1992). The 
Constitution of Japan (Articles 13, 25, and 27) establishes state responsibility 
for worker well-being. Through the Constitution, the state is charged with estab-
lishing laws to promote social welfare and public health, individual rights, and 
standards for wages and working hours. The most important of these laws are the 
Labor Standards Act of 1947 (Rōdō Kijun Hō), the Industrial Safety and Health 
Act of 1972 (Rōdō Anzen Eisei Hō), and a companion law that is the basis of the 
Workers’ Compensation Insurance System (Rōsai Hoken Seidō).
The substance and enforcement provisions of both the Labor Standards Act 
and Industrial Safety and Health Act are weak. Capital and labor are to reach 
agreements regarding working hours, overtime, and work rules in each enterprise. 
These are then reported to the Labor Standards Office holding jurisdiction over 
particular geographic areas. Above them are regional Labor Standards Bureaus 
with even wider jurisdictions. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare in 
Tokyo has ultimate jurisdiction. Both the Labor Standards Office and the Labor 
Standards Bureau are understaffed. Due to heavy case loads, only the most seri-
ous and intentional violations can be investigated. Compliance with the standards 
established by the Labor Standards Act and Industrial Safety and Health Act is 
thus, in effect, voluntary. Furthermore, these standards only apply to firms with 
ten or more workers. Consequently a large minority (between 35 and 42 percent) 
of the private sector work force that works in small enterprises is not protected by 
these laws (Chalmers 1989, 102; Rebick 2005, 107). The Workers’ Compensation 
Insurance System, however, covers all workers. Even if a worker reports a viola-
tion of the Labor Standards Act or Industrial Safety and Health Act to the Labor 
Standards Office, the Labor Standards Office cannot issue an injunction to stop 
illegal labor practices, but must refer the case to the overburdened public prosecu-
tor. In cases where a conviction is obtained, punishment seldom exceeds exhorta-
tions to make greater efforts, or small fines.
In sum, the Labor Standards Act and Industrial Safety and Health Act are 
inadequate to protect workers from abusive employers or dangerous working con-
ditions. The workers themselves must know the law and see that its provisions are 
North
52
carried out. However, in many companies, corporate culture or the pressure of hi-
erarchical relations with supervisors thwart employee initiatives. Unions seldom 
make safety or working hours their top priorities, preferring to concentrate instead 
on job security and wages. The protections of the labor laws are most effective for 
workers in large firms.
When a worker is injured or killed on the job, he or she is eligible for Workers’ 
Compensation Insurance payments. The compensation system is administered by 
the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare through the Labor Standards Office 
and Labor Standards Bureau, which oversee the first two steps of the application 
process. The ministry itself sets the standards for compensation. The basic stan-
dard is a demonstrable cause and effect relationship between work and the death 
or injury of the worker. When this relationship is easily established, the system 
moves quickly to compensate the victim’s immediate family, one of whom must 
file the claim. Unions and other groups may support such claims, but may not file 
them without the participation of the next of kin. Compensation is based on the 
severity of the injury. When a worker dies, compensation is based on salary at 
the time of the incident, the number of dependents, and the ages of any children. 
The average daily wage, exclusive of bonus, for the ninety days prior to death is 
multiplied by a number of days between 175 and 245 to get the basic compensa-
tion. This is paid monthly to the survivors and replaces the Survivor’s Pension 
(only about ¥120,000 per month) awarded by the Welfare Insurance System. To 
this is added a bonus, calculated in similar fashion (about 20 percent of the basic 
compensation). A one-time special payment to survivors of ¥3 million and funeral 
expenses of ¥600,000 complete the compensation package.
When a cause and effect relationship is more difficult to establish, as in 
karōshi cases, simply applying for compensation may take years. Lawyers for 
karōshi victims say this is due to ministerial reluctance to recognize karōshi and 
its implied relationship between work stress and illness. The ministry has ac-
knowledged issuing both public and internal sets of guidelines for determining 
compensation in karōshi cases. Courts have taken a harsh view of that duplicity, 
and the criteria are now freely available on the Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare website. Nevertheless, there are many obstacles to reaching the courts. 
The claimant must first apply for compensation at the Labor Standards Office 
having jurisdiction over the employer. Decisions at this level are based only on 
documentary evidence, which the plaintiff is not allowed to view. If compensa-
tion is denied, the plaintiff has sixty days to file an appeal for a review of the 
judgment with the Labor Standards Bureau having jurisdiction. At this stage, a 
Workers’ Compensation Insurance investigator carries out an investigation based 
on the evidence submitted by both the claimant and the firm, sometimes including 
examination of the job site. 
No time limit is stipulated for reaching these decisions. Two years or more 
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may elapse at each stage of the application process. The ministry has tried to 
speed the handling of cases in response to charges that it purposely stalls them as 
a way of discouraging victims’ families from filing karōshi claims. If the judg-
ment at the Labor Standards Bureau is against the plaintiff, an appeal may be filed 
with the Central Workers’ Compensation Insurance Board in Tokyo. At this third 
stage plaintiffs can at last see the evidence presented by the firm, as well as have a 
right to be heard. Nevertheless, rejection by the board is a near certainty. In 1996, 
Japan’s Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs may file a civil suit to have the judg-
ment against compensation removed without first having to appeal to the Central 
Workers’ Compensation Insurance Board. Although this ruling allows plaintiffs 
access to the judicial system sooner, claimants must still anticipate a struggle of 
several year’s duration, as civil trials are often broken into brief and infrequent 
sessions.  
Beyond these administrative hurdles, involvement in public disputes such 
as lawsuits imposes a significant stigma in Japan. The majority of survivors are 
bereaved widows who feel powerless in the face of their loss. Many refrain from 
filing claims for compensation because they are unfamiliar with and intimidated 
by bureaucrats and bureaucratic procedures; they do not wish to publicize their 
plight; they fear for their reputations if they complain; they are concerned that 
filing a claim will only prolong the suffering of their families; and they do not 
know that compensation is possible in karōshi cases. Moreover, companies tend 
to handle karōshi deaths as if the victim had merely retired. Wives seldom know 
that, in addition to their individual life insurance policies, their husbands have 
been enrolled in group life insurance through their employers; nor are they aware 
that the company collects on these policies because the firm rather than the family 
is the beneficiary. This practice is being contested in court. With this brief intro-
duction to the social and legal difficulties of filing a claim, we can now turn to the 
story of Mr. Hiraoka. 
From August 1993 through June 1994, I participated in several karōshi-
related groups in the Kansai area. During this time, and in subsequent visits to 
Japan in June 1996 and again in 1998, I gathered documentary information on 
Tsubakimoto Seiko and the Hiraoka case. I attended sessions of the trial, observed 
meetings of the legal team, the Osaka Karōshi wo Kangaeru Kazoku no Kai (Osaka 
Association of Families Concerned with Karôshi), and the Zenkoku Karōshi wo 
Kangaeru Kazoku no Kai (National Association of Families Concerned with 
Karōshi), including negotiations at the Ministry of Labor in Tokyo. I had one 
formal, three-hour interview with Mrs. Hiraoka at her home on October 23, 1993, 
as well as many subsequent informal conversations and correspondence with her, 
her children, her lawyers, and other supporters. These conversations I recorded in 
my field notes. Movement participants sent me newspaper clippings, newsletters, 
magazines, and copies of books in which the case was reported when I was out of 
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the country. In constructing this account of the case, I have drawn from my collec-
tion of both formally and informally published sources as well as my field notes. 
(Sources of direct quotes are identified in the text and References.)
the work aNd death of hiraoka satoru
A native of Kagoshima Prefecture, Hiraoka Satoru first came to Osaka in 1959 at 
the age of nineteen. Fresh out of high school, he became a lineman for an electric 
company. He quit after six months because of bad working conditions, which he 
attributed to the firm’s lack of a union. He then joined Tsubakimoto Seiko, remain-
ing there for twenty-eight years. At the time of his death, at age 48, Mr. Hiraoka 
was a section chief in charge of approximately thirty workers at Tsubakimoto’s 
S-2 factory in Nara. Employing a secret process, the plant produces very small, 
precision ball bearings, which are used in devices ranging from ballpoint pens to 
rockets to automobiles. 
The S-2 factory came on line in 1985. It quickly became the most profit-
able section of the firm, and with its debut the company’s stock began to rise. 
Throughout 1986 and 1987, the company stepped up production in preparation 
for entry into the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. For workers in the 
S-2 plant, this meant an increased workload. Saturday holidays were abolished, 
and the plant was operated around the clock. However, to keep costs down, it was 
done with only two shifts of workers each putting in large amounts of overtime 
and holiday work. Meeting production quotas was difficult because of labor short-
ages and mechanical breakdowns. Section chiefs like Mr. Hiraoka bore especially 
heavy burdens. Seven of them performed the work of nine by each working a 
double shift once a week. Section chiefs trained new workers, supervised and 
evaluated their sections, oversaw quality control, made frequent repairs to the 
production line, and worked on the line themselves.
When he collapsed due to heart failure in the toilet of his home on February 
23, 1988, his family was devastated. Mrs. Hiraoka was convinced that he had 
“been killed by the company.” Several top company officials attended the funeral. 
They brought ritual sympathy and a small sum of cash. Afterward, Mrs. Hiraoka 
pressed the firm’s personnel manager about why her husband had been working 
more than 3,500 hours a year. In a rare moment of candor, he confirmed her suspi-
cions, saying, “Well, in truth, he was doing more than one job” (Ikeda 1997, 164) 
However, after Mrs. Hiraoka had filled an occupational death claim with the local 
Labor Standards Office, relations with the firm deteriorated. Tsubakimoto Seiko 
refused to support her application with time cards or other records. They claimed 
his death was due to “personal infirmity” and handled it as if Mr. Hiraoka had sim-
ply retired. After paying the family his accumulated ¥7 million retirement bonus, 
the company severed ties. His daughter, Tomoko, recalled, “At the funeral, they 
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called him ‘Hira-san, Hira-san,’ but afterward they never even phoned to see how 
we were getting along” (Hiraoka Tomoko 1991, 4) Use of the diminutive form 
“Hira-san” was probably meant to indicate familiarity and close relations with the 
deceased, but, ironically, it can also be taken as a reference to “Mr. Ordinary,” as 
in hirashain or ordinary worker.
Reconstructing the Facts
Facing corporate indifference, Mrs. Hiraoka and her children felt betrayed and 
frustrated. Then, in April 1988, they happened upon a small newspaper article 
announcing the advent of “karōshi 110 ban.” This was a free, legal consultation 
hotline service offered by the Osaka Defense Counsel for Victims of Karōshi 
(Osaka Karōshi Mondai Renrakukai, hereafter Renrakukai). The organizers were 
Kansai (Osaka and Kobe) area labor lawyers. Lawyer Matsumaru Tadashi took 
Mrs. Hiraoka’s call. As he hung up the phone and looked at the notes he made 
regarding her case, he mused incredulously, “Are there really still companies with 
working conditions like these?” (Ikeda 1997, 164). Soon thereafter, Mrs. Hiraoka 
participated in a seminar about karōshi compensation and met Mr. Matsumaru 
and the other lawyers in the Osaka group. Her case was the first one recruited via 
the hotline. The Renrakukai agreed to take her case pro bono. 
The first step in applying for workers’ compensation insurance benefits was 
to compose a portrait of Mr. Hiraoka’s work environment. Her lawyers helped 
her put this information into chart and graph form that would demonstrate to 
the Labor Standards Office that a cause and effect relationship existed between 
her husband’s work and his death. However, since the company would not pro-
vide her with the documents she requested, only Mrs. Hiraoka and her children, 
Tomoko (then 21) and Shōgō (17), could create the facts necessary to support that 
interpretation of Mr. Hiraoka’s death. 
The company union, Mr. Hiraoka’s original reason for changing jobs, was 
uncooperative. Parroting the dominant discourse of Tsubakimoto’s corporate cul-
ture, the union head answered Mrs. Hiraoka’s request for support by saying, “If 
the firm doesn’t profit, our salaries won’t go up. Workers who can’t accept that 
idea aren’t needed. If the company won’t support your application for workers’ 
compensation, then we can’t either” (Hiraoka Chieko 1993).
Sitting together around a calendar, the three remaining members of the family 
reconstructed Mr. Hiraoka’s work schedule from January 4, 1988 to February 
23, 1988, the day of his death. Although they had lived together, the process of 
recreating his schedule made the family acutely aware of how little he was with 
them. With his pay receipts, his datebook, and other documents found in his desk 
at home, as well as their memories of when he left for work and returned, mother 
and children established the number of days he worked, how many hours of 
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overtime he put in, and how many hours of night work were involved. As directed 
by her lawyers, Mrs. Hiraoka visited or called each of his coworkers and asked 
for their assistance. One former employee provided details about the nature of the 
work in the plant and Mr. Hiraoka’s duties, although he was unwilling to testify 
or be identified. When the schedule was done, it was discovered that Mr. Hiraoka 
had not had a single full day of rest in the fifty-one days prior to his collapse. In 
addition, nearly half of his working hours had been on the night shift, including 
two weeks of continuous night work just prior to his death.
Effects of Overwork on Family Life
The family had long been aware that Mr. Hiraoka’s work kept him apart from 
family life. They recalled him coming home late, eating alone, and then falling 
asleep in his chair at the dinner table, too exhausted to make it to bed. They re-
called the many times he was called in to work on his days off and how he refused 
when the family urged him to take time off, saying, “They will just call me in any-
way,” or, “I have to be there because there aren’t enough workers” (Ikeda 1997, 
165). Tomoko was angry with him for working so much that he did not even have 
enough energy to greet family members when he returned home. Growing up, 
there were weeks when she did not see his face. Once she had even complained to 
him that the house was devoid of signs of his presence. She was upset about his 
slovenly (darashinai) appearance. Shōgō, too, had few memories of his father, but 
he remembered offering to walk with him to the train station “to eat ice cream” 
when he had to work the night shift and that arguments with Tomoko about his 
working at night had grown heated. Mrs. Hiraoka thinks her son was trying, in his 
own way, to protect her husband from becoming isolated from the family. After 
reconstructing his father’s working life, Shōgō had a political epiphany: “Little by 
little I came to see how society gives rise to karōshi. Ironically, I feel that it was 
only with his death that we came together to do something as a family for the first 
time. But now, as then, he isn’t here” (Ikeda 1997, 165).
Calculating the Cause 
Extending the reconstruction back to February 1987, a full year before death, 
Mrs. Hiraoka and her children found that Mr. Hiraoka had been required to spend 
more than 4,000 hours at the factory, of which only 3,550 were paid. The first two 
years at the S-2 plant had actually been worse. His compensated overtime in 1986 
reached 1,650 hours, and in 1985 it was 1,715 hours (Morioka 1995, 5–6). Such 
a workload would have been taxing for a healthy, young man. Mr. Hiraoka was 
neither. In 1984 his annual company physical examination revealed that he had 
ischemic heart disease, a narrowing of the arteries that feed the heart muscle. He 
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began taking medication and regularly saw a doctor in his neighborhood. He was 
still being treated when he died. 
According to his wife, he complained of fatigue in these years. Especially 
after night work, his legs felt heavy:
He would be so tired that he could not climb the stairs to the second 
floor or change his clothes. In the last two days he was having trouble 
talking. The company should have taken steps to protect him, knowing 
that he had heart trouble. His overtime should have been restricted, but 
they just kept calling him in to work. If he complained, they would 
have told him he could leave. He didn’t want to aggravate his condi-
tion by arguing. Besides, where would he have gone? He would have 
been like a sumo wrestler [without a stable]. So, they could force him 
to work murderously long hours. (Hiraoka Chieko 1993) 
applyiNg for workers’ compeNsatioN
Flanked by her lawyers and children, and recorded by the media, Mrs. Hiraoka 
filed her application for workers’ compensation on July 7, 1988. In addition to the 
reconstructed schedule, she submitted depositions from Mr. Hiraoka’s doctor and 
a specialist in occupational medicine, both of which made a clear, strong case for 
overwork as the reason for his heart problems and his death. During the next ten 
months, she went to the Labor Standards Office every other month to ask about 
the progress of the investigation. At the urging of her lawyers, she talked about 
her case with labor unions, students, and other victims’ families. This helped her 
expand her network of supporters, garner publicity, and demonstrate the credibil-
ity of her interpretation and the sincerity of her intent.
Signing Up Support
On February 13, 1989, Mrs. Hiraoka, her lawyers, and about fifty other people 
gathered to hold the inaugural meeting of the Association to Consider Overwork 
Society and Support Recognition of Mr. Hiraoka’s Workers’ Compensation Claim 
(Hatarakisugi Shakai o Kangae Hiraoka-san no Rōsai Nintei o Shien Suru Kai). 
After being abandoned by her husband’s union and shunned by his employer, 
this was a great encouragement to Mrs. Hiraoka. Aided by this group, in less 
than a month she got more than 2,000 individuals and another 200 groups, in-
cluding labor unions and associations of victims of other occupational injuries, 
to sign petitions urging action on her claim. These she delivered to the Labor 
Standards Office officer in charge of her case. Henceforth, when she visited the 
Labor Standards Office, members of the support group came along to demonstrate 
that she and her children did not stand alone. A Socialist Party parliamentarian, 
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sympathetic newspaper and magazine articles, and coverage of her case by NHK, 
the quasi-public broadcasting network, all supported her version of the facts. 
Mrs. Hiraoka was unable to see copies of her husband’s time cards before 
her application was filed. However, once this step had been taken, her lawyers 
finally succeeded in obtaining time cards and other documents from Tsubakimoto 
Seiko. Comparing them with the calendar that the Hiraokas assembled showed 
that the family’s reconstruction of Mr. Hiraoka’s last year of work was essen-
tially accurate: hours of required attendance at the plant: 4,038; hours of actual 
work compensated: 3,663; hours of overtime worked: 1,399; hours of overtime 
compensated: 1,015. Work taken home was not included in these totals. The dif-
ference between paid and unpaid hours of both regular work and overtime was 
759 recorded hours, or 2.07 hours per day of uncompensated “service overtime.” 
In addition to Mr. Hiraoka’s time cards, the Labor Standards Office considered 
his pay receipts, his physical examinations, the company’s work rules, and its 
Article 36 overtime work limits exemption agreement with the union in reaching 
its decision.
Article 36 of the Labor Standards Act provides for agreements between capi-
tal and representatives of labor in firms of ten or more full-time employees. Filed 
with the local Labor Standards Office, these agreements permit companies to ex-
ceed the maximum working hours established in Article 32 of the Labor Standards 
Act without penalty or sanctions. Workers sometimes refer to these agreements as 
“blue sky” agreements, the inference being that there is no limit on the amount of 
overtime a firm can demand. Sugeno (1992, 233–38) provides a full discussion of 
these agreements. At Tsubakimoto Seiko, the agreement stipulated a daily maxi-
mum of five hours of overtime for male workers and a monthly maximum of 110 
hours. In practice, however, the firm ignored even these limits, and a workday in 
excess of 24 hours was possible when, in the firm’s judgment, it was necessary to 
“maintain the integrity of the production process.”
Obstacles on the Road to Compensation
Mrs. Hiraoka worried that the Labor Standards Office would not take her seri-
ously. She learned from her lawyers that she had to insist that her husband’s death 
was karōshi. However, despite her conviction that his company had killed him, it 
was hard to take such a determined stand. She received unsigned letters in which 
Tsubakimoto employees or their wives criticized her campaign as self-serving and 
potentially damaging to the other workers. One told her she should be grateful for 
having been supported by the firm for twenty-eight years. Neither Mrs. Hiraoka’s 
parents nor her in-laws backed her efforts. The former did not wish to be associ-
ated with a public complaint. The latter claimed that sending Tomoko to a private 
music college contributed to their son’s need to work overtime. 
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When Mrs. Hiraoka first began to inquire about the progress of the investiga-
tion, the Labor Standards Office officer in charge of the case made vague state-
ments that seemed to indicate that her application would be rejected. “Hiraoka-
san did not have the longest working hours at the plant. . . . Tsubakimoto’s work 
environment is not the worst in Nara Prefecture” (Ikeda 1997, 166). The Ministry 
of Labor had, in October 1987, just revised the standards for recognizing death 
due to work-related circulatory diseases to include the week before, rather than 
just one day before, the onset of symptoms. However, the tone of the officer’s 
statements gave Mrs. Hiraoka the impression that her case was being judged by 
the old standards in which it was necessary to prove that some calamity or acci-
dent immediately presaged the onset of symptoms.3 
The Result: Rōsai Recognized
It was with some surprise, then, that Mrs. Hiraoka and her children received a call 
from the Labor Standards Office in May 1989 asking them to come and receive 
the decision in person. Normally the result—a single sentence, with no explana-
tion—is sent by mail. In a decision that the lawyers felt was “epoch-making,” the 
Labor Standards Office ruled that in comparison with official working hours, Mr. 
Hiraoka’s workload had been excessive enough to cause his collapse. The Labor 
Standards Office cited three points: (1) three days before the onset of symptoms, 
he worked 16 hours despite it being a holiday; (2) Mr. Hiraoka worked almost 
twice the normal hours in the week prior to his death; and (3) he worked 19 and 12 
hours, respectively, on a holiday and a scheduled day off eleven and twelve days 
prior to dying. In addition, the Labor Standards Office decision noted that Mr. 
Hiraoka was being treated for a mild heart ailment prior to his death and that his 
excessive workload could be seen to have caused the condition to worsen rapidly. 
Mrs. Hiraoka (1993) recalled, “When I heard the decision, I thought, ‘At last he 
is free of that place. He is mine again and doesn’t belong to them anymore.’” The 
practical result was that the Workers’ Compensation Insurance System would pay 
Mrs. Hiraoka and her children a package of compensation consisting of a pension, 
funeral expenses, and a special, one-time, lump-sum payment of ¥3,000,000. The 
pension would replace the much smaller Welfare Insurance System’s survivor 
pension she had been receiving. Details of how such pensions are calculated can 
be found in Osaka Karōshi Mondai Renrakukai (1989, 64–65) and Sugeno (1992, 
328–32).
3. A description of both older and newer standards can be found in Osaka Karōshi Mondai Renraku-
kai (1989, 44–55). The standards continue to be challenged as too strict and not in keeping 
with either the medical understanding of the relationship between work, accumulated stress, and 
health, or the public sense of what the standards for compensation ought to be. Further revisions 
were made in 1994.
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Despite the favorable outcome, the lawyers were dismayed that the Labor 
Standards Office decision did not mention the effects of night work and irregular 
shift rotation, which Mrs. Hiraoka felt had as much impact on her husband as his 
excessive hours. Even more dismaying were Tsubakimoto’s public comments, 
which betrayed the firm’s unrepentant attitude. In response, Mrs. Hiraoka and her 
children filed a civil suit against the firm.
creatiNg credibility through litigatioN: iNterpretiNg Karōshi iN court
Tsubakimoto Seiko rejected the Labor Standards Office implied criticism of the 
firm’s work practices in its decision. “Seven others do the same work as Mr. 
Hiraoka,” said the personnel manager in a statement to the press. “Mr. Hiraoka’s 
devotion to his work was an extreme example and was not forced by the company. 
Our interpretation is that he overworked of his own volition” (Hiraoka Tomoko 
1991, 3).
Mrs. Hiraoka was angry that Tsubakimoto could ignore even the judgment of 
the government. The company’s attitude was an insult to her husband’s years of 
unstinting hard work, and she was determined that they should apologize and pay 
a price for their callous disregard for his health, his memory, and the feelings of 
herself and her children. She declared herself committed to the goal of a karōshi-
free society for the next generation.
Mrs. Hiraoka and her children together filed suit in Osaka District Court, in 
May 1990. In her opening statement, she made it clear that she was taking this 
action on behalf of her husband’s coworkers at Tsubakimoto, as well as her dead 
husband. The suit alleged negligence on the part of Tsubakimoto Seiko with re-
gard to its legal obligations to abide by its own work rules and agreements with 
workers regarding overtime work and rest days. Furthermore, the plaintiffs al-
leged that Tsubakimoto should have been able to foresee that its work practices 
would be harmful to a 48-year-old man with heart problems. They argued that the 
firm was negligent in its duty to show concern for Mr. Hiraoka’s well-being, that 
it ordered him to work beyond all reasonable limits, and that this made his death 
their responsibility. The plaintiffs demanded that Tsubakimoto Seiko publicly ac-
knowledge responsibility in the Hiraoka case and pay a total of ¥55 million to 
Mrs. Hiraoka and her children, as well as funeral expenses of ¥1 million, the costs 
of the trial, and lost wages estimated at over ¥66 million (Hiraoka Chieko 1990). 
Shortly after she filed the suit, lawyers for Tsubakimoto Seiko offered Mrs. 
Hiraoka ¥12 million to settle out of court. She explained to them that her prime 
objectives were contrition and an apology. No amount of money would entice her 
to give up these goals. Unwilling to admit responsibility, the firm’s representa-
tives departed. For their part, Tsubakimoto expressed regret that there would be a 
trial in spite of its sincere efforts to gain the understanding of the family. However, 
Karōshi activism aNd receNt treNds iN JapaNese civil society
61
they also said they welcomed the trial as an opportunity to make the facts of the 
case clear (Uchihashi 1990, 20).
The defense strategy was based on the concept of labor performed at the 
worker’s initiative (sossen rōdō). Tsubakimoto’s attorneys insisted that Mr. 
Hiraoka needed extra money to meet his living expenses. He therefore elected to 
work many hours of overtime on his own. Furthermore, they said his work was 
supervisory and did not entail physical hardship.
Making the Legal Case: Why Had Mr. Hiraoka Worked So Much?
Since the case was without precedent, Mrs. Hiraoka’s lawyers had doubts about 
being able to prove corporate responsibility for Mr. Hiraoka’s karōshi. The key 
point would be demonstrating that Tsubakimoto should have been able to fore-
see that its illegal labor practices would have adverse consequences for Mr. 
Hiraoka. In twenty-four trial sessions over the course of the next four years, the 
lawyers worked to expose coercion hidden within the organizational structure of 
Tsubakimoto Seiko. Although no rank and file worker from within the factory 
testified for either side, skillful use of documentary evidence and questioning of 
hostile management witnesses established that there were good reasons to doubt 
the defense notion that Mr. Hiraoka had worked so much at his own initiative. 
Using time cards and pay receipts, the plaintiffs established that Mr. Hiraoka’s 
working hours were abnormally long and violated the company’s work rules. 
Operating the factory 24 hours a day, 365 days a year with only two shifts was il-
legal. Tsubakimoto had been previously warned about this by the Labor Standards 
Office, but had done nothing to rectify it. According to the firm’s work rules, the 
day shift should have been from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. with an hour for lunch. Similarly, 
the night shift was to start at 8 p.m. and go to 5 a.m. with a 90-minute break for 
food and rest. In reality, to meet quality and quantity quotas set by management, 
four hours of overtime was automatically added to the end of each shift. This 
filled the gap between shifts and enabled the plant to run without interruption. But 
it also meant that workers seldom got the rest to which they were entitled. Mrs. 
Hiraoka testified that her husband told her the factory manager roamed the plant 
and used his rank and threatening glare to force workers to stay beyond quitting 
time, to work unpaid overtime, or to prevent them from taking full lunch breaks 
or sleeping during the 90-minute break on the night shift. 
To avoid having to shut down the line during meals and other breaks, the 
company also insisted that half the workers take over the whole line for half the 
break, changing places with the other half during the second half of the break. 
Although the workers were paid the standard 25 percent premium for this work, 
the practice is illegal. The Labor Standards Office cited Tsubakimoto for this vio-
lation and cautioned it to make improvements at the time that it recognized Mrs. 
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Hiraoka’s workers’ compensation claim. Motivation at Tsubakimoto was by in-
timidation rather than rewards. 
Frequent mechanical breakdowns and other difficulties with the production 
process, as well as a shortage of trained manpower and management’s unreason-
able production targets, made long hours necessary. In theory, workers were to 
alternate between the day and the night shifts on a weekly basis. All Sundays and 
thirteen Saturdays each year were to be designated by the firm as days off. Public 
holidays and 20 days each year of paid leave in Mr. Hiraoka’s case, rounded out 
the vacation schedule. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Hiraoka did not have a single 24-hour period off between 
January 4, 1989 and his collapse on February 23. According to his pay receipts, 
compensated overtime in the last three months of his life averaged 150 hours a 
month, which exceeded the 110-hour limit imposed by the firm’s Article 36 agree-
ment with the company union. If money was his aim, why was he working an 
average of more than two hours of unpaid overtime daily?
In a notebook begun nine months before his death and entered into evidence 
at the trial, Mr. Hiraoka recorded his own view. As he saw it, it was impossible to 
keep enough good workers in the factory when the working conditions were so 
severe. “The real problem is to get 48 hours a week down to 40. But right now 60 
or more is the norm. No one is able to take any of their paid holidays. I want the 
union to negotiate with management for a reduction to 48 hours in 1988” (Hiraoka 
Satoru 1994, 6–7). In addition, his diary expressed personal disappointment when 
workers he had trained quit because of the harsh working conditions. 
Mrs. Hiraoka testified that her husband as a man who was proud of his abili-
ties and the role he played in Tsubakimoto’s success. From a firm of 120 employ-
ees when he joined, it grew to have more than 900 and, at the time of his death, 
was the second largest manufacturer of ball bearings in Japan. She said that his 
sense of responsibility for his subordinates and his professional pride were strong, 
but the real reason for his overwork was not any abstract loyalty to the company 
but his manager’s cruel exploitation of his uncomplaining nature.
Ignorance Is No Defense
Mr. Hiraoka’s immediate supervisor provided the key testimony. Under intense 
questioning, he had to admit that foremen at Tsubakimoto were forced by quotas, 
understaffing, and rigged employee evaluations to both work on the production 
line and supervise their crews. A copy of the firm’s secret overtime plan, bearing 
the supervisor’s personal seal (the Japanese equivalent of a signature), was found 
by Mrs. Hiraoka on Mr. Hiraoka’s desk at home. When confronted with the docu-
ment in court, the supervisor blurted out, “Where did you get that?” but then con-
ceded that even leaving out work done on holidays, the firm’s schedule called for 
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322 hours more overtime work than authorized in the Article 36 agreement with 
the union. “We couldn’t meet the targets,” he sighed. He tried to deny knowing 
about Mr. Hiraoka’s heart problem, although his seal was also on the copy of the 
physical examination results that he personally handed to Mr. Hiraoka. 
Other company officials also claimed ignorance of Mr. Hiraoka’s continuing 
heart problem. They testified that his health was his responsibility. Because he 
did not mention it to them, they assumed he had no problem. They also asserted 
darkly that he smoked and drank to excess, although the executives who testified 
had to admit that they seldom socialized with him. Their protestations of igno-
rance in regard to other matters, such as their firm’s work rules, labor laws, the 
legal requirement to have a physician trained in occupational medicine conduct 
regular inspections of the plant, and even the date of Mr. Hiraoka’s death, caused 
the judge to wonder aloud from the bench how a firm with such managers could 
stay in business. Indeed, Tsubakimoto Seiko was unable to remain independent, 
and in 1996 it was forced to merge with Nakashima Seisakusho. Today the com-
pany is known as Tsubaki-Nakashima.
 
Credible Legal Doctrine
Attorneys for the plaintiffs in the case argued that a proper legal notion of em-
ployee responsibility for health maintenance must be based on the worker’s right 
to considerate treatment by the firm as established by various provisions of the 
Labor Standards Act of 1947 and the Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1972. 
They reasoned that if a company has no system for reassigning workers to jobs 
commensurate with their individual physical abilities, the employer rather than 
the worker bears the legal obligation to protect the worker’s health. Forcing work-
ers to announce their infirmities under such circumstances would give manage-
ment carte blanche to dismiss older or handicapped workers. 
This interpretation impressed the court. Moreover, Tsubakimoto’s refusal to 
allow inspection of the S-2 factory and failure to put any rank and file workers 
on the stand to support their case created a strong suspicion that they were hiding 
something. However, rather than issue a judgment, the court proposed a face-
saving compromise settlement, which the parties accepted. Tsubakimoto would 
make a public apology and pay Mrs. Hiraoka and her children ¥50 million. In 
return, the Hiraoka family would drop their other demands. Each side would bear 
its own share of the costs of the trial. The plaintiffs regarded this outcome as a 
victorious settlement (shōri wakai). 
The Hiraoka case might have had more of a precedent-setting impact if Mrs. 
Hiraoka had rejected the settlement and forced the court to issue a judgment. Her 
most cherished goal, however, was an apology, for an apology that recognized the 
firm’s negligence in her husband’s death would restore his good reputation and 
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validate his hard work. When Tsubakimoto agreed to publicly apologize, Mrs. 
Hiraoka would have lost face by not accepting. She would have seemed more 
concerned with money or revenge than honor. Moreover, forcing the case to judg-
ment would remove the social obligation for the firm to apologize. Nor did her 
legal team think a judgment would lead to a significantly greater monetary award. 
By concluding the case in this way, both sides could appear magnanimous. For the 
lawyers, the Hiraoka case broke new ground in establishing credible legal strate-
gies for pursuing karōshi claims against employers and demonstrated how those 
strategies could contribute to redress of larger social issues as well as individual 
problems. Avoiding the appearance of vindictiveness was important for growing 
the credibility of the movement as a whole.
social movemeNt actors, activities, aNd motives
As a pioneer case, the Hiraoka Karōshi Saiban became a rallying point for a va-
riety of groups and individuals concerned with labor and quality of working life 
issues in the Kansai area. Mr. Hiraoka’s death and a trial with lawyers proved to 
be the key ingredients in the founding of the anti-karōshi movement in Osaka. 
Mrs. Hiraoka’s earliest and most important supporters were the lawyers who 
recruited her case through the hotline. All seven of her lawyers were members 
of the Japan Labor Lawyers Association (Nihon Rōdō Bengōdan). The leader of 
her legal team, Matsumaru Tadashi, is the de facto head of the Osaka Defense 
Counsel for Victims of Karōshi (Osaka Karōshi Mondai Renrakukai), which 
holds its monthly meetings at the office of the Osaka Democratic Law Association 
(Minshû Hōritsu Kyōkai). Matsumaru was the college classmate of Kawahito 
Hiroshi, head of the National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karōshi. Both men 
graduated from the Faculty of Economics at Tokyo University before becom-
ing lawyers. Matsumaru says “widow’s tears” are behind his pro bono karōshi 
work. He is also a central figure in the Stockholder’s Ombudsman (Kabunushi 
Omubutsuman), a watchdog group that has been filing suits to make corporations 
accountable to their stockholders. Other lawyers on the team share Matsumaru’s 
zeal for using litigation to reconfigure the institutions of society to produce a more 
level playing field. Above all, the lawyers’ concern is the protection of the human 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Japan.
Frequent attendees at the monthly Renrakukai meetings also included 
Professor Morioka Koji and doctors specializing in occupational medicine. One 
of them, Tajiri Junichirō, was the specialist whose deposition helped win Labor 
Standards Office recognition for Mrs. Hiraoka. This group was the central ner-
vous system of the movement. It directed overall strategy and planned events. The 
lawyers examined potential cases carefully and took those that they felt would 
help them boost their winning percentage and enhance the movement’s success. 
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The Renrakukai members, according to their individual political and 
philosophical inclinations, have diverse connections to other groups such as 
Occupational Disease Countermeasures Council (Shokugyōbyō Taisaku Renra-
kukai), the Communist Party-affiliated labor union federation Zenrōren, the 
Kansai Laborers’ Education Cooperative (Kansai Kinrōsha Kyōiku Kyōkai), and 
others.  
Although Mrs. Hiraoka had Japan Socialist Party support for her workers’ 
compensation application, they backed away when she decided to sue for negli-
gence. Only Communist Party supporters seemed willing to join her confrontation 
with Tsubakimoto management in the civil trial. Chief among these were mem-
bers of the dock, chemical, and metal workers unions. Owing to the inherent dan-
gers of working in these industries, members of these unions had a keen interest in 
workplace safety issues as well as a strong tradition of union activism. I was told 
that their history of confrontation, with management and underworld competitors, 
gave their solidarity a hardened edge. As the Hiraoka case went on, these union-
ists came to play a larger role in supporting her case. The class-struggle-oriented 
agenda of these unionists was broader and more militant than either Mrs. Hiraoka 
or her lawyers. At times they seemed to relish making the Hiraoka case an outlet 
for their anger. 
Early in the trial, the factory manager testified that he was unable to recall the 
date Mr. Hiraoka died. More than anything else, for Mrs. Hiraoka this symbolized 
Tsubakimoto’s lack of care and concern for their employees. She and her sup-
porters choose to use the 23rd of each month to hand out leaflets in front of the 
factory as a way to remind the factory manager of the date when Mr. Hiraoka died. 
The leaflets described in detail the progress of the trial, including some of the 
highlights of the testimony of company officials. The Hiraokas and their lawyers 
hoped that workers inside the plant might be encouraged to come forward and tell 
what they knew. They passed out the leaflets to workers as they walked from the 
nearby train station to the gates of the factory for the morning shift. Other sup-
porters with bullhorns explained why the trial was being held and appealed to the 
workers for support. 
Tsubakimoto’s management at first tolerated the leaflets, and the workers 
were cordial. However, some months later, after thirty or so of Mrs. Hiraoka’s 
more militant unionist supporters forced an acrimonious meeting with top man-
agement, workers were ordered by the firm not to take the leaflets. For the remain-
der of the trial, the firm photographed the leafleting. Telephoto lenses could be 
seen peeking between the blinds of the factory office, and the number of workers 
who accepted the handbills fell to near zero.
For the unions, who sent members to accompany Mrs. Hiraoka thereafter, the 
trial provided an opportunity to attack Tsubakimoto’s poor reputation and score 
points for unionism. They became progressively more aggressive, thrusting the 
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leaflets into the mid-sections of the workers and telling them to get a union that 
would fight for their rights and not let the company tell them who they could talk 
to or what they could read. Likewise, the unionists attended the trial sessions and 
could be counted on to mutter and grunt derisively in response to the statements of 
defense witnesses. When the judge asked why the court could not examine the S-2 
factory, the defense attorney’s explanation was followed by cries of, “What are 
you hiding?!” Mrs. Hiraoka’s lawyers thought that this peanut gallery behavior 
had a beneficial effect on the judges as long as it was kept within reason.
Many of Mrs. Hiraoka’s personal supporters became associated with oth-
er karōshi plaintiffs through mutual friends in the Renrakukai, or through the 
Association of Families Concerned with Karōshi (Osaka Karōshi o Kangaeru 
Kazoku no Kai), a survivors’ mutual support group. As the attorneys recruited ad-
ditional cases from around the Kansai area, they enrolled the plaintiffs in this mu-
tual aid association. Here, Mrs. Hiraoka played the role of guide. Each new recruit 
had to be educated about how to file for compensation, how to approach doctors 
for depositions and expert testimony, how to gather signatures on petitions, and 
how to cope with the stress of bereavement and the long ordeal of being a plaintiff 
waiting for a bureaucratic decision. Mrs. Hiraoka symbolized the possibility of 
eventual success for this group. As karōshi numbers have increased, the Kazoku 
no Kai has grown. It is now a national organization, with lawyer-led chapters in 
every prefecture in Japan.
Karōshi as moral culture
aNd the struggle over the movemeNt’s ideNtity
In June of 1991, Mrs. Hiraoka’s case became even more central to the karōshi 
movement. A Nagoya labor drama group called Aspiration Theater (Kikyūza) had 
learned of the trial through the media. They approached Mrs. Hiraoka and asked 
if they could base a play on her family’s experiences. The group’s leader and 
playwright, Koguma Hitoshi, thought her case the perfect way to take up the 
karōshi problem, and he wanted to make it the first in a series of new productions 
about the impact of corporate society on the lives of workers and their families. 
He sent Mrs. Hiraoka a draft of the script and a tape of the proposed theme song. 
Mrs. Hiraoka was deeply moved to find her family’s plight rendered with such 
sensitivity and feeling.
The following year, the play was performed four times in Nagoya to packed 
houses. Called The Sudden Tomorrow (Totsuzen no Ashita), it is the story of the 
causes and consequences of a karōshi death. A factory supervisor is overworked, 
despite having a heart condition known to the company. A snarling factory man-
ager pushes the workers unmercifully to meet ever-increasing quotas, but he re-
fuses to take on extra staff. One worker is forced out when he thinks to file a 
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complaint. The company’s feckless union, afraid to make working conditions an 
issue, refuses to come to his aid. After the unfortunate supervisor dies, his wife, 
an unsophisticated woman of gentle character, and her two children find the cour-
age to collect evidence and pursue a workers’ compensation claim. Their claim 
is eventually recognized thanks to evidence provided by an older worker who 
decides that gaining a clear conscience is worth sacrificing his retirement pension. 
He comes forward to tell the truth about the firm’s illegal and heartless methods. 
His testimony subsequently results in the widow and her children filing a civil suit 
against the firm, and in the dismissal of the greedy factory manager.
Totsuzen no Ashita is a powerful representation of the karōshi movement’s 
central themes. It mobilizes images of protection, mutual care, and love and in-
sists that compassion and familial relations are the essential foundation of both a 
good society and a good business. With the aid of jurisprudence, rendered in the 
play as a booming voice from above, the dead worker’s family is reconstructed as 
a site of courageous resistance and source of moral value.
The play represented a cultural resource for the movement, and there was 
a small struggle over who would perform it in Osaka. A representative from the 
Communist Party-affiliated Osaka labor drama group Kizugawa asked that his 
group be given permission to perform the play in Osaka in December. Other 
movement participants wanted Kikyūza to bring the production to Osaka. Both 
groups worried about saturating the market. This was the same problem plaintiffs 
who followed Mrs. Hiraoka faced: the limited number of groups willing and able 
to support karōshi cases meant competition between plaintiffs that could fragment 
the movement. Iwaki Yutaka, one of Mrs. Hiraoka’s lawyers with close ties to var-
ious groups, brokered a win-win compromise. Kikyūza would perform the play 
in August, and Kizugawa would perform it in December. The two groups would 
work together and form the Totsuzen no Ashita Osaka Performances Promotion 
Association (Totsuzen no Ashita Osaka Kōen o Miru Kai). Kizugawa would help 
stage the August performances, and a joint committee to carry out both sets of 
performances was formed. This committee gathered staff members and estab-
lished the Miru Kai, printed a newsletter, publicized the play, handled ticket sales 
and distribution, and arranged liaison between the two drama groups. The two 
key organizers were volunteers with strong Communist Party ties. At the event, 
both sets of performances played to full houses. Over ¥200,000 in donations was 
raised, and the funds were given to the Kazoku no Kai. The two Miru Kai orga-
nizers subsequently became the secretariat of that organization, too. Building on 
their success, the following year the Miru Kai published a volume of reflections 
and opinions about the play and the karōshi movement entitled No More Karōshi 
(Nō Moa Karōshi). 
As with the play, these two skilled organizers tried to use the Kazoku no 
Kai and its members to create additional cultural resources and political meaning 
North
68
for the movement. Their success was limited. Over 200 people turned out for a 
November 1993 evening of music, education, and fellowship that featured sev-
eral plaintiffs in performing roles. However, the members of the Kazoku no Kai 
were reluctant to be used as mascots for the broad array of social causes implied 
by some of the speakers that evening. Their interest was less about social change 
and strengthening the labor movement than about gathering support for their in-
dividual cases. They resented being used as propaganda tools. After a subsequent 
concert with professional singers failed to generate much interest, the secretariat 
concentrated on returning the Kazoku no Kai to its original mission of mutual 
self-help for its members. Mrs. Hiraoka, who did not like the way some of her 
communist supporters sometimes tried to use her case as a vehicle for union orga-
nizing and JCP politics, withdrew from the Kazoku no Kai in 1996. However, she 
remains grateful to and friendly with them as individuals for the assistance they 
rendered, and she is still working for a karōshi-free future.
coNcludiNg remarks
While the Hiraoka case typified the social movement strategies and practices 
generally employed by karōshi activists, it was atypical in the ease and speed 
with which workers’ compensation insurance payments were granted. It was also 
atypical in pursuing corporate responsibility in a civil suit. In the years since her 
case was settled, however, it has become common for claimants who win Ministry 
of Health, Labor, and Welfare recognition of their cases to sue companies for ad-
ditional damages. Lawyer Matsumaru says that official recognition of a karōshi 
case enables an easy victory over the firm. 
Karōshi activists base the credibility of their claims on facts created by 
their own research into the work environment and its relationship to workers’ 
health. This is exactly what the investigators from the Labor Standards Office 
do. However, where once the opinions of victims’ families took a back seat to 
documentary evidence supplied (or not supplied) by firms, today facts discovered 
by the plaintiff can acquire a most potent credibility. In this, Mrs. Hiraoka was 
exceptionally fortunate. Her husband’s overtime schedules, medical records, and 
other documents were found on his desk at home. Since these became the key 
evidence in the civil trial, in this sense she and her children were lucky that Mr. 
Hiraoka was so overworked that he had to bring work home. The documents cor-
roborated his family’s recollections of his working hours and demonstrated that 
the firm was willfully negligent in its failure to care for Mr. Hiraoka and provide 
him with a safe working environment. 
Many other families have followed in the wake of Mrs. Hiraoka’s success. 
In Osaka, they are often led by the same lawyers who worked on the Hiraoka 
case. In Tokyo and other cities, her case is known through its portrayal in books 
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written by those lawyers. Subsequent successful cases received similar treatment. 
In addition to creating a growing body of legal doctrine, the approximately 300 
lawyers in the National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karōshi across Japan 
have been instrumental in the creation of a national karōshi discourse. They have 
publicized the concept of karōshi, shown how it occurs, explained how to prevent 
it, and how to gain compensation when it happens. In league with their medical 
colleagues, these lawyers are primarily responsible for making karōshi a social 
problem. Their guidance and suggestions teach plaintiffs the accepted conven-
tions of credible fact making, give rise to support groups, and help plaintiffs con-
struct their own personal discourses for use in public appearances, in petitions, 
or in visits to the Labor Standards Office. They also try to engineer a balanced 
distribution of resources among the various plaintiffs who are fighting karōshi 
cases at any given time. 
Over time, the volume of critical judicial opinions generated by Karōshi 
Bengōdan activities has influenced the Ministry of Labor. Since 1987 the stan-
dards for recognizing karōshi have been relaxed three times, an example of litiga-
tion encouraging regulatory law to catch up to social realities. Recently, compen-
sation has even been extended to victims of suicide due to work-induced stress 
(karōjisatsu). The concept of karōshi and the understanding of its epidemiology 
have become widespread in Japan. Many, though by no means all, Japanese can 
now identify with victims such as Mr. Hiraoka. There is a growing consensus that 
Japanese men have focused too much on work at the expense of family life and 
personal growth. 
Changes in Japanese workplaces and employment practices due to the col-
lapse of the late 1980s bubble economy and ensuing stagnation, however, are 
intensifying the competition for corporate survival. Pillars of social stability, 
such as lifetime employment and seniority wages, are being replaced by flexible, 
fixed-term employment and results-based compensation schemes. Revisions to 
the Labor Standards Act in April 1999 made women subject to the same overtime 
provisions as men. In the absence of strong unions, it is widely believed that these 
revisions, carried out in the name of gender equality, will put women in the same 
unprotected position as men. Business leaders have recently introduced proposals 
that would exempt many white-collar workers from limits on working hours and 
free employers from having to pay them overtime premiums (North and Weathers 
2007). Mrs. Hiraoka says that while the gains of the anti-karōshi movement are 
not insignificant, there is little reason to be optimistic about eliminating karōshi 
anytime soon.
In the face of business efforts to water down or eliminate many provisions 
of the Labor Standards Act and Industrial Safety and Health Act, the success of 
karōshi plaintiffs such as Mrs. Hiraoka points to the impact that ordinary Japanese 
citizens can have when their energies and knowledge are mobilized within the 
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organizational framework and practices of a social movement led by dedicated 
professionals. With this guidance and expertise, victims and their families can 
generate credibility sufficient to activate the potential for protection and redress 
inherent in the law and thus, in some measure, confront and successfully battle 
both the manifest power differences between capital and labor and bureaucratic 
inertia and indifference. The tactics and strategies of the anti-karōshi movement—
using the courts and raising a public fuss about a private problem—while perhaps 
distasteful to many Japanese, are a viable alternative to capitulation and quietism. 
They contain the potential for individuals to exercise the power of the law in a 
way that calls attention to the common interests of workers, using litigation and 
the threat of litigation as a means to the enactment of policies that ultimately 
benefit them all. 
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Chapter 3
Courting Justice, Contesting “Bureaucratic 
Informality”: The Sayama Case and the 
Evolution of Buraku Liberation Politics1
John H. Davis, Jr.
Under normal circumstances a signed confession would hardly seem like a 
sound basis for seeking reversal of a criminal conviction. However, the legal 
team representing Ishikawa Kazuo and the thousands of supporters who have 
rallied around him for more than five decades point to his signed confession 
and the circumstances surrounding its elicitation by authorities as compelling 
evidence proving his innocence. On July 9, 1963 at the Urawa District Court, 
prosecutors indicted twenty-four-year-old Ishikawa for the abduction and murder 
of sixteen-year-old Nakata Yoshie in Sayama City, located northwest of Tokyo 
in neighboring Saitama Prefecture. Although initially maintaining his innocence 
for the first month following his arrest on May 23, 1963, by June 20 Ishikawa 
confessed to being one of three perpetrators who acted in concert to commit the 
crime. Three days later the story would change again as Ishikawa claimed sole 
responsibility.
1. This research would not have been possible without the assistance of countless people in Japan. 
First, I want to express my gratitude to the residents of Saiwaichiku, the pseudonym I have given 
the community where the initial research was conducted between 1997 and 1999. For more than 
two years they proved to be remarkably welcoming and patient despite the intrusive presence 
and persistent queries of an American anthropologist. I would also like to extend a special thank-
you for the valuable help provided by Mr. Tomonaga Kenzo, Director of the Buraku Liberation 
and Human Rights Research Institute in Osaka. Without his support the research upon which this 
essay is based would not have been possible. Likewise, I benefited from the gracious assistance 
of Mr. Yasuda Satoshi of the Buraku Liberation League Headquarters in Tokyo who provided 
me with an eye-opening tour of the genba, Sayama City. I thank him for sharing his valuable in-
sight into the Sayama incident. I am eternally grateful to the following entities that provided the 
financial support to make various phases of this research possible: U.S. Department of Education 
Fulbright Program, Abe Fellowship Program, MMUF-WW Junior Faculty Career Enhancement 
Fellowship Program, The Institute for the Study of World Politics, and Stanford University’s 
Institute for International Studies. Finally, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Sato 
Yoshimichi and Dr. Numazaki Ichiro for providing a superb environment for reflection and writ-
ing at Tohoku University’s fabulous Center for the Study of Social Stratification and Inequality.
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Various aspects of the Sayama case, as it is widely known, seem to violate 
Japanese criminal law. First, police employed an illegal practice known as bek-
ken taiho whereby an individual is arrested on charges unrelated to the crime for 
which that individual is being investigated. Ishikawa was originally taken into 
custody on suspicion of larceny, assault, and attempted extortion. When dressed 
in the technical terminology used in official documents, such as arrest warrants, 
the charges sound quite serious, but the evidence on which they are based is high-
ly dubious. For example, police alleged that Ishikawa stole the work uniform of 
Takahashi Ryohei. Takahashi, however, was a longtime friend of Ishikawa and 
seemed fully cognizant that Ishikawa was borrowing the uniform since Takahashi 
asked him to “wash it before you return it.” The assault charge seems equally 
peculiar. It claims that Ishikawa roughed up a young man who caused a fender 
bender in February 1963. While Ishikawa was involved in a minor traffic acci-
dent, a police officer called to the scene helped mediate an out-of-court settlement 
between the parties involved. In other words, Ishikawa was being arrested for in-
volvement in an incident that had already been resolved. The third and final crime 
listed on the arrest warrant, attempted extortion, alleges that Ishikawa delivered 
a ransom note to the Nakata residence seeking money for the missing girl’s safe 
return. It is a far more serious allegation than the previous two, yet the public 
prosecutor could find no basis to prosecute Ishikawa for this particular crime. 
However, the prosecutor did decide to bring formal charges for the other two 
crimes on June 13. Four days later, on June 17, Ishikawa was released on bail. 
Yet before he could leave the police station, police served him with another arrest 
warrant naming him as a suspect in the killing of young Yoshie.
Rather than being reunited with his family members after nearly four weeks 
in police custody, Ishikawa found himself being subjected to yet another round of 
intense questioning. A 2005 episode of “The Scoop” included a segment on the 
Sayama case as part of a special zeroing in on the problem of false accusation in 
the Japanese criminal justice system. Broadcast nationally on Asahi TV, the news 
program opened by giving viewers an intimate look at what transpires during 
police questioning. Speaking from a studio set built to replicate a typical interro-
gation room, co-host Torigoe Shuntaro describes how a suspect sits alone on one 
side of a small table in a tiny room that measures roughly fifty square feet while 
taking questions from a police officer seated directly in front of him on the other 
side of the table. Handwritten notes of the proceedings are taken by another of-
ficer seated at a second table. While these notes do not become part of the official 
court record, they may inform the separate statements crafted by police and pros-
ecutors and offered as evidence. Unlike in the American judicial system, there 
is no right for the defendant to have legal counsel present during interrogation. 
Nor is audio or visual recording of the session permitted at that time. Thus, there 
is no impartial account of what is said or done at the time of questioning when a 
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defendant is essentially cut off from the outside world. The host of the program 
notes that it is an environment ripe for potential abuse by authorities, resulting in 
incidents of “false accusation” or enzai. 
Although defendants are not allowed to have an attorney present during ques-
tioning by authorities, Article 39 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does al-
low them to confer privately with their attorneys during incarceration. However, 
during the time that he was in police custody, Ishikawa had this legally protected 
right severely constrained, if not outright violated. On the day of his re-arrest, 
Ishikawa was not allowed to meet with his lawyers. The following day, he met 
with his counsel for only twenty minutes. The day after that, their consultation 
time dwindled to just five minutes. He would spend another five minutes with his 
lawyer on June 20 before entering a five-day period where he did not meet with 
anyone. Given that he was taken into custody as a murder suspect, one wonders 
why Ishikawa seemed so disinterested in meeting with his attorneys. During part 
of his televised interview with Torigoe, Ishikawa explains his unwillingness to 
speak with his lawyers by stating that the police told him not to talk to them. 
Reluctant to violate a directive given by his jailers, he says, “Even when my 
lawyers did come, I would have them leave after two or three minutes.” By his 
thirty-second consecutive day in police custody (counting since the day of his 
initial arrest), Ishikawa’s story changed from a denial to a confession. On June 
23 he accepted sole responsibility for the kidnapping and murder by signing a 
confession written not by Ishikawa himself but, as is standard practice in Japan, 
by his jailers/interrogators.
Ishikawa had declared his innocence from the time he was arrested on charg-
es unrelated to the murder. From the very beginning authorities were asking him 
about the death of Nakata Yoshie; they subjected him to polygraph tests and start-
ed asking him about the case shortly after taking him into custody on May 23. De-
spite the polygraph tests and having his hair pulled repeatedly during long hours 
of questioning late into the night while handcuffed, Ishikawa had been steadfast 
in denying any involvement with or knowledge of the disappearance and murder 
of Yoshie. 
What happened to convince or compel him to reverse his testimony and con-
fess to murder? Ishikawa described how investigators presented him with evi-
dence linking his older brother to the crime. He was told that a footprint recovered 
from the crime scene matched that of his sibling. Unaware that this was a total 
fabrication by police, Ishikawa agreed to accept responsibility for the murder to 
spare his brother, the family’s principal bread winner at the time, from incarcera-
tion and thus to save his family from economic hardship. Police reassured him 
that if he confessed, they would not seek to prosecute his brother. What’s more, 
they told him he would only have to serve a ten-year sentence. At the opening of 
the trial on September 4, 1963 Ishikawa pleaded guilty. Roughly six months later 
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on March 11, 1964 the Urawa District Court sentenced him to death. 
The television special did a fantastic job of highlighting trouble spots within 
Japan’s criminal justice system by pointing to some of the systemic problems that 
enable law enforcement to exert extraordinary pressure on individuals in order 
to extract confessions that then become the primary basis for conviction. Many 
of these systemic deficiencies were evident in the way that authorities conducted 
their investigation in the Sayama case: arrest on unrelated charges, interrogation 
under duress, and restricted access to defense. The program notes a startling sta-
tistic that makes it clear that coerced confession and the specter of abuse of au-
thority by law enforcement officials is more common than one might think. A 
confession was part of the evidence marshaled against defendants in 84 percent 
(42 out of 50) of the confirmed enzai cases between 1945 and 1991 in which a 
conviction was later overturned. In other words, those wrongly convicted were 
coerced into confessing to a crime it was later proven they did not commit. As I 
will discuss shortly, Ishikawa and his supporters are convinced his case would be 
added to this tally of overturned cases were the courts to do an impartial analysis 
of the facts of the case.
There is another wrinkle to Ishikawa’s story that received only a brief men-
tion at the very end of Scoop’s segment on the Sayama case. Torigoe notes that 
Ishikawa is from a community that historically has been subject to discrimination 
and prejudice: he is a burakumin. As a result, Torigoe chastises his media counter-
parts for failing to give the story adequate attention and for neglecting to scruti-
nize the actions of investigators and the court. It must be encouraging to Ishikawa 
and his supporters to see some journalists accepting a measure of responsibility 
for what happened to him and start to give the Sayama case more attention now. 
But in addition to explaining why journalists shied away from this story, I discuss 
in this chapter how Ishikawa’s link to Japan’s burakumin is a critical element for 
understanding what the Sayama case means to a core group of supporters number-
ing in the thousands, who have worked tirelessly for decades using a variety of 
tactics and strategies to influence what was happening in the courts. 
Even though Ishikawa was released on parole in 1994, twice each year sup-
porters from all over the country gather in Tokyo and rally in support of him. They 
then take to the streets to march in protest against his arrest and conviction and, 
with this public show of outrage, to pressure the courts to revisit his case. Thou-
sands more still work toward a reversal of the guilty verdict by writing letters and 
cards demanding a retrial and by sponsoring local public awareness initiatives to 
educate people about the dubious facts surrounding Ishikawa’s conviction. 
Ishikawa and his supporters have sought to exert ever-increasing pressure 
on the judiciary by expanding the base of supporters from a predominantly bura-
kumin constituency to include Japanese citizens in general as well as those from 
the international community, using leverage from members of the United Nations 
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Human Rights Committee to pressure the Japanese government. In examining 
why Ishikawa and his supporters keep going to court and pursuing his case, I 
hope to illustrate how people in Japan are no less interested than people elsewhere 
in working through and on the courts to resolve conflict and bring about social 
change.
I use the Sayama case as a lens for reexamining the current trajectory of the 
Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei), a group of activists arguably 
best known for confronting discrimination head-on outside of the courts using 
confrontational tactics such as denunciation sessions (kyūdankai). I challenge this 
prevailing image of the organization; I argue that both the long history of protest 
activities concerning the Sayama case and the nature of some of the more recent 
forms the protest has taken make it clear that working through the judicial sys-
tem has become an increasingly important part of the political repertoire of those 
engaged in the Buraku Liberation Movement (BLM). As I show below, through 
these activities the Buraku Liberation League (BLL) has been influential in level-
ing some degree of external pressure (gaiatsu) on the state, even if it has yet to 
significantly alter the functioning of specific state institutions such as the judi-
ciary. Critiques concerning the state’s handling of the Sayama case now include 
specific reference to government statements in official reports submitted to inter-
national human rights entities like the United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee. This is no minor accomplishment because it works as a critically important 
counterbalance to “bureaucratic informality.”
Frank Upham (1987) coined the term “bureaucratic informality” to describe 
the way that elite bureaucrats within Japanese society seek to maintain the social 
and political status quo by manipulating the legal framework to “control the pace 
and course, if not substance, of social change” (p. 17). In other words, by taking 
an aggressive and central role in mediating disputes that could fundamentally 
alter the power structure, bureaucratic elites controlling the machinery of the state 
are able to make the changes necessary to resolve the potential crisis in a manner 
that ultimately maintains the status quo by preferring informal mechanisms to 
formal ones. According to this particular model, in the legal sphere the judiciary 
plays a rather limited role because, as Upham argues, “informality means most 
of all legal informality” (p. 22). This limited capacity of the judiciary to act to 
resolve disputes is essential to maintaining the power structure because the ju-
dicial process has the ability to make transparent, and thereby expose for public 
consideration and debate, fundamental issues that could potentially threaten the 
current balance of power.
Marshaling support for his argument, Upham presents several case studies of 
which the Buraku issue is one example. In his estimation, the various efforts of 
the government, specifically the wide range of programs created with the adop-
tion of the Law on Special Measures for Dōwa Projects in 1969, have effectively 
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contained the potentially catalytic effect of the grassroots movement for Buraku 
liberation by limiting the ability of activists supporting this cause to expand their 
base of support to the wider community. He observes that Buraku liberation ac-
tivists “have not been able to universalize their complaints or gain the political 
support that would enable the movement to begin to bring [them] into the main-
stream of employment and society” (p. 24). Upham provides an excellent model 
for charting the political dynamics limiting the ability of social movements that 
have taken root within a particular constituency to expand beyond their traditional 
political base of support and make inroads within the wider society. In this essay 
I consider how the BLL is responding to this challenge.
The attempt here to (re)assess the character of BLL activities as well as gauge 
their efficacy in terms of Upham’s model engages the central problematic at the 
heart of this volume—revisiting the all too common notion that people in Japan 
are presumably less interested than their Western counterparts in pursuing legal 
means to resolve conflict. In the case of the BLL the trope of the reluctant litigant 
is coupled with an equally intransigent image of Buraku liberation activists as in-
timidation brokers who choose deliberately to operate outside of the legal sphere 
in order to protect their prerogative of using high-pressure persuasion to achieve 
short-term compensation, if not long-term justice. 
The exemplar par excellence of this style of persuasion is the denunciation 
session. The denunciation tactic was inherited from the National Levelers Soci-
ety (Zenkoku Suiheisha), the first national political organization representing the 
interests of residents of Buraku areas. Denunciation essentially consists of BLL 
members confronting those who have allegedly engaged in some sort of behavior 
prejudicial against Buraku residents. This form of protest was radical when ini-
tially adopted because it publicly challenged the idea that Buraku residents were 
legitimate targets of discrimination because of their low social status. There have 
been times in the past when this confrontational approach resulted in violence 
of some sort (see Rohlen 1976; Upham 1987, 87–103). These days, however, 
outbreaks of violence are exceedingly rare. Denunciation sessions are preceded 
by small-scale fact-finding meetings (kakuninkai) between the parties involved. 
During the denunciation sessions that I witnessed involving companies believed 
to be practicing employment discrimination and rejecting applicants from Buraku 
districts, representatives of the local government were also present to witness the 
proceedings.
However, the Sayama case demonstrates that the goal of having a significant 
impact on the judiciary has inspired Buraku liberation activities for more than 
four decades. Despite its long history as a cornerstone of the Buraku Liberation 
Movement, the special significance of the Sayama case for those participating in 
the movement has not been examined thoroughly. By situating part of my analysis 
in the context of experiences accumulated during my fieldwork within a specific 
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Osaka Buraku, I hope to illuminate some of the activities that burakumin engage 
in outside of the court in an effort to influence what happens within the court. This 
is vital if we are to understand the uptick in activity following Ishikawa’s release 
on parole. The extent to which the Sayama case continues to be a focal point of 
the BLM addresses the question of why Ishikawa and his supporters keep going 
to court. The case is a potent mobilizing force for the movement and a constant 
reminder of the continuing victimization of burakumin.
Brief Overview Of the Buraku issue
The Buraku issue can be understood partly as an anachronistic vestige from an 
earlier historical period characterized by gross disparities in status and power. The 
word buraku literally means “hamlet” or “village.” The term hisabetsu buraku 
(discriminated-against buraku) refers to those communities whose roots can be 
traced back to outcaste groups during the Tokugawa period (1609–1867). During 
this time a calcification of status disparities tethered individuals to one of several 
groups that were ordered hierarchically. Society was divided into the following 
rank-ordered statuses: warriors followed by farmers, artisans, and merchants, 
each of which had to dress and live according to detailed regulations that made 
their status visible to all. Outside of the status hierarchy altogether (or rather at its 
very bottom) was the eta-hinin class. Eta translates roughly into “abundant filth,” 
and hinin means “nonhuman.” Both terms are extremely pejorative and are no 
longer considered acceptable to use. As these terms indicate, eta-hinin were sub-
jected to intense prejudice and social control. They were required to marry others 
of their status, reside in eta-hinin villages, and wear clothing and hairstyles that 
readily communicated their status (Ninomiya 1933, 97–98). 
Outcasts were officially liberated in 1871 when the Emancipation Procla-
mation issued by the Meiji Government declared all outcasts to be “new com-
moners.” The change in legal status did little, however, to improve their plight. 
If anything, the situation may have worsened as many in the general population 
bristled at the notion that they now occupied the same rung of the social hierarchy 
as the “former eta,” a phrase used in records and documents intermittently with 
“new commoner” to keep track of outcast households and individuals long after 
the status system was officially abandoned.
During the postwar years, much of Japan experienced improvements as the 
country went through a period of rapid economic growth. Those in Buraku ar-
eas, however, did not progress as rapidly as the rest of society. National surveys 
revealed significant gaps between the general population and Buraku residents, 
who experienced higher levels of poverty exacerbated by high unemployment and 
low educational attainment (Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho 1997; Sōmuchō 1995). 
Moreover, social prejudice against those residing in Buraku districts manifests 
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itself in areas such as marriage and employment discrimination. Private investiga-
tors would be hired by companies and individuals alike to conduct background 
checks on potential spouses or prospective employees to see if they had any ties 
to a Buraku. One need only gain access to an individual’s family register (koseki) 
to obtain information about his or her hometown. In 1976 the national law was 
amended to curtail discriminatory background checks by eliminating unfettered 
public access to family registers. An address alone, however, might provide in-
vestigators sufficient information if they are willing to travel in person to examine 
the neighborhood and talk with locals to determine whether or not an individual is 
burakumin. Of course if one had access to one of the comprehensive Buraku lists 
with the names and locations of more than 5,300 Buraku communities across the 
country, travel would not be necessary (Tomonaga 2006).
Over the years a number of organizations have formed to deal with the range 
of economic and social challenges confronting Buraku residents. The largest of 
these is the BLL, which dates back to 1946.2 The organization resumed the work 
of its organizational predecessor, the National Levelers Association (Zenkoku 
Suiheisha) founded in 1922. One of the distinctive features of the National Level-
ers Association was its use of direct confrontation to deal with instances of dis-
crimination against Buraku residents as a way of reaffirming the human dignity 
of burakumin while also challenging the prevailing social norms of the day. The 
BLL inherited this tradition of confronting and correcting various manifestations 
of discrimination experienced by Buraku residents including everything from so-
cial prejudice to material needs such as adequate and affordable housing. 
The cause of Buraku liberation received a huge boost in 1969 when the 
government passed the Law on Special Measures for Dōwa Projects, which 
designated public funds for community improvement projects in designated 
Buraku. Buraku communities that received money are referred to in government 
documents as dōwa districts. The last such law expired in March 2002. During 
the thirty-three years of legislative initiatives, funds were allocated to pave 
roads, to construct housing with adequate plumbing and sewage facilities, and to 
establish youth and senior citizen centers that provided important services. The 
economic position of many Buraku households was improved thanks to programs 
such as housing subsidies, employment assistance, and a scholarship program 
2. Initially the organization was named the National Committee for Buraku Liberation as individuals 
with a diverse range of political views joined in collaboration to restart the Buraku Liberation 
Movement. The organization changed its name to the Buraku Liberation League in August 1955. 
The diversity of opinions eventually led to the splintering of the organization a few years after 
the Special Measures Legislation went into effect in 1969. Members favorable to the general 
approach taken by the Communist Party, which preferred to address the Buraku issue as part of 
the larger social and economic challenges confronting society at large opted to break away from 
the Buraku Liberation League and form their own organization in 1976, named Zenkoku Buraku 
Kaihō Undō Rengōkai (National Buraku Liberation Association).
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for youth designed to boost education levels and thus facilitate a transition into 
better paying jobs. Human rights education programs in schools and companies, 
denunciation sessions by the BLL, and mass protests have all helped curtail 
blatant acts of discrimination. Nonetheless, discrimination persists (Central 
Executive Committee for the Establishment of Buraku Liberation and Human 
Rights Policies 2008; New York Times 2009).
histOrical BackgrOund Of the sayama case3
May 1, 1963 in Sayama City—this day should have been a happy one for Nakata 
Yoshie because it marked her sixteenth birthday. However, it became a day of 
tragedy when she never returned home from school. According to Yoshie’s class-
mates, she departed school around 3:30 p.m. When she had not returned home by 
early evening, her family began to worry. Her brother, Kenji, searched for Yoshie 
in the general vicinity of her high school and the local train station. His search 
was fruitless. He returned home at 7:30 p.m. Although deeply concerned, the fam-
ily members commenced to have dinner. During dinner, Kenji noticed a white 
envelope lodged in the glass door of the main entrance. The envelope contained 
a ransom note addressed to the father. This was the start of the Sayama incident.
In the letter the kidnapper demanded that on the following night ¥200,000 be 
brought to the gate of Sanoya, a general store located about one kilometer west 
of the Nakata residence. Not wanting to jeopardize Yoshie’s welfare, the family 
complied, but not before consulting with police. It was decided that Yoshie’s older 
sister would deliver counterfeit money in accordance with the instructions con-
tained in the ransom letter. At 11:50 p.m. she traveled to the designated location 
with an envelope of fake bills in hand. She was not alone. Approximately forty 
police officers waited surreptitiously for the kidnapper to appear to collect the 
money. The officers came not only from the local police station but also from the 
Saitama Prefectural Police Headquarters.
Twenty minutes passed before the abductor arrived. Calling out from a 
tea field located next to the store, he asked warily, “Hey! Hey! Are you here?” 
The older sister acknowledged that she was there with the money. The culprit, 
possibly suspecting that he may have been walking into a trap, did not come out 
to get the money immediately. Instead, he continued the conversation for another 
3. The particulars of the Sayama case presented here are taken from Buraku Liberation League Head-
quarters (1994, 1998), Buraku Liberation Research Institute (1989, 71–76, 187–200), and Hina-
moto (1994), plus the voluminous compilation of Noma Hiroshi (1997) that totals nearly two 
thousand pages. This three-volume set contains articles Noma wrote for the magazine Sekai over 
a sixteen-year period from February 1975 to April 1991. Pages 27–74 of the introduction to this 
volume contain an illuminating roundtable discussion in which the lead attorney for Ishikawa’s 
legal team, Nakayama Taketoshi, participates. 
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ten minutes or so. Suddenly, things went awry. The kidnapper yelled, “You told 
the police, didn’t you! I can see two of them over there. Since I can’t pick up 
the money, I am going home.” Upon hearing this, police officers sounded their 
whistles and rushed into the field to apprehend the kidnapper. Their efforts were 
to no avail, however. The kidnapper successfully managed to escape though the 
field.
Several consequences followed from not apprehending the kidnapper on that 
night. First, the outcome most likely contributed to the murder of Yoshie, whose 
corpse was found on May 4, just two days after the botched arrest attempt. Sec-
ond, the Saitama Prefectural Police became the target of intense public scrutiny. 
Their competence was being questioned publicly in major newspapers and even 
within the Diet because one month earlier police in neighboring Tokyo had failed 
to apprehend a kidnapper in the abduction case of a young boy. This initial failure 
had done much to undermine public trust in the competence of police. Predictably, 
that trust further eroded when news spread of police committing the same kind of 
mishap again within one month’s time. Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato stood in the 
Diet and implored the police to “take every necessary step to see to it that such a 
thing never happens again.” With the discovery of young Yoshie’s body, it seemed 
that public opinion placed a great deal of responsibility, if not outright culpability, 
on the police.
In an effort to rehabilitate their tarnished image and regain the public trust, 
police stepped up efforts to find the kidnapper/killer in the Sayama case. Their 
investigation quickly led them to focus on 120 young men residing in Buraku 
areas, from whom they collected alibis and handwriting samples to compare with 
the writing style of the person who penned the ransom note. Some were asked 
to provide biological samples, which were used to compare their blood type to 
that of the murderer. Ishikawa was one of the individuals targeted by the police 
investigation. The way the investigation was conducted, with authorities collect-
ing information from such a large group of people with nothing in common other 
than their Buraku roots, seems to indicate that police had no specific information 
leading them to a particular individual. Rather, the investigations looks like a 
fishing expedition that smacks of residential profiling. I use “residential profiling” 
in a similar sense as the better known “racial profiling” in order to highlight the 
significance of the Buraku as a place, both in terms of identifying burakumin as a 
group and also in order to highlight the special attention given to location in the 
way that the police investigation unfolded.
SabetSu Saiban (discriminatiOn trial)
News of a judgment in the Sayama case in March 1964 spread around the country. 
Mainstream media outlets would report that the Sayama incident had come to an 
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end as the man convicted of killing Tanaka Yoshie would pay with his own life. 
This death sentence, which most likely signaled to the general public a just resolu-
tion to an emotionally wrenching case, signaled something quite different to many 
Buraku residents across the country. They saw the verdict issued in the Sayama 
case as a clear example of a Buraku resident being made a scapegoat. Ishikawa’s 
arrest, conviction, and sentence were deemed to be grossly unjust acts that needed 
to be contested and overturned so that justice might ultimately be done.
There are several points of contention noted by Ishikawa’s supporters. First 
and foremost are the facts surrounding the ransom note. Buraku liberation activ-
ists have argued that the author of the ransom note was clearly someone who 
had attained a literacy level higher than that of Ishikawa, who, like many Buraku 
residents during the time, had to forego formal education beyond primary school 
so that he could earn money to help his family make a living. As is evident from 
the writing sample obtained prior to arrest, Ishikawa had a limited knowledge of 
kanji (Chinese characters) corresponding roughly to the number of kanji learned 
during the first three years of elementary school. Moreover, he seemed unable to 
use punctuation marks appropriately. He frequently failed to use any punctuation 
at all, producing a sequence of run-on sentences. Unaccustomed to writing, his 
characters were blockish. All of these characteristics of his writing style stand in 
stark contrast to those of the author of the ransom note. Punctuation and kanji are 
used freely, and the penmanship has a measure of originality stemming from the 
use of characters with curvature. Critics of the Sayama case adduce this difference 
in writing ability and writing style to argue that Ishikawa could not be the one who 
wrote the ransom note. This objection, however, carried very little weight with the 
trial judges. In rejecting Ishikawa’s request for a retrial, the court acknowledged 
the difference in writing styles of the ransom note and the samples of Ishikawa’s 
writing, but asserted that an individual’s handwriting can be influenced both by 
external factors, such as the environment, and internal factors, such as state of 
mind. Therefore, according to the rationale offered by the bench, just because 
the writing style is different it does not necessarily mean the same person did not 
write it.
Another suspicious piece of evidence upon which Mr. Ishikawa’s conviction 
was based is a pink fountain pen allegedly belonging to the victim. The pen was 
not discovered at the Ishikawa residence until three days after his confession. 
It took three officers 24 minutes to locate this item on June 26, 1963. Critics 
point not only to the timeliness of this discovery but also to the fact that police 
had failed to discover the pen on two previous searches. The initial search of the 
Ishikawa home by twelve officers took place on May 23, the same day that he 
was first arrested on unrelated charges, and lasted for two hours and seventeen 
minutes. Fourteen officers conducted a second search on June 18 for two hours 
and eight minutes. Neither of these searches turned up any physical evidence 
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linking Ishikawa to the crime. Most importantly, however, an officer who was part 
of the first investigation for evidence inside the home is on record as saying he was 
“surprised” when he heard a pen was found above a doorframe of the Ishikawa 
residence because he had previously searched that specific place thoroughly and 
found nothing.
Aside from the timing of its discovery, questions arose as to whether the pen 
that was found was actually the one that belonged to Yoshie. Her school notebook 
contained writing in blue ink only. However, the pen discovered at the Ishikawa 
home was filled with black ink. The court discounted this by maintaining that one 
cannot rule out the possibility that Ishikawa might have stopped at a post office 
or somewhere and purchased new ink for the pen. Since prosecutors presented no 
evidence to this effect, many are puzzled (and frustrated) at the unwillingness of 
the court judges to acknowledge inconsistencies such as this, which raise impor-
tant doubts about the discovery of the pen and whether in fact this was actually 
the writing instrument used by the victim. A final point concerning this one piece 
of evidence, the only piece of evidence used by prosecutors to establish a direct 
link between the victim and the alleged murderer, is the fact that Ishikawa’s fin-
gerprints were not found on it. For that matter, his fingerprints were not found on 
any items recovered by the police during their investigation, including the ransom 
note and the envelope within which it was placed.
Such questionable circumstances regarding evidentiary items have supported 
a general belief among many Buraku residents, and increasingly the general pub-
lic, that the Sayama case is a clear example of enzai or “false accusation.” This 
view is strengthened all the more by a general sense that the choice in the very 
beginning to arbitrarily target Buraku residents smacks of prejudice. In addition 
to this initial decision to focus on youth residing in Buraku areas, there is a feel-
ing that the consistency with which the judicial system has turned a blind eye to 
the dubious veracity of the evidence in the Sayama case is also the product of 
discrimination against Buraku communities. For these reasons the Sayama case 
is referred to most often by Buraku liberation activists as a sabetsu saiban or 
“discrimination trial.” 
significance Of the sayama case
As a cornerstone of the BLM, the Sayama case provides a unique perspective on 
subtle but significant shifts in the political mobilization efforts of those with ties 
to Japan’s Buraku areas. It also gives a vantage point from which to critique a 
dominant image in Japanese society of Buraku residents as political extortionists 
who rely on tactics like denunciation sessions to achieve their ends. Denunciation 
sessions continue to be one of several means employed by the BLL in parts of 
Japan. However, the Sayama struggle makes it clear that the organization employs 
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more conventional means too. Through a combined use of domestic courts, hu-
man rights discourse, and international organizations, the BLL has reframed its 
movement as a universal one aimed at protecting the fundamental rights of the 
individual against the state.
The Sayama case provides a superb opportunity to gauge the shifting political 
trajectory of the BLM. During my fieldwork in Osaka from July 1997 to August 
1999, it became apparent that the case was a focal point of postwar politics con-
cerning the Buraku issue. First, it is one of but three issues printed on the yellow 
protest vests often worn by members of the BLL during official events such as 
negotiation sessions with the local government, denunciation sessions, and public 
demonstrations like the protest marches held in Tokyo to condemn verdicts ren-
dered in the Sayama case and demand a retrial. The Sayama case dominates one 
entire side of the protest vest upon which the following is written: “We Denounce 
the Sayama Discrimination Trial” (Sayama Sabetsu Saiban Kyūdan) and “We De-
mand a Retrial” (Saishin Yōkyū). The other side of the vest calls for the establish-
ment of a Fundamental Law of Buraku Liberation and denounces the Buraku Lists 
Incident, which refers to the discovery in 1975 of several books listing the names 
and locations of Buraku areas that were found in the possession of several large 
companies that used them to weed out job applicants from Buraku districts (see 
Tomonaga 2006). 
The second thing that impressed upon me the significance attributed to the 
Sayama case was my discovery one day of a bas-relief in an obscure spot in 
Saiwaichiku (pseudonym), the Buraku in western Japan where I conducted the 
bulk of my research. The right side of the bas-relief shows riot police wearing 
helmets and wielding shields as they stand at the entrance of the Supreme Court. 
Foregrounded on the same side of the sculpture is a group of BLL protesters iden-
tifiable by a flag held in the air by the leader of the group. The flag being hoisted 
is none other than the Keikanki, the official flag of the Buraku Liberation League, 
which features the symbolic mark inherited from the National Levelers Associa-
tion: a red crown of thorns against a black backdrop. Within the sculpture one can 
discern protesters of various ages showing expressions of frustration, outrage, and 
determination as they mobilize against what they believe to be a miscarriage of 
justice. One can also make out in the background school-age children distributing 
leaflets to passersby. When asked who created this piece of work, residents an-
swered that it was a joint effort by “everyone” in the community. While there are 
certainly those that played no part in the creation of the sculpture, the sentiment 
expressed about the broad support for the Sayama case was largely confirmed by 
my own observations. The Sayama case received considerable support from the 
overwhelming majority of the community. It did not have the kind of polarizing 
effect other issues sometimes had. Thus, the sculpture exceeds being a representa-
tion of communal solidarity and becomes its very manifestation.
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Notably, this politically inspired artwork also represents a divide between 
Saiwaichiku and the local government. This symbol of support for Ishikawa is 
located on a second floor balcony on the back side of the Youth Center, a location 
that renders it invisible to anyone except those standing on the balcony. This less 
than ideal location was picked because local officials disapproved of placing it 
in a more prominent location, given that Ishikawa had been convicted of murder. 
There were two other artistic works authorities did not contest, and they were 
prominently displayed. Perched atop the Human Rights Culture Center, for ex-
ample, is a statue named Ogari. It portrays a mother protecting two of her children 
from a looming threat by shielding them with her body as she stretches out her 
right arm in what appears to be an attempt to keep some sort of peril at bay. Like-
wise, running along the side of the Youth Center that faces a park area, there is 
another piece of community-crafted art showing individuals of various ages wear-
ing expressions of pain and agony. The trio of artistic works was part of a joint 
venture meant to represent different elements of the community and the BLM—
the emotional toll taken on those subjected to discrimination, the determination 
to meet any challenge, and the resolve to mobilize en mass to challenge injustice.
The third and final indication of the importance of the Sayama case within the 
movement was the fact that it was routinely on the agenda of local, regional, and 
national meetings of the BLL. During larger gatherings the topic of Sayama was 
often addressed within the context of a thematic session devoted to disseminating 
the latest information regarding the status of the push for a retrial. Occasionally, 
lawyers representing Ishikawa would be in attendance to answer detailed ques-
tions regarding the legal intricacies of the case. It was not unusual for Ishikawa 
himself to make a personal appearance, as he did at the national meeting of the 
women’s branch of the BLL in 1997. His presence alone sent a spark through the 
room; his soft-spoken manner and frequent expressions of gratitude for the un-
wavering support he has received from core members of the organization seemed 
to strengthen the resolve of those listening to him speak. Since being paroled on 
December 21, 1994, he has become a living legend within Buraku communities 
throughout the country. His apology to the group of activists assembled from all 
corners of the country for not being able to entertain all of the requests for a per-
sonal visit underscored just how significant the cause he symbolizes continues to 
be within the contemporary movement for Buraku liberation.
I had the opportunity to meet him during the national meeting of the women’s 
branch, when I was introduced to him by a resident of Saiwaichiku who had per-
sonal ties to his wife. My impression at the time was that he was not altogether 
comfortable with the central role he has come to play. He struck me as a reticent 
man who would just as soon not be caught in the limelight. I noticed during the 
afternoon’s session (and on one other occasion as the Ishikawa couple addressed 
a crowd of thousands during one of the Tokyo demonstrations) that Mrs. Ishikawa 
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bore a considerable share of the weight of her husband’s celebrity by appearing 
in public with him and following his usually concise public statements with her 
own comments. Her well-chosen words, charisma, and apparent comfort before 
large crowds made her especially effective at communicating gratitude to long-
time supporters. Her outgoing personality made her the perfect person to act as a 
buffer between her somewhat subdued husband and the multitudes of people who 
look to him as a source of inspiration, something which has become arguably a 
critically important function as the BLL grapples with changing circumstances. 
Long before they got married in 1996, Mrs. Ishikawa was a Buraku liberation 
activist who campaigned tirelessly with others demanding a retrial of the Sayama 
case. It is hard to imagine anyone better suited to help Mr. Ishikawa make the 
transition back into society after thirty-one years and seven months of incarcera-
tion. Ishikawa struck me as a totally different person when I saw him at a 2005 
Citizens’ Meeting Demanding a Retrial of the Sayama Case held for the first time 
in the city of Sayama. When he addressed the crowd of roughly 4,000 supporters, 
he spoke with a confidence and determination I did not see in 1997. To the extent 
that this was due to the overwhelming support network he had both in public 
and private, one can only wonder how others embroiled in suspected as well as 
confirmed enzai cases cope with life post-prison. See Steinhoff (this volume) for 
more on the significance of support groups.
 Sayama had a firm place not only within the national meetings of the BLL but 
also within small-scale gatherings that took place in communities like Saiwaichi-
ku. During one of the regular neighborhood meetings, for example, everyone was 
encouraged to write postcards to be sent to the Supreme Court expressing disap-
proval with the handling of the Sayama case. Pens and postcards were prepared 
in advance. They were distributed along with several succinct examples of how 
one might express dissatisfaction with the reluctance of the courts to overturn Mr. 
Ishikawa’s guilty verdict or retry his case. One reason sample statements support-
ing Ishikawa were distributed is that many among the older generations in Buraku 
areas received little formal education. In general, senior residents of Saiwaichiku 
were much more active in local affairs, and they were well represented at this 
meeting. Of course, having a model at hand also made it much easier to complete 
the task, thereby increasing the odds of widespread participation. 
Whether at formal sessions within larger national meetings or more informal 
gatherings within particular Buraku communities like Saiwaichiku, it was not un-
common to bring things to a close with a rendition of what might be called the 
Sayama theme song: “Sabetsu Saiban Uchikudakō” (Let’s Shatter the Discrimina-
tion Trial).
Declaring innocence from West to East
We march beneath our flag of a crown of thorns
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Let’s shatter the discrimination trial
Let’s shatter the discrimination trial
Against the Sayama discrimination trial
We must fight resolutely
Let’s take back young Ishikawa
Let’s take back young Ishikawa
We declare his innocence 
As a group of three million brothers
Let’s shatter the discrimination trial
Let’s shatter the discrimination trial
The lyrics clearly are a call for sustained engagement with the courts in the 
fight against the verdict rendered in the Sayama case. The only way to shatter the 
trial is to work through and on the courts to achieve the ultimate aim of proving 
Ishikawa’s innocence and, in so doing, win this particular round in the ongoing 
battle against discrimination.
develOpment Of the sayama prOtests
The Sayama case had a catalytic effect among the various branches and members 
of the BLL. The organization quickly began to rally around the fate of Ishikawa. 
Public pronouncements of support for him would in a short time give rise to large-
scale demonstrations numbering in the thousands. At its twentieth national meet-
ing on October 5, 1965, just a year and a half after his conviction, the BLL offi-
cially took the position that he was in fact innocent, and it called for a new public 
trial to exonerate him. Four years later it would begin protest activities demand-
ing Ishikawa’s release. In 1970 a massive demonstration was organized against 
the “discrimination trial.” A procession traveled across the country protesting his 
conviction and continued incarceration.
Mr. Ishikawa’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by the 
Tokyo High Court on October 31, 1974. Although likely relieved to some degree 
to see that his life was no longer on the line, those protesting against the Sayama 
case were enraged by this verdict because, in their eyes, an innocent man was 
still being held accountable for a crime he did not commit. Despite revelations 
such as glaring inconsistencies between the confession Ishikawa gave the police 
and the facts established in the case, the judge disregarded these discrepancies 
as insignificant and attributed them to the defendant’s tendency to mix fact with 
fiction (Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho 1989, 3:134). Upon hearing the news that the 
original conviction was upheld by the courts, thirteen thousand people took to the 
streets of Tokyo in protest over the ruling that, in effect, reaffirmed Ishikawa’s 
culpability.
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This verdict, which seemed indifferent to the appeals of the thousands or-
ganizing in support of Ishikawa, sparked another phase of protests. A couple of 
demonstrations that stand out in particular were those staged by youth living in 
Buraku areas. Simultaneously with the submission of an appeal to the Supreme 
Court by Ishikawa’s lawyers on January 28, 1976, approximately ten thousand 
elementary and junior high school students in Nara and Osaka participated in 
the Sayama dōmei kyūkō and refused to attend classes in protest (World Human 
Rights Research Center 1999, 190). This number increased tenfold on May 22 of 
the same year when one hundred thousand school children from 1,500 schools 
across the country boycotted classes in a day of protest (Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho 
1989, 3:187). Of course the young age of the participants in both cases raises 
questions about whether they were acting on their own volition. It is unlikely 
that they would be able to execute such a well-coordinated act of protest without 
the guidance and permission of their parents and other adults in the community. 
Nonetheless, one can argue that these two protests are indicative of just how gal-
vanized Buraku communities and the families living within them were during this 
time. Even children were encouraged to take part in the mass protests.
Saiwaichiku was also abuzz with political activities criticizing the handling 
of the Sayama case. According to local residents, the roots of the national Sayama 
campaign can be traced back to this very community. “At a time when other shibu 
[BLL branch offices] were preoccupied with machizukuri [community improve-
ment projects], we pressed the importance of the campaign against the Sayama 
verdict because it was literally a matter of life and death.” These words were 
spoken by the head of the Saiwaichiku branch of the BLL as he showed me pic-
tures of local residents in protest dating back more than twenty years. The pic-
tures depicted scenes of an entire community that stood together: a photograph 
of hundreds of men, women, and children crowded in the local gymnasium (the 
only space available at the time for public meetings of this magnitude) during a 
community forum to discuss the Sayama case; a picture of community residents 
marching through the local streets carrying signs denouncing the verdict; and 
snapshots of groups of residents distributing informational fliers clarifying the 
facts surrounding the Sayama trial to people at train stations, shopping centers, 
and other public venues.
The extent to which the community mobilized around the Sayama case 
is reflected in an original form of protest carried out by five young men from 
Saiwaichiku. Protesting the handling of the Sayama case in particular and dis-
crimination against Buraku residents in general, these five individuals walked 
roughly 700 kilometers from Osaka to Tokyo. It took the better part of one month 
for them to reach their destination. The extended journey helped galvanize and 
solidify Buraku communities across the country as the group made several stops 
along the way for food and lodging, enlisting the support of several Buraku areas 
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located between Osaka and the nation’s capital. The documentary of the protest 
march, “Sayama: 700 Kilometers from Osaka to Tokyo,” which is preserved in 
the library of the Human Rights Cultural Center in Saiwaichiku, contains ample 
footage of the five men being cheered on by local BLL members and Ishikawa 
supporters in whatever region of the country they were passing through on that 
particular day. Many who came out to voice their support wore yellow protest 
vests nearly identical to the ones donned by the marchers. Against the yellow 
background of the vest, the text of the slogans, written in bold red characters 
denouncing the Sayama verdict and calling for a retrial, seemed to jump off the 
chests of the marching protestors and their supporters.
Mass protests were part of a comprehensive effort to respond to what was 
transpiring within the judicial system and to put pressure on the state to overturn 
Ishikawa’s conviction. In addition to these types of mass demonstrations, there 
have been a dizzying amount of legal actions pursued to spur the reversal of court 
decisions. Yet at every turn prosecutors have presented a rebuttal deemed more 
compelling in the opinion of the bench. The courts have consistently ruled against 
legal challenges mounted by Ishikawa. Following his original conviction and sen-
tencing by the Urawa District Court on March 11, 1964, Ishikawa’s lawyers filed 
an appeal with the Tokyo High Court on the very next day. Though the sentence 
was downgraded to a life sentence with hard labor, the conviction was upheld 
on October 31, 1974. This decision too was challenged with an appeal to the Su-
preme Court, which was ultimately dismissed by the Second Petty Bench of the 
Supreme Court on August 9, 1977. Just two days later Ishikawa’s lawyers filed 
an objection with the Supreme Court over the ruling, but the Court rejected this 
challenge four days later on August 15. On August 30, attorneys for Ishikawa filed 
papers seeking a retrial with the Tokyo High Court. The Fourth Criminal Division 
of the High Court ruled against the retrial request on February 7, 1980. Ishikawa’s 
legal team filed a formal protest with the Tokyo High Court on February 12 on the 
grounds that the Court failed to consider new evidence germane to the case, but 
this action was also denied on March 25, 1981. Five days later a special appeal 
was filed with the Supreme Court. Like in the past, this proved to be unsuccess-
ful when rejected by the Supreme Court’s Second Petty Bench on May 28, 1985. 
The following year on August 21, legal proceedings were initiated at the To-
kyo High Court requesting, for a second time, a new trial. More than thirteen 
years would pass before Judge Takagi Toshio ruled against the request on July 
9, 1999. Ishikawa’s legal team wasted no time as they filed a complaint over the 
decision with the Tokyo High Court on July 12. Judge Takahashi Shogo dismissed 
the complaint on January 23, 2002, setting the stage for another round of legal ac-
tions at the highest court. On January 29, Ishikawa filed a special appeal with the 
First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court. Yet again the Court would rule against 
him in the decision rendered by Supreme Court First Petty Bench Judge Shimada 
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Niro on March 16, 2005. On the day marking the forty-third year since his arrest, 
May 23, 2006, Ishikawa commenced proceedings demanding for the third time 
that the Tokyo High Court grant him a retrial. 
The BLL has helped coordinate Ishikawa’s legal team, most of whom work at 
greatly reduced rates. Money to pay legal bills and other expenses is raised partly 
through donations routinely collected as part of the mass demonstrations in To-
kyo. Additional funds are raised through selling literature relating to the Sayama 
case, including one monthly serial titled Sayama Sabetsu Saiban (The Sayama 
Discrimination Trial), which has been published since February 21, 1974. A non-
government organization started by the BLL in 1988, the International Movement 
Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism, has helped extend support for 
the Sayama struggle beyond the borders of Japan. For decades the BLL has played 
a critical role by providing the political, economic, and emotional support to help 
Ishikawa sustain his legal battle for exoneration. Perhaps because the base of sup-
port has expanded considerably and the audience it hopes to reach with its mes-
sage has grown too, one can discern a subtle shift in the tenor of recent Buraku 
liberation activities.
evOlving struggle
The changing character of the Sayama struggle was evident during one of the 
mass demonstrations I attended in Tokyo in October 1998 to denounce the 1974 
upholding of Ishikawa’s conviction by Justice Terao Shōji of the Tokyo High 
Court. The event attracted thousands of participants, the majority of whom 
seemed to be close to Ishikawa’s own generation. As was true with the delega-
tion from Saiwaichiku, young faces were present but scarce. Predictably, the bulk 
of the audience was affiliated with a Buraku community that could be identified 
by the flag each delegation carried. However, I saw several banners designating 
non-BLL groups, such as labor organizations and religious coalitions, that were 
on hand to show their support. 
Still more unexpected were the citizens groups present to express their sup-
port for reconsidering the Sayama case. There were about forty such groups at the 
rally, each hailing from a different part of the country. These groups were called 
Sayama Jiken o Kangaeru Jyūmin no Kai (Association of Citizens for Contem-
plating the Sayama Case).4 Most of these citizens wore makeshift vests with slo-
gans calling for a reexamination of the Sayama case or demanding all the eviden-
tiary material be disclosed. These slogans were in line with most of the demands 
4. As of 2001 the number of such groups jumped to 103 (Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Re-




written on the large banners that were draped over the stage.
• We demand that Justice Takagi have the prosecution make the entire
 evidentiary record available!
• The Tokyo prosecutor’s office should comply with the United Nations
 and make all evidence available!
• We demand that the Tokyo prosecutor’s office immediately make
 available a list of all evidentiary items!
• Let’s encourage a democratic revolution within the judiciary through a
 broad-based citizen’s movement!
The above slogans approach the Sayama case as a matter of protecting the 
individual from abusive state power. It is interesting to note the slight tension 
between this particular framing of the Sayama case and the way it was presented 
in some of the other banners:
• Ishikawa Kazuo is innocent! We denounce the Sayama discrimination
 trial!
• We denounce the 36th year of the false arrest of Ishikawa Kazuo and the
 illegal use of state authority rooted in Buraku discrimination!
• We demand that the Tokyo High Court immediately conduct an
 investigation into the true facts and hold a retrial!
• Let’s bring about an investigation into the true facts, open up access to
 the evidentiary record, and win a retrial and a not-guilty verdict!
• Let’s create a “Citizens Group for Contemplating the Sayama Case” in
 every region of the country!
The sentiments expressed through these banners are more politically charged 
than the others. Likewise, they call for more drastic action than both the first set 
of banners and the types of slogans espoused by the citizens groups. In fact, the 
slogan of the final banner explicitly identifies growing the number of such civic 
groups scrutinizing the criminal justice system’s handling of the Sayama incident 
as a key organizational aim of the BLL. The other banners assert Ishikawa’s in-
nocence, question the veracity of the Supreme Court proceedings, list securing a 
not-guilty verdict as the endgame, and subordinate the issue of excessive use of 
state authority to a theme of Buraku discrimination. 
A close look at the messages on the banners revealed that the Sayama demon-
stration drew its support from two different sources. This was suggested not only 
by the particular concerns written on the banners but also by their spatial arrange-
ment. The first four slogans were listed on the left side of the stage area, and the 
remaining five were listed on the right side. The right side banners clearly situated 
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the Sayama case within the long history of political activism of Buraku residents 
and their attempts to liberate Buraku districts through their own efforts, a goal 
first articulated by the National Levelers Association (Zenkoku Suiheisha) in the 
1920s. The demands listed on the left, however, drew on more general themes that 
present the Sayama case as a fundamental problem resulting from infringements 
by the state. These different bases for critiquing the Sayama case were manifest 
among the participants in the slogans they chanted as well as those they displayed 
on their chests as they marched through the streets of Tokyo. Despite attending the 
event to express solidarity, the call from citizens groups to think about or consider 
the breakdown of the judicial process in the Sayama case and the fundamental hu-
man rights concerns it embodies were considerably more measured in tone than 
the unqualified assertions of Ishikawa’s innocence and charges of anti-Buraku 
discrimination coming from the various BLL delegations.
An equilibrium of sorts seems to have been reached, judging from more 
recent protests. The number of banners at some meetings, for example, has been 
reduced to a single one overhanging the stage area. In other protests where multiple 
banners are featured, the same banner is reproduced multiple times. Judging from 
photographs of the many different events held across the country in support of 
Ishikawa, the emphasis seems to have shifted to framing the Sayama case as an 
example of false accusation (enzai). Casting the Sayama incident primarily as 
an enzai matter spurs greater awareness of the problem of false accusation in the 
criminal justice system as well as greater awareness of troubling aspects of police 
investigations and court proceedings that increase the risk of enzai. This way of 
framing the Sayama case also allows the BLL to synchronize it with international 
human rights discourse and seek assistance from external bodies like the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, which has consistently pressed the Japanese 
state to make reforms such as full disclosure of all evidence gathered during 
investigations so that defendants have access to material that might exonerate 
them. The continuous expansion of the community of potential supporters through 
the superimposition of gradually broader frames—Buraku discrimination, denial 
of due process guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution, human rights violation—
reflects a concerted effort to universalize the problem and expand the limited 
options available through bureaucratic informality. 
discursive duality and pOlitical mOBilizatiOn
The Sayama case continues to be a focal point of the political activities within 
Buraku communities across Japan. It still has the support of thousands of mem-
bers of the BLL. It is also attracting new supporters because it illustrates a con-
crete problem concerning the rules of evidence within the judicial system. Attor-
neys representing Ishikawa maintain that one reason they were not able to mount 
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a suitable defense was because the prosecution was under no obligation to share 
evidence they were not going to use during trial. Until very recently, there was 
no rule of discovery obliging the prosecution to share all evidence regardless of 
whether it strengthens or weakens their case. There is a strong feeling among 
many that there is evidence in the possession of the state that may help prove the 
innocence of Ishikawa. 
This argument has been used to broaden the base of support well beyond Bu-
raku residents. Ordinary citizens are politically mobilized as partners in protest by 
pointing out that the Sayama case illustrates how the fundamental human rights 
of all Japanese citizens are imperiled within the current judicial system. Thus, the 
banners and slogans of the non-BLL members participating in the demonstration 
advocate thinking broadly about the Sayama case as something of significance 
for every citizen of Japan. Among the mainstream citizens protesting Ishikawa’s 
arrest, there are fewer slogans denouncing the ruling of Justice Terao of the Tokyo 
High Court or asserting Ishikawa’s innocence. This is in stark contrast to BLL 
protesters for whom the demonstration is a massive denunciation of nearly every 
aspect of the Sayama case.
The legalities concerning evidentiary proceedings have also been used 
as a basis for constructing the Sayama case as a gross human rights violation 
before members of the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The BLL 
has worked hard to promote knowledge of the Buraku issue in general and the 
Sayama case in particular outside of Japan. Although the committee does not 
mention Ishikawa or the Sayama case by name, there are unmistakable echoes 
of Sayama resonating in the words of criticism the Human Rights Committee 
directed at the Japanese government in response to the Fourth Periodic Report 
submitted in 1997:
 
The Committee is concerned that under the criminal law, there is no 
obligation on the prosecution to disclose evidence it may have gath-
ered in the course of the investigation other than that which it intends 
to produce at the trial, and that the defense has no general right to ask 
for the disclosure of that material at any stage of the proceedings. The 
Committee recommends that, in accordance with the guarantees pro-
vided for in article 14, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the State party 
ensure that its law and practice enable the defense to have access to all 
relevant material in order that the right of defense is not hampered.5 
5. The Committee’s full response to Japan’s Fourth Periodic Report can be found on the website 
of the United Nations at the following web address: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Sym-
bol)/CCPR.C.79.Add.102.En?Opendocument. One can also locate the Human Rights Commit-
tee’s response to Japan’s Fifth Periodic Report submitted in December 2006. The committee 
expressed frustration that most of its recommendations were not acted upon sufficiently. See 
Repeta 2009.
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The committee’s words are perfectly in synch with one of the rallying cries 
of the demonstration: Make all evidence available! The words of the committee 
are also a testament to the success of the BLL in courting justice domestically by 
enlisting the support of international organizations and institutions.
Ishikawa himself made a plea in person to members of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee on October 15, 2008. Having obtained special permis-
sion to leave the country and travel to Geneva, Switzerland despite his status as 
a parolee convicted of murder, he appealed to members of the committee to help 
him gain access to the evidentiary materials not disclosed by the prosecution. 
New evidence is the primary factor considered by the courts to determine whether 
or not to grant an appeal to retry a case. Ishikawa and his legal team continue 
to press for full disclosure of all evidence gathered by investigators during the 
Sayama case in order to be able to determine what evidence not introduced by 
the prosecution during the trial could be presented to the courts in an effort to 
win a retrial. Although recent changes in the legal system permit more discovery 
if the defense asks for it, the revisions do not apply to cases tried under the old 
rules. Thus, pressing for full disclosure is of paramount importance to the suc-
cess of Ishikawa’s quest for exoneration. In his brief statement to the committee, 
Ishikawa, then sixty-nine years old, expressed his desire to clear his name while 
he still walks this earth. With the exception of the following three lines from the 
very beginning and the very end of his address, his presentation was in Japanese: 
“Dear Members of the Committee, my name is Kazuo Ishikawa. . . . Dear Mem-
bers, I am innocent. . . . Thank you for your attention.”6 
cOnclusiOn
The mass protests organized around the Sayama case give us a glimpse into how 
Buraku liberation activists creatively reframe their struggle, combining two sepa-
rate bodies of discourse to amplify the appeal and the power of their movement. 
They have managed to accomplish several things. First, by modifying the discur-
sive framework within which they articulate concerns about the Sayama case, 
they transform a subject typically avoided by most people and still considered 
somewhat of a taboo, the Buraku issue, into something less threatening. Second, 
they have managed to enlist the support of influential human rights institutions to 
help them pressure the Japanese government in an effort to influence the judiciary. 
Again, by stressing the improper use of state power over the individual and fram-
ing it as a fundamental human rights issue, they are able to win the cooperation of 
people outside of the Buraku and outside of the country. At the same time, by link-
ing the Sayama case to broader concerns for judicial reform, the BLM is able to 
6. For the full text of his speech see http://www.sayama-jiken.com/ki/top/ki2002.htm. 
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contribute to and benefit from a growing public concern with some of the tenets of 
the legal system. The numbers of people concerned is likely to continue to grow, 
as is the legal IQ of the general public as more individuals experience judicial 
proceedings firsthand as jury members. The reintroduction of the jury system last 
year has made the courthouse a hot topic of the mass media and spurred a mix of 
curiosity and anxiety among a general public somewhat uneasy about how best to 
execute this new civic duty.
The push for a retrial now enters its third phase. On March 16, 2005 the 
Supreme Court ruled against Ishikawa’s second bid for a retrial (Asahi Shinbun, 
online edition, March 17, 2005). Justice Shimada Niro of the First Petty Bench 
of the Supreme Court downplayed the significance of arguments contained in 
the appeal. Ishikawa’s counsel based the appeal on the discrepancies within the 
evidentiary record. For example, they provided a new handwriting analysis that 
confirmed what now has become common knowledge among many BLL activists 
supporting Ishikawa—he could not have written the ransom note. Three reasons 
given to substantiate this claim are the distinct differences between Ishikawa’s 
handwriting style and the style in which the ransom note was written, the like-
lihood that the author of the ransom note possessed a literacy level exceeding 
Ishikawa’s level of formal education, and traces of fountain pen ink were discov-
ered on the envelope containing the ransom note despite the fact that Ishikawa 
confessed to writing it using a ballpoint pen. 
In response to the issues raised by the lawyers, the First Petty Bench ruled 
that whatever differences might exist between the ransom note and the confes-
sion that Ishikawa wrote in 1964, “there are many similar characteristics.” With 
respect to the point concerning Ishikawa’s level of literacy at the time, the judge 
dismissed the argument that he was only able to write a composition equivalent 
to that of a young primary school student on the basis that the confession makes 
clear that he was accurately able to communicate his intentions and emotions. 
Finally, the court opined that there was a high probability that Ishikawa possessed 
a fountain pen and a bottle of ink at the time of the crime and ruled that the issue 
of whether there were traces of fountain pen ink on the ransom note envelope has 
no bearing on his guilt or innocence.
Despite this setback, the Sayama struggle seems to be gaining momentum 
of a particular sort. The month before Japan’s highest court made its determina-
tion, information about the Sayama case was broadcast in homes throughout the 
entire country during the special episode of the program “The Scoop” discussed 
above. The following year the popular weekly news magazine AERA published 
by the Asahi Shinbun featured a humanizing article profiling Ishikawa that also 
noted dubious aspects of the case and the broader backdrop of discrimination 
against burakumin. In the article Emori Ryōkō, the Asahi Shinbun journalist who 
was present to cover Ishikawa’s arrest at 4:30 a.m. on May 23, 1963, says, “I 
Courting Justice, Contesting “Bureaucratic Informality”
97
was certain it was a case of enzai (false accusation). Since the day that [he] was 
arrested, and to this day, I am ashamed. I feel ashamed because I was one of the 
reporters who continued to report the case from the vantage point of the police 
rather than the point of view of a person police were underhandedly making into 
a murderer just because he was from a hisabestu buraku” (Kitanokuchi 2006, 72). 
The recent publication of a book on the Sayama jiken by renowned investigative 
journalist and author Kamata Satoshi (2004) is just one additional example of 
how a fifty-one-year-old case is being infused with the voices of those bringing 
new perspectives and generating a new wave of interest in both the Sayama case 
and the judicial system. Intellectuals, literary figures, journalists, and entertainers 
as well as legal scholars and practitioners have joined the steady core of activists 
raising awareness about the Sayama case and demanding modifications to the 
administration of criminal justice. 
The Sayama case remains a centerpiece of the BLM. To the extent that this 
is true and the struggle to prove Ishikawa’s innocence continues, working both 
on and through the courts will continue to be a central focus of Buraku liberation 
activists and newcomers to the struggle. Their efforts have finally borne fruits. In 
December 2009 the Tokyo High Court recommended that additional evidentiary 
material be made available to the defense. On May 13, 2010 the Tokyo High 
Prosecutor’s Office signaled its intention to release an additional thirty-six pieces 
of evidence.7 Not included, however, is evidence deemed by the defense to be of 
inestimable value in terms of establishing key elements of the case and exonerat-
ing their client. Such items include a range of video and photographic evidence 
gathered during the investigation as well as evidence that might potentially shed 
light on the circumstances surrounding Ishikawa’s questioning by authorities. 
Even these missing items signal an important shift in the dynamic between the 
parties involved. The High Prosecutor’s Office cited its inability to locate some 
of the material sought by the defense, rather than denying the existence of such 
evidence outright as it did in previous exchanges with Ishikawa’s lawyers.
Suguya Toshikazu’s appearance on stage in support of Ishikawa at the May 
12, 2010 rally held at Tokyo’s Hibiya Park is yet another indication that the call 
to reexamine the Sayama case is continuing to gain momentum. Sugaya was con-
victed of murder in 1990, but his conviction was overturned after a reanalysis of 
DNA evidence. Sugaya emerged victorious in a retrial that concluded a couple of 
months prior to the rally and produced not only an innocent verdict but also an 
apology from the bench. During the retrial audiotapes were played of the grueling 
interrogation that extracted the false confession that helped seal Sugaya’s fate. 
7. The recent information relayed in this section is taken from an article in the May 2010 issue of Con-
nect, the newsletter for the human rights non-government organization International Movement 
against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR).
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Following his acquittal, images of Sugaya wearing a dark suit and gleefully rais-
ing a banner declaring himself “absolutely innocent” appeared in newspapers and 
on television screens across the country. The image of him standing on stage in 
solidarity with Ishikawa, I argue, symbolizes the burgeoning support for Ishikawa 
coming from an increasingly broad spectrum of groups and individuals.
Although the BLL and other supporters of Ishikawa have yet to achieve the 
stated goal of gaining access to all of the evidence pertaining to the case and prov-
ing Ishikawa’s innocence, if recent events are any indication, they have been able 
to find ways to counter the effects of bureaucratic informality, and they have be-
gun to integrate into the Buraku issue universal themes that have started to attract 
widespread interest and backing from a broader constituency.
references
Asahi Shinbun. (2005). Sayama jiken: Dainiji saishin yōkyū no tokubetsu kōkoku 
o kikyaku saikōsai [Sayama Jiken: Supreme Court Rejects Special Appeal 
Containing Second Request for Retrial]. Online ed., March 17 and 18. http://
www.asahi.com/national/update/0317/ TKY200503170216.html.
Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute. (2002). Buraku kaihō 
jinken nenkan [Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Almanac]. Osaka, 
Kaihō Shuppansha. 
Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute. (1998). Discrimination 
in Japan from the Perspective of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights: Counter-Report to the Fourth Periodic Report. Osaka, Kaihō 
Shuppansha.
Buraku Liberation League Headquarters, ed. (1971). Sayama sabetsu saiban 
[Sayama Discrimination Trial]. Osaka, Buraku Kaihō Chūō Shuppankyoku. 
Originally published 1970.
Buraku Liberation League Headquarters and Sayama Struggle Central Headquar-
ters. (1998). Shitte imasu ka? Sayama jiken ichi mon ittō [Do You Know 
about the Sayama jiken? Questions and Answers]. Osaka, Kaihō Shuppansha. 
Originally published 1994.
Buraku Liberation League Headquarters and Sayama Struggle Central Headquar-
ters. (1993). Subete no chikara o hitotsu ni: ansorojī Sayama jiken sanjyūnen 
[Combining All Effort into One: A Thirty-year Anthology of the Sayama 
Case]. Osaka, Kaihō Shuppansha.
Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho. (1989). Buraku kaihōshi [History of Buraku Libera-
tion], 3 vols. Osaka, Kaihō Shuppansha.
Central Executive Committee for the Establishment of Buraku Liberation 
and Human Rights Policies. (2008). Zenkoku no aitsugu sabetsu jiken 
Courting Justice, Contesting “Bureaucratic Informality”
99
nisenhachinendoban [2008 Edition of Continuing Discrimination Incidents 
across the Country]. Osaka, Buraku Kaihō Jinken Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkyū 
Chūo Jikkōiinkai.
Davis, John. (2000). Blurring the Boundaries of the Buraku(min). In Globaliza-
tion and Social Change in Contemporary Japan, ed. J. S. Eades, Tom Gill, 
and Harumi Befu. Melbourne, Trans Pacific Press.
Hinamoto, Masahiro, ed. (1984). Enzai Sayama jiken [A Case of False Accusa-
tion: The Sayama Case]. Tokyo, Gendai Shokan.
Johnson, David. (2002). The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Ja-
pan. New York, Oxford University Press.
Kamata, Satoshi. (2004). Sayama jiken: Ishikawa Kazuo, yonjyūichinenme no 
shinjitsu [The Sayama Case: Ishikwa Kazuo, the Forty-first Year of Truth]. 
Tokyo, Sōshiya.
Komori Megumi. (2010). The Sayama Case: Another Step Forward. Connect 13.4 
(May): 19.
Kitano Futoshi. (2006). Sayama jiken no moto tyōekisyō Kazuo Ishikawa: 
Shakuhō sareta no ni mienai tejyō ga omoi [Ex-Convict of the Sayama Case 
Kazuo Ishikawa: Though Released from Prison, Invisible Handcuffs Weigh 
Heavily]. AERA, December 18.
Neary, Ian. (1989). Political Protest and Social Control in Pre-War Japan: The 
Origins of Buraku Liberation. Manchester, UK, Manchester University Press. 
New York Times. (2009). Japan’s Outcasts Still Wait for Acceptance. Online ed., 
January 16. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/world/asia/16outcasts.
html?_r=1&scp=1&sq= Japan’s%20Outcasts&st=cse>
Noma Hiroshi. (1997). Sayama saiban [The Sayama Trial]. Tokyo, Fujiwara 
Shoten.
Repeta, Lawrence. (2009). U.N. Committee Faults Japan Human Rights Perfor-
mance, Demands Progress Report on Key Issues. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 
May 20.
Rohlen, Thomas. (1976). Violence in Yoka High School: the Implications for Jap-
anese Coalition Politics of the Confrontation between the Communist Party 
and the Buraku Liberation League. Asian Survey 16.7: 682–99.
Sōmuchō. Tenkanki o mukaeta Dōwa Mondai: Heisei gonendo dōwa chiku jittai 
haakutō chōsa kekka no kaisetsu [A Turning Point for the Dōwa Mondai: 
Analysis of the Results of the 1993 Survey to Assess Conditions in Dōwa 
Districts]. Tokyo, Chūōhōki Shuppan.
Tomonaga Kenzō. (2006). Ima aratamete “Buraku Chimei Sōkan” sabetsu jiken 
o tou [Revisiting the Discriminatory “Buraku Lists Incident” Again Now]. 
Osaka, Kaihō Shuppansha.
Upham, Frank. (1987). Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press.
Davis
100
World Human Rights Research Center. (1999). Jinken rekishi nenpyō [Chronol-
ogy of Human Rights History]. Tokyo, Yamagawa Shuppansha.
101
Chapter 4
Becoming Unforgettable: Leveraging Law for 
Labor in Struggles for Employment Security
Christena L. Turner 
When the owners of their parent company dissolved Universal1 they 
had a strategy, an expectation. They would declare the company bank-
rupt, and, if the union opposed it and occupied the place, they would 
just wait. They compared it to making canned food (kanzume). They 
would just close the gates and let them stay sealed up inside for a 
while. They thought that most workers would give up and leave, espe-
cially the older workers and the part-timers. If the union tried to resist, 
they would just call the police and have them clear the premises. 
This statement was later recounted by a union official from the parent company, 
Custom Shoes, who participated in the initial meetings with Custom management 
when the decision was made to let the Universal Shoe Company go bankrupt. The 
effort to dissolve Universal Shoe Company failed. It did not fail quickly, but in 
the end it did fail. 
Immediately after the announcement at work that Universal was to be 
liquidated as a company, and, as a consequence, jobs would be eliminated, workers 
were led by their union leaders into the office of the Universal company president. 
They refused to leave or to let him leave until he signed a “factory use agreement” 
giving them the temporary right to use equipment and premises to continue 
production. Rather than disbanding, fifty Universal workers plus supporters 
from affiliated unions and labor movement networks occupied the Universal 
factory and resisted efforts by the parent company to force the evacuation of the 
buildings, the liquidation of assets, and the dissolution of this small subsidiary 
1. To insure anonymity for participants in this research, the names of companies used in this chapter 
are pseudonyms. I chose these pseudonyms to sound like English language names because the 
real names are taken from English and transliterated into Japanese to sound English. 
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company. During these early days of the struggle even neighborhood residents 
and businesses came out in support of the Universal workers and their refusal to 
vacate the factory premises and give up their work and workplace. The supportive 
relationship with their neighborhood continued throughout the decade of labor 
struggle that followed. These disruptive and defiant actions were wrapped in legal 
cases that defined their struggle as a labor dispute and permitted them to continue 
to exercise self-production until all court cases could be concluded.
The account of management strategy that begins this chapter is one that 
leaked out through a sympathetic figure from the parent company. It summarizes 
a conversation held at a local coffee shop between the owners of the parent com-
pany and the owners of Universal, a meeting at which Universal’s bankruptcy 
was planned. According to these owners and managers, that plan was an inevi-
table result of economic upheaval and could not be avoided. There was simply 
not enough work to maintain Universal. The workers through their union argued 
that this was untrue and that insufficient effort had been made to adapt to current 
economic conditions. Issues raised in this account illustrate the fundamental point 
that tied eight separate court cases to nearly ten years of collective action for the 
Universal Shoes labor union. The most radical form of social change that the Uni-
versal union pursued was greater employment security through the establishment 
of a worker-owned production company. The more modest form of social change 
they demanded was adequate efforts to guarantee employment security on the part 
of employers during times of economic upheaval. The court cases could not argue 
that workers had the right to run their own companies, but they could argue that 
under Japanese employment law they had the right to every possible effort on the 
part of management to protect their employment.
More specifically, the Universal Shoes union was fighting what, beginning in 
the 1970s, came to be known as kubikiri gorika, or the rationalization of employ-
ment dismissals. Their collective action rhetoric accused employers of discarding 
workers, treating them as invisible and as exchangeable commodities rather than 
as human beings in their business calculations. The legal arguments charged the 
parent company, Custom Shoes, with “fabricating” the bankruptcy of their subsid-
iary Universal Shoes, resulting in unfair dismissal of all Universal workers. Both 
labor lawyers handling the legal cases and the union leaders managing the near 
decade-long dispute spoke with passion about their drive to force employers to re-
member the rights of their employees when adjusting to economic changes. In the 
rhetoric of Universal’s collective action, workers must become “unforgettable” 
(wasurerarenai). In the language of their lawyers, Japanese employers must be 
required to take workers’ livelihood seriously, respect their legal rights, and use 
liquidation of a company or dismissal only as a last resort.
A dispute as legally complex and as organizationally challenging as this one 
required both agile leadership and deeply felt commitment to a cause on the part 
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of the rank and file. Strategies for leveraging Japanese labor law and strategies 
for maintaining the solidarity necessary to an ongoing labor dispute shifted in 
tandem. Nearly four years into a bankruptcy-related labor dispute that would 
eventually last almost ten, one of the lawyers prosecuting the court cases for the 
Universal Shoe Company union said, “I believe that the true struggle does not 
take place in the court but in the actions of union workers and their families, and 
if we can continue more collective action, we might realize a positive settlement.” 
At the same time, leaders of the labor movement saw the court cases as essential 
both to the ongoing self-managed production that sustained them in the short term 
and to the eventual settlement they hoped would offer compensation, continued 
employment, and an opportunity to reopen the small company under management 
of their own choice. 
The president of the Universal union liked to say, “They tried to throw us 
away—like waste paper—just toss us out. We had to fight to become unforget-
table.” In demonstrations this simple idea took the form of demands for rights 
guaranteed both by Japanese constitutional provisions and by Japanese employ-
ment law. It also took the form of shouts aimed at financial institutions and their 
parent company to take responsibility for their employment and to treat them as 
human beings. Becoming “unforgettable” was, according to their legal team, criti-
cal to the court cases. They had been, according to these lawyers, “underestimated 
from the beginning,” expected to just give up, disperse, and disappear.
Here I will suggest ways in which court cases set limits on collective action 
and influence the forms of that action, and also ways in which this union strategi-
cally used court cases to achieve labor dispute goals related to employment secu-
rity and entitlements, as well as more radical goals aimed to challenge the very 
structure of Japanese employer-employee power relations. In the context of the 
global reach of marketization that has progressively exposed Japanese workers to 
greater and greater employment insecurity, these early bankruptcy disputes and 
those that followed over the subsequent decades called attention to the precarious 
position of workers in times of economic instability and demanded responsible 
actions to safeguard the livelihood of those affected. These demands were embod-
ied in collective action and articulated in legal arguments. 
In previous publications I have written extensively about the Universal labor 
dispute, along with a very similar dispute carried out by the labor union of Unikon 
Camera (Turner 1995). Subsequently, detailed information concerning their legal 
cases became available and has made it possible to examine these cases and the 
critical links between legal and political arguments and strategies that provided a 
measure of shared meaning between the rank and file, union leaders, lawyers, and 
others in their extensive support networks. Here I will analyze the relationship 
between legal rights and political power, and the complex strategies required to 
get ordinary people involved in disruptive actions aimed at exercising either one.
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gloBalizaTion, economic insTaBiliTy and employmenT securiTy issues
The globalization of the Japanese economy has brought widespread economic, 
political, and social changes, which have affected Japanese workplaces. What in 
Japan were called “Nixon Shocks” and “Oil Shocks” in the 1970s were just the 
beginning of a series of economic crises that included the so-called bursting of 
the bubble economy and recession. These crises ultimately ushered in an era of 
reform and restructuring aimed at economic recovery that began the new millen-
nium. Beginning in the 1970s, the Japanese economy faced a series of challenges 
to its postwar high growth economic policies, its customary practices of labor-
management relations, and its workplace values and frames of thought. Unem-
ployment rose to 3 percent in the 1980s, 5 percent in the 1990s, and to nearly 7 
percent by the turn of the century. These rates have been dropping since 2003 in 
response to aggressive economic restructuring, changes in employment practices 
such as increases in nonstandard workers, and gradual attrition as people drop out 
of the labor market altogether. Some of these changes were themselves responses 
to rapidly growing labor activism like that addressed in this chapter.
Unionization rates have been dropping since the beginning of the 1980s, and 
in 2003 they fell below 20 percent for the first time in postwar history, hovering 
at about 18 percent through 2009. This reflects the increase in nonunionized ser-
vice sector jobs and nonstandard employment in all sectors at the expense of the 
more stable and lucrative industrial, financial, and transport sector jobs. Rengo, 
the Japanese Trade Union Confederation, which represents more than 60 percent 
of all union members, is challenged to design ways of safe-guarding employment 
and workplace practices in an economy where increasing proportions of the work 
force are in part-time, temporary, postretirement, or contract worker status instead 
of regular full-time employment. 
Bankruptcies of small and medium-sized firms climbed in the 1970s, leveled 
off in the middle 1980s, and climbed steadily again in the post-bubble decade 
of the 1990s. Revisions in bankruptcy law just after the turn of the century have 
helped bring these rates down after 2003 as economic recovery began to take 
hold. This recent economic recovery has been crafted out of responses to crises 
experienced in workplaces throughout the society. Recent challenges regarding 
excessive overwork and over the rights of stockholders in corporate governance, 
which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, have similarly challenged Japanese so-
cial practices and cultural concepts regarding economic activities and appropriate 
measures of value. These signal challenges to cultural notions about work and 
about the social importance of stability of livelihood for workers.
Reforms in corporate structures, employment practices, labor union organi-
zations, and employment and business law have emerged throughout this period. 
In this context activist workers and their unions organized labor disputes and filed 
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legal cases to protest against bankruptcy-related job loss. People have struggled 
to cope with changes visited upon them by taking some measure of control over 
their own work organizations and by appealing to the legal structures that help 
define legitimate labor-management relations in a period of economic and politi-
cal change. Social change in these struggles is not always the result of efforts to 
bring about something new. It is sometimes about trying to hold on to something 
of value that is perceived to be in danger of undesirable reform or loss. Legal 
cases are used as a means to struggle against the market when the marketization 
of labor seems to challenge fundamental cultural values of stable employment. 
The connections between daily life, a secure livelihood, and the changes in 
the world economy were reflected in daily conversations among workers at Uni-
versal as well as at other small and medium-sized companies in which I con-
ducted fieldwork through the 1980s and 1990s. The rank and file worried that 
the success of conservatives like Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and 
Ronald Reagan in the United States would have a negative impact on their own 
labor movement and ultimately on labor conditions and the labor market in Ja-
pan. The emergence of global market forces and Japan’s vulnerability to them 
was of central importance in their evaluation of their prospects for the success of 
their own collective action. These connections were made regularly both in daily 
conversation and in organized union events where films about labor struggles in 
Europe or the United States were shown and discussed. Visitors from Eastern 
European labor unions came to the factory during the time I was there, and the 
Universal union itself made a documentary about its own struggle to distribute 
through national and international networks. The rank and file and their union 
leaders shared with workers elsewhere in Japan and around the world concerns 
about the economic disruptions related to transnational integration of markets that 
were troubling labor everywhere.
Similarly, Universal union leaders who were in charge of making production 
decisions as well as designing labor dispute strategies worried that “There isn’t 
much we can do when we have to compete with European shoe design. Especially 
Italian! We have to make better, cheaper, more locally appealing shoes, and we 
have to study the designs from abroad.” Sympathy for the challenges facing the 
entire shoe-making industry was great, but anger at the reckless way in which 
their parent company attempted to cope with their own business problems by dis-
solving Universal and dismissing its workers was even greater. The ties between 
their own lives and these larger changes were clear, and they were convinced that 
while the changes in national and international policy might be beyond their con-
trol, the strategies used by Japanese employers to cope with them should not be 
void of the “responsibility” to protect the livelihood of their employees. 
This sentiment was widespread, and unions throughout Japan began to learn 
from one another how to cope with bankruptcy-related job loss. Universal was 
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one of the earliest to engage in an antibankruptcy labor dispute, and their case 
inspired other unions to be watchful. For example, Unikon Camera’s union began, 
even before their owners declared them bankrupt, to prepare the ground for such 
a dispute. As the market for cameras slowed and they began to worry about the 
outlook for their own company, they commissioned an independent analysis by 
university professors of the global market and the outlook for camera production 
and their place in it (Turner 1995). This study provided solid evidence about the 
nature of the industry and the possible ways in which the company could continue 
to succeed as a producer, an issue directly related to the argument made in the 
legal cases that bankruptcy and job loss were not unavoidable business strate-
gies. Court cases filed by the unions fighting bankruptcy disputes often claimed 
that changes in the business environment should have been met with changes in 
management strategy, not with dissolution and unfair dismissals.
The Universal union is just one case in which a labor union successfully 
challenged the way in which a Japanese employer eliminated jobs by declaring 
bankruptcy. Theirs was one of the first of a series of antibankruptcy labor disputes 
beginning in the late 1970s that combined social movement tactics with legal 
battles. By 1982 there were ninety-four such struggles, and throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s small companies continued to organize such disputes as recession and 
economic restructuring threatened employment security (Gordon 1998, 190). La-
bor disputes involving working conditions and employment security issues have 
continued to rise, reaching over one million by 2005, and they and have inspired 
tripartite negotiations between government, business, and labor over ways to stem 
this trend through improved economic policy and labor law reform (McNamara 
1996). The Universal case demonstrates the power of collective action coupled 
with court cases to place limits on employer rights to dissolve companies or make 
structural changes that lead to job loss.
from BankrupTcy To courT:
legal leverage and collecTive acTion sTraTegies 
The Universal Shoes Workers’ Cooperative Company operates as a small shoe-
manufacturing company in Tokyo with about fifty employees. It was established 
under union ownership and management as a result of the 1986 year-end settle-
ment of a nearly ten-year-long legal battle in tandem with an active labor dispute. 
Opened in 1946 immediately after World War II, Universal Shoes operated as a 
subcontractor for Custom Shoes, the third largest shoe manufacturer in Japan, 
until becoming its subsidiary in 1967. The liberalization of trade policies which 
opened the domestic Japanese market in shoes and leather goods to more import-
ed products and the increasing sluggishness of the domestic economy associated 
with globalization led Custom to begin a process of “rationalization of produc-
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tion” (gōrika) in their factories. In 1977, as part of that effort, they made the deci-
sion to shut down their subsidiary, Universal, altogether. Some claim that this was 
also designed to intimidate their own unionized employees into accepting further 
unpopular rationalization measures, including forced retirements and layoffs. 
The response of the Universal union was swift and decisive and is itself il-
lustrative of the way in which social movement action and legal action worked in 
concert in this struggle from the very beginning to make a powerful and ultimate-
ly successful labor movement strategy. As described at the outset of this chapter, 
union members immediately forced the Universal Company president to sign a 
factory use agreement. The factory use agreement gave the union the temporary 
right to use land, buildings, and equipment, pending resolution of union demands 
for appropriate bankruptcy-related liquidation and dismissal, a “temporary right” 
that was the basis for use for nearly a decade. This innovation on the part of the 
Universal union was emulated by other unions in subsequent bankruptcy-related 
disputes because it facilitated the maintenance of production and thus of both 
economic solvency and social solidarity during legal and political battles, battles 
that in Japan are normally long and drawn out. Furthermore, it effectively marked 
all subsequent actions on the part of the union as sōgi kōdō, or “dispute actions.” 
These sōgi kōdō are protected under trade union law as legitimate union actions 
so long as a dispute is ongoing and unsettled. Legal precedent in Japanese courts 
have allowed even otherwise illegal actions to go unpunished so long as they are 
construed as part of an ongoing dispute (Gould 1984). 
  The jishuseisan, or “worker-managed production” disputes, were strate-
gically smart, largely successful, and culturally characteristic of Japanese labor-
dispute tactics. They illustrate the significance of maintaining the relationship 
between employer and employee as a legitimate platform from which to enter and 
prosecute a dispute. Even the shell of the relationship, if preserved, is sufficient to 
continue to make claims, to engage in “dispute actions,” and to assure a legitimate 
negotiating position on the part of workers until resolution can be reached. The 
simple unilateral declaration on the part of the owners of an enterprise is not suf-
ficient to break this relationship. Indeed, the continued production at the factory 
itself, although managed by the union, served to preserve not just the livelihood of 
the workers enabling their continued activism, but also the existence of the enter-
prise and its employer-employee relations, guaranteeing the continued relevance 
of employment law to their legal cases as well (see Gould 1984; Totsuka 1984; 
Gordon 1998). 
The propensity of labor-relation cases to be mediated until some conciliatory 
settlement can be reached commonly leads to very lengthy negotiations. This 
“legal informality” of the Japanese judicial process is credited by Frank Upham 
with shifting power to control and manage social change to the state through 
the court system, making the court a relatively conservative force in considering 
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social change in Japan (Upham 1987, 22). It permits resolution without reference 
to universal principles or clear statement of right and wrong, thus situating social 
change firmly in particular circumstances. Hiroshi Itoh makes a related point in 
his evaluation of judicial activism in Japan when he claims, “actual and concrete 
disputes must exist before the court can adjudicate. No declaratory or advisory 
opinions are allowed in Japan” (Itoh 1990, 173). He goes on to suggest that courts 
are conservative in the sense that they do not wish to be active policymakers, 
opting whenever possible to act within established case law. 
While case law may be influenced by a collection of resolutions, few grand 
gestures toward universal standards are made in Japanese court cases. The process 
is long, drawn-out, complex, and heavily reliant on the particular circumstances 
of each case. Such procedures generally tend to favor those with more power 
and more status within organizational and institutional hierarchies. Labor union 
leaders claim that the sheer length of court proceedings can in many cases be a 
significant factor in losing the requisite rank-and-file support for going to court 
in the first place, and even more so in keeping people engaged in the dispute long 
enough to reach a satisfactory settlement. Companies can often benefit by simply 
stalling because workers cannot maintain either the social solidarity or economic 
resources to persist to resolution. 
As a platform from which to launch the dispute and to persevere for nearly 
ten years until resolution, self-managed production is the most important and 
powerful site where social movement and legal cases intersected. Here the court 
case and the social movement are mutually formative of one another. The legal 
limbo of the self-managed production dispute had two important consequences. 
First, it permitted the union to guarantee for an indefinite period of time a living 
wage and daily work routines to participating workers. As a result, the union man-
aged to keep nearly all their workers for the duration of the dispute. This made 
daily contact around both production and movement solidarity building activities 
possible and was crucial for maintaining movement solidarity. Second, it situated 
the legal cases within the context of an ongoing employer-employee relationship 
because continued production acted as a de facto stall in the process of bank-
ruptcy, preventing liquidation and all associated procedures.
righTs and power: creaTing frameworks To moTivaTe acTion 
While Japanese labor law has developed extensive legal and even constitutional 
provisions to protect workers, their rights to collective bargaining, and even their 
right to stable employment, it is not the case that the rank and file necessarily 
understand these provisions, act on assumptions about rights, or even conceptual-
ize their own agency in such terms. Indeed, in the Universal struggle, as in other 
struggles of its kind that I have studied, union leadership has had to undertake 
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extensive educational activities as an integral part of mobilization strategies. As-
sumptions about lifetime employment norms in Japanese culture notwithstanding, 
Universal workers began their struggle with a stronger sense of resignation than 
entitlement. For some this was due to simple assumption that under bankruptcy 
law they had no legal basis for action. For others, it was rooted in a sense that even 
if a legal case could be made, their small fifty-member union would not have the 
resources and the power to make it. 
 Universal workers were accustomed to working under conditions of unequal 
power as relatively low-wage workers in a very small subsidiary company. Ideas 
about their own legal rights as workers were at the least counterbalanced by and 
sometimes outweighed by common sense understandings of their own positions 
of relative political, social, and economic weakness. Their education through par-
ticipation in this movement involved learning about their rights as employees 
under Japanese law, regardless of income, size of company, gender, or age. The 
task for Universal’s leaders hoping to motivate the rank and file was to uncouple 
notions of economic marginalization from notions of political marginalization. 
Workers in small companies like this one already differentiate themselves from 
workers in large companies with respect to the privileges of secure employment, 
fringe benefits, and high salaries. During Universal’s struggle, workers frequently 
expressed their feeling that the judges in the courts, like the financial institutions 
that backed their parent company, would all just expect them to disappear from 
the scene. 
While union leaders and lawyers urged the rank and file to stick together to 
make themselves known, to make it impossible for the financial institutions and 
the parent company to forget about them, the rank and file easily slipped back 
into a sense of vulnerability. They often explicitly talked about being “small” 
and being afraid that they had been “forgotten” when expressing their feelings of 
marginality. 
 As part of their efforts to change the culture and consciousness of the rank 
and file and make them powerful agents in the legal and political struggle, union 
leaders and the lawyers handling the Universal case convened large general meet-
ings, held smaller seminar-style meetings, and engaged in study sessions before 
and after court dates. In addition to discussing specific legal strategies and the 
progress of ongoing cases, union leaders, lawyers, and/or national union federa-
tion organizers discussed Japanese employment law with the rank and file. This 
included Japanese constitutional provisions like those guaranteeing the right and 
obligation to work (Article 27) and the right to collective bargaining and collec-
tive action (Article 28). They also educated the members about the body of trade 
union and employment law within which their own cases fit, especially the legal 
limitations on employers concerning the dismissal of workers. Because so much 
of this is case law, union leaders and lawyers strove to educate workers about the 
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postwar history of Japanese legal cases, the statutory protections available, and 
the ways employment law could be applied after a declaration of bankruptcy. This 
history itself involved activism on the part of unions to bring cases into the courts, 
a history that has established a body of law relevant to labor disputes that, once in 
the hands of the judiciary, union activists see as favorable to workers in matters 
related to termination of employment and the failure of management to negotiate 
or consult with workers. 
Beginning as early as 1950 Japanese courts have, in Daniel Foote’s words, 
“built a complex and sophisticated body of law providing workers strong rights 
against dismissal” (1996, 638) and establishing conditions that must be met before 
employers may exercise their rights to dismiss an employee or employees. While 
the Civil Code provides employers the right of dismissal without a requirement 
that cause be stated and the Labor Standards Act of 1947 adds that employees 
must have only thirty days notice, case law has ensured that specific conditions be 
demonstrated, even in the case of dismissal for economic reasons, and particularly 
in cases of collective dismissal. These include a necessity for reduction of the 
workforce, an employer good-faith effort to avoid discharge, the fair implementa-
tion and selection of workers to be discharged, and a consultation with the trade 
union or workers involved (Foote 1996; Yamakawa, 2001). If these conditions are 
not met, employers may be found to have engaged in “abusive dismissals.” There 
is, in Foote’s evocative description, “an iceberg of precedent underneath the small 
tip of Section 20 of the Labor Standards Act” that gives Japanese workers much 
greater rights under settled case law than might be apparent from a strict reading 
of the text of the law (1996, 707).
These rights and understanding of the history of judicial decisions in struc-
turing Japanese employment relationships over the course of the postwar period 
gave union leaders within Universal and those in local, regional, and national fed-
erations a common ground for creating legal and social movement strategies and 
for being reasonably optimistic that if they could survive as a union long enough 
they would eventually win their case. Japanese law and legal precedent in mat-
ters of job security served, in other words, as a critical frame within which labor 
movement organizers made decisions about legal cases and created strategies to 
increase their political power relative to their parent company and adversary, Cus-
tom Shoes. The understanding of their potential for political power provided by 
this framework was crucial in mobilizing the rank and file for the lengthy and eco-
nomically difficult personal struggles that constituted a labor dispute like this one. 
The activist labor movement struggles of the 1970s and 1980s were com-
pared to those of the fifties by union leaders and their legal teams. They saw the 
legacy of that period’s labor activism in proving that workers could manage their 
own production. However, the new struggles were viewed quite differently in 
that they were taking place in times of settled employee-employer relationships 
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rather than in times of enterprise disorder. They believed that this made their own 
struggles more complex because they required workers to struggle with estab-
lished and powerful employers and management teams in order to take charge of 
production. They saw similarities, however, in the struggle of workers to have a 
stable workplace, to have a say in production decisions about adjustment to eco-
nomic trouble, and to take over in order to save the company from failure. The 
history that leaders and lawyers emphasized in mobilizing workers favored the 
immediate and early postwar period.
Nimura Kazuo argues that the spread of struggles for the control of produc-
tion in the immediate postwar period hinged on the appeal of the strategy to save 
the company from dissolution and on worry over the economic livelihoods of em-
ployees. Production control was a form of struggle “that had no adverse affects on 
company results. They thus easily gained the support of all employees, including 
that of managers who were concerned for the company’s future, as well as the un-
derstanding of society at large” (Nimura 1994a, 65). In the case of the struggle by 
Universal workers, this was certainly an important factor especially in the early 
days when they had to refuse the order to evacuate the premises and had to make 
the case for their right to stay put and begin to manage their own production. The 
primary motivation for production control in a time of economic upheaval is to 
continue production and to secure employment, something that was as appealing 
at the end of the century as it was in the immediate postwar period. That legacy of 
the early Japanese labor movement was an inspiration for most of the Universal 
workers and a personal memory for many. Nimura argues that postwar workers 
“for their part . . . had entrusted their livelihoods to the company, [and] were afraid 
for the company’s future, and their lack of faith due to their employers’ feeble-
ness only increased” (1994a, 64). He argues that the first struggle for production 
control, that at Yomiuri Shinbun, showed workers a way forward.
The Yomiuri dispute showed such workers a way to address the prob-
lems that faced them. The dispute, which began with criticisms of em-
ployers’ irresponsibility and developed into a takeover of production 
at the enterprise by the employees’ union, taught many people that the 
way forward was to form a union and reconstruct companies them-
selves. Anger at a management that showed neither “sincerity” nor any 
understanding of employees’ demands turned the dispute into a fero-
cious struggle that proved to be highly significant. (p. 64) 
These early postwar struggles were infused with the chaos of a time 
where management had often left a vacuum into which union activists stepped. 
Kumazawa Makoto (1996) discusses these struggles in his history of postwar labor 
movements, pointing out that they were powerful and exemplified labor’s ability 
and core concern with production. He writes that although such struggles faded 
away in the high-growth period of the sixties, between 1952 and 1957, “when 
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management was in a general state of shock and bewilderment immediately after 
the war, unions exercised strong authority over production and personnel matters” 
(Kumazawa 1996, 66). The immediate postwar period was a time of economic 
crises, political change, and extensive realignment of Japan’s relationships 
with the world, especially with the United States. The social movements of 
this time were powerful, and their gains contributed to the workplace practices 
of employment security and collective bargaining to which the Universal case 
referred (see Gordon 1998; Kumazawa 1996; Niimura 1994a, 1994b). 
The majority of workers at Universal had personal memories of that time. 
Over one-third had vivid memories because they were old enough during the war 
to participate in social life as adults and to experience the transition from war 
through economic devastation and political turmoil. At Unikon, the camera com-
pany where I did research first, the Universal union was respected as the architect 
of the model that the Unikon union had used for their own labor dispute, and 
even more as a model for what their young leaders liked to call “real Japanese 
workers.” It was at the urging of the Unikon people that I came to Universal in 
the first place. They said that I couldn’t really understand activism and workers’ 
consciousness without working with them. What I came to believe myself was 
that I had not fully encountered the lived history of the postwar worker until I met 
the Universal workers. 
Personal adult memories of the immediate postwar period do not explain the 
organizing strategies, the successful legal battles, or even the ultimate success of 
their dispute, but they do allow us to understand some of the cultural models for 
thinking about employer-employee relationships, the importance of stability, the 
rights of workers not to be forgotten even in times of crises, and the sense of the 
possibility of social change itself. These cultural models helped people imagine 
activism and the power of collective action. It was commonplace to have con-
versations in which people laughed about the past where everything was “for the 
sake of the emperor, for the sake of the company” (tennoheika no tame, kaisha no 
tame), followed by comments that would begin with “thanks to losing the war” 
(senso ni maketa okage de) and would go on to remark about improvements in 
Japanese social and political life that they themselves had witnessed. 
The frank lament that “democracy” had come to Japan but that Japanese peo-
ple didn’t know how to use it yet was a frequent refrain (Turner 1989, 299–323). 
References to that postwar economic chaos through which people had lived were 
used to contextualize their current struggles. One worker told me that it was im-
possible to know if you would live or die and that coming through experiences 
like that made you “used to struggling” (narete kuru). The older workers who 
were in positions of responsibility in the factory were even frustrated that there 
were no younger workers who knew how to do everything. One man in his sixties 
told me, “By our age we should be able to let the young ones run the place, but 
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somehow it is always we, the older ones (toshiyori), who have to get involved.” 
The legacy of the postwar activism of labor and the production control strug-
gles of the immediate postwar period were on the minds of lawyers and union 
leaders. For the rank and file, the hardships, the experience of struggling to get 
by, and the importance of what they considered the “importation” of democracy 
from America dominated their memories. These memories of both hardships and 
positive political change and the ways in which personal lives could be changed 
by political action and legal institutions grounded the commitment of many of the 
Universal workers. One of the younger workers told me that she felt “lucky” to 
work with “these men who just do what they have to do and go on working for 
something.” She said that maybe she wouldn’t have “stuck it out” for all those 
years “if it weren’t for them.”
The legal cases:
good faiTh efforTs, employmenT securiTy, and consulTaTion
There were eight legal cases associated with the Universal dispute. Six were filed 
in Tokyo District Court, one with the Tokyo Labor Relations Board, and one in 
Yokohama District Court. None of these was settled prior to the final settlement 
nine years and nine months later. Each of them has a very specific claim based on 
some specific provision under Japanese labor law, and each of them had a specific 
set of arguments and evidence to support that claim, developed by labor lawyers 
handling the case, union leaders, and the Joint Struggle Committee (Kyōtōkaigi). 
The first two cases were filed simultaneously, three months after the company 
announced bankruptcy proceedings. The union filed a formal case with the Tokyo 
Labor Relations Board against Custom for unfair labor conduct and a separate 
case in Tokyo District Court (Civil Suit Section 19) against Custom and Universal 
management for unpaid wages. The content of this appeal was based on two main 
arguments. First, because of massive wealth and multiple factories, Universal 
claimed that Custom had not demonstrated the economic necessity to close this 
small plant and eliminate the jobs of these few workers. The union claimed that 
Custom Shoes had at least two hundred million yen and factories in nine other 
locations throughout Japan. Thus, they claimed Custom was involved in “abusive 
dismissal” because they did not make “good faith efforts” to avoid bankruptcy or 
to relocate employees to other jobs (see Gould 1984; Foote 1996). Consequently, 
the union demanded, Custom must begin negotiation over reopening of the fac-
tory and over unpaid wages. 
Second, the union argued that Custom was an employer. This was a critical 
claim, one that had to be accepted before labor law regulating employer-employee 
relationships could be invoked to settle all other disputes. Here they argued that 
because Custom owned two-thirds of Universal’s stocks and five-sixths of all 
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assets and property, they were, as a matter of practice, in an employer-employee 
relationship even though the formal business status of Universal Shoes was that of 
a subsidiary. This charge is, of course, an important challenge to one of the ways in 
which many Japanese companies try to guarantee long-term secure employment 
for a core of their own regular workers by creating a more flexible source of labor 
in small and medium-sized subcontractors and subsidiaries.
There were also, included in this case, charges of unfair labor conduct alleg-
ing that Custom forced the bankruptcy of Universal through intentional misman-
agement as part of a policy of rationalization of production with a reckless disre-
gard for the loss of jobs and an unwillingness to consult with the union represent-
ing their workers about solutions to existing economic problems. There was, it is 
worth noting, no claim that rationalization or other organizational changes were 
themselves outside the rights of the employer, but rather that reckless disregard of 
the employment security of the workers combined with unwillingness to negotiate 
or consult violated workers’ rights under Japanese employment law. 
Japanese labor law does not guarantee workers freedom from market strain 
or other economic upheaval, but it does set limits beyond which employers may 
be charged with violating their responsibility as employers for their employees. 
The legal notion of “abusive dismissal” is about setting constraints on treatment 
of employees especially during times of economic crisis and collective dismissal. 
The responsibility of employers to act responsibly toward their employees has 
been established over the past six decades and has become the subject of record 
numbers of court cases, extensive legislative debate, and some legal reform over 
the past few years as postwar labor law and practice has been challenged by un-
precedented economic crisis. The idea that employers must make “good faith ef-
forts” to find alternative employment raised in the Universal dispute is an issue 
still debated today in the context of employment policies related to economic 
restructuring. Interestingly enough, in spite of reforms in labor law, commercial 
laws, and civil codes, the core features that allow workers to go to court to fight 
against unreasonable dismissals have remained largely unchanged (Yamakawa 
2001). Foote quotes the legal scholar Nakayama Ichiro who claimed, in 1959, that 
“there is no other country in the world where dismissal is as strictly regulated as 
in Japan,” and Foote goes on to argue himself that “the limitations on dismissal 
in Japan have become even more strict over the intervening years” (1996, 638). 
The Universal union also filed charges against Custom for refusal to negoti-
ate in a document that went before the Tokyo Labor Relations Board (TLRB). 
They outlined their own efforts at collective negotiation and claimed that they 
could do nothing without the cooperation of Custom and that their requests on 
six separate occasions to their “real employer,” Custom, to enter into collective 
negotiation were met with refusal. On the one occasion when they did meet infor-
mally, the discussion became contentious and Custom ended up calling the police 
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and accusing the union members of violent behavior. The attempt on the part of 
the parent company to charge violent behavior on the part of the union members 
was to no avail. Many have noted that it is common in Japanese labor disputes to 
forgive otherwise disruptive actions—even marginal or illegal ones—so long as 
they can be shown to be part of a set of dispute actions (sōgikōdō) (Gould 1984, 
40). Ultimately, the TLRB called on Custom to come and engage in negotiations 
aimed at settlement of the case. Custom refused to negotiate, however, claiming 
that they were not an employer and that they were in fact a separate legal entity 
from Universal. In response to this refusal, the Universal union formally request-
ed assistance from the TLRB in settling the dispute.
The second case brought by the Universal union was a suit in Tokyo District 
Court (Civil Section 19) against Universal owners and Custom for unpaid wages. 
Once again, the central and critical claim was that Custom is the “real employer” 
and was thus a reasonable entity against which to bring suit. Universal owners 
responded by acknowledging their debt but claiming that they had no ability to 
pay. Custom rejected the obligation to pay based on their legal status as a separate 
entity. In this case, the evidence and arguments made over the following months 
and years were specifically aimed at proving the “parent/child company” (oyako 
gaisha) relationship and arguing the status of Custom as an employer. The court 
met approximately once every two months to hear this case. Over time, other 
claims were added to include unpaid wages for subsequent months.
The second and third legal cases were linked. and both were in Tokyo District 
Court. Universal’s union petitioned the court (Civil Section 9) for permission to 
seize and auction unsold products to pay workers their unpaid back wages. The 
court granted this petition within a month, but Custom brought a third-party ob-
jection suit in Tokyo District Court (Civil Section 4) and halted the process. Once 
again the union argued that because Custom was an employer it had the obliga-
tion to pay back wages; Custom argued that as an independent entity and a major 
stockholder in the bankrupt Universal company, it was entitled to property as part 
of settlement for its own financial investment claims. This case was heard about 
once every two months over the course of several years. 
The fifth, sixth, and seventh cases were all brought by Custom against the 
Universal union demanding settlement of debts through access to assets and prop-
erties of Universal, including cash savings in a bank account (Civil Section 12 and 
23), buildings and land (Civil Section 15), and equipment (Civil Section 24). The 
final suit was brought by Custom against the Universal president in Yokohama 
District Court claiming that he had repaid debts incurred by Universal to a credi-
tor bank using Universal assets and demanding that he reimburse them from his 
personal funds. 
However favorable Japanese employment law may be for employees in any 
one of these cases, the process of litigation and negotiation presented a challenge 
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requiring human, organizational, and financial resources possible only through 
the social movement practices of the Universal union and the extensive activist 
network within which they were situated. While fighting the legal battles in court, 
the Universal union and its network of supporters created and maintained resis-
tance to asset liquidation, the economic context to maintain workers’ livelihood, 
and the cultural context to understand the legal strategy and motivate people to 
become agents of social change over nearly a decade of struggle.
union-managed producTion, commiTmenT, and endurance as evidence
Labor movement leaders and the lawyers representing Universal frequently talked 
about the “three pillars” of union-managed production struggles: “living, work-
ing, and struggling.” For union leaders these three pillars helped organize their 
efforts to maintain a strong collective sense of purpose and motivation, whereas 
lawyers saw them as good for their court battles. They claimed that maintaining 
the livelihood of the rank and file gave them time to gather evidence and construct 
stronger and stronger arguments as they engaged in the slow-moving process of 
court proceedings. They saw the length of time it took to settle as a mixed bless-
ing. The continued production under worker management was in and of itself evi-
dence for the feasibility of continued operation of the company as a business, and 
although they wanted to bring the cases to a successful close as soon as possible, 
the longer the production and sales continued the harder it was for the other side 
to argue the necessity of bankruptcy in the first place. Finally, the struggle both 
in its collective action forms and its production form gave them a client that was 
visible, tenacious, and “unforgettable.” 
One of the lawyers for Universal claimed that after four years of struggle 
their cases were actually stronger because the worker-managed production had 
enabled the legal team to gather more evidence and to make stronger arguments 
about the careless way in which the parent company had treated the Universal 
workers. “What we need for our court cases is evidence,” and “nearly four years 
of self-management of production had made it possible to produce more and more 
evidence together.” Of course no one wanted this case to last nearly a decade, 
least of all the union members who lived with uncertainty and personal economic 
struggles to sustain their families or the union leaders who had to maintain the 
solidarity necessary to outlast the legal negotiations and reach a favorable settle-
ment. However, from the lawyers’ point of view, time passing was not necessarily 
an indication of the likelihood of defeat. This, of course, is why they saw such 
significance in the activities of the union that stabilized the livelihoods, work, and 
social lives of the workers themselves and the Universal factory as a union man-
aged plant.
The “living” and “working” aspects of this labor dispute created remark-
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able counterpoints to the disruptive actions and court hearings organized by the 
union. The combination of stable daily routines of production, sales, company 
management, and maintenance of the plant resembled the pre-bankruptcy rou-
tines to which all were accustomed. Given the goal of the eventual reopening of 
the company as a worker-owned production cooperative, these two “pillars” of 
normalcy were particularly important. One of the most striking things about the 
atmosphere of Universal during its struggle was its feeling of normalcy. In my 
own field notes, I remarked on this the first time I visited them. Aside from the 
small red flags adorning the fence that ran around the factory property, one would 
not know that anything unusual was going on inside. People and machines were 
active, and normal routines of work, breaks, friendly games, exercise, and even 
factory gardening were repeated daily. Following a very brief period of less than 
three months after the declaration of bankruptcy, workers had returned to routines 
with which they were already familiar. They shared these routines with people 
with whom they had already established ties of workplace collegiality and friend-
ship. If I were to try to describe these daily routines it would make for tedious 
reading, but ironically it was largely that tedious stability of daily work life that 
grounded the Universal struggle and gave the union traction in pursuing a settle-
ment of their dispute.
Periodically the festivals, parties, and factory bazaars opened the premises 
to neighbors, networks of social movement supporters, academics, representa-
tives of political parties, and of course their legal team. One of the members of 
the union’s Joint Struggle Committee joked at a general meeting that “rumors are 
running around the neighborhood about Universal workers—you are supposed 
to have gone bankrupt and to be engaged in a harsh struggle, but in fact you are 
working and partying as usual. What’s going on?” He talked about numerous 
social events of the past year that had contributed to strengthening their reputa-
tion as a healthy small company. They had convened a New Year mochi-making 
party, a summer obon festival, a bazaar where they sold their shoes at a discount 
to those in their immediate neighborhood, and a factory festival. Not only had 
these activities demonstrated the continued existence of the company itself, they 
had also become a direct and powerful defiance of the order to go bankrupt and 
disband. As such they had become “an embarrassment to the parent company” 
against whom they were fighting. 
The collective actions that support the “struggle” element in the dispute were 
dramatic, disruptive, and infrequent. Each effort to bring the rank and file into dis-
ruptive actions required renewed persuasion, framing, encouragement, and mo-
bilization on the part of union leaders and their Joint Struggle Committee. These 
collective actions were largely unfamiliar and uncomfortable for people at first. 
Over the years they became adept at carrying them out although for most there 
was at best an uncomfortable fit between their lives as workers and their actions 
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as demonstrators and activists (see Turner 1995). 
In the beginning of their disputes workers were convinced to stay, to join in 
the court case, to continue production under their union’s management, and to 
commit to a plan of action aimed at financial settlement, job security, and publicly 
correcting unfair treatment on the part of their parent company, Custom. In daily 
conversations and interviews over the course of many months, all the Univer-
sal workers reported that they experienced a gradual change in their motives for 
joining the struggle, staying with it for the first few years, and then persevering 
through to the end. One woman told me, “At first we had no work. We had no right 
to even be at work. But we were worried about our jobs and about the possibility 
of finding other jobs. Even the parent company had dismissed workers from its 
own factories. How could we expect to find work?” 
The strength of union-managed production as a strategy for pursuing court 
cases about unfair dismissal lies in its creation of a short-term solution to the 
immediate problem worrying many of the workers involved. In order to keep 
the rank and file motivated over the long term, however, the leadership of the 
union had to offer more than a temporary solution to the problem of employment. 
Many workers expressed their anger at their parent company for treating them as 
“less than human” (ningen to shite atsukarete inai) and their worry about find-
ing other jobs in a sector of the Japanese economy deeply affected by changes 
in international economic policy. However, as one worker put it to me, “What 
works in the beginning won’t work after a few years or even months.” Over time 
workers needed to find reasons to stay with this struggle, not knowing for sure 
that it would settle to their advantage. There were several things that sustained 
people. The most common was a deeply felt connection to other workers who 
had not quit. When I asked people why they stayed even after so many years, the 
most common response was, “I couldn’t quit after all that time when others were 
sticking it out.” These others were sometimes labeled as “even the young guys 
with families” or “even the older workers who should be retiring,” but they were 
always a reference to a sense of shared purpose based on ties of common experi-
ence. Ironically, it seemed that time was on the side of staying even longer. There 
was a certain logic to staying put once a significant investment of time and effort 
had already been made. 
In addition to the grounding of the struggle in bonds of shared experience, 
daily life routines of work, special occasions, and life, there were many for whom 
seeing this struggle through to the end held meaning beyond their own local dis-
pute. The notion that they were doing something of value by standing up for 
Japanese workers and their rights to fair treatment even in times of economic 
hardship was tangible and provided for many a sense of purpose (ikigai) in their 
own lives. This was primarily developed in the process of finding, through the 
experience of participation in the dispute itself, that they were part of the very 
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extensive network of the Japanese labor movement, a movement that had a his-
tory to which they might contribute. This was an explicitly argued message heard 
from lawyers, union leaders, and other labor movement activists. As a motivation 
for participation it was more salient for some rank and file than for others, but for 
everyone it was part of the cultural environment of their struggle. The legal cases 
themselves explicitly tied these workers and their collective purpose to the larger 
world of Japanese society and the historical evolution of important values and 
norms about workers’ rights. 
Clifford Geertz called law a way for society to “imagine the real” (Geertz 
1983, 173). In the Universal case and in others like it that I have studied, I think 
that going to court has also been a way for ordinary citizens to realize the imag-
ined or at the very least to exercise their agency to that end. In considering social 
change, in other words, it is not just the activist intention to transform that is in 
question, but also the process through which ordinary Japanese workers come, 
through specific political actions, to realize their legal and social positions within 
national institutions and Japanese society as a whole. It is in this union of legal 
action to achieve organizational goals and cultural action to create common sense 
categories for social agency that the role of the labor dispute as a social movement 
becomes critical for success legally, politically, and culturally.
power, neTworks of supporT, and poliTical sTraTegies for proTesT
Universal built an extensive local, national, and even international network of 
unions and labor federations that supported their collective action and their court 
cases, including the then powerful and progressive Sohyo, or General Council 
of Trade Unions.2 The first thing the Universal union president did when he was 
notified of the bankruptcy declaration was to call the Custom Shoes union, the 
Federation of Shoe Manufacturers Union, to which they both belonged, and the 
national federation Sohyo. He claimed years later that while people always talk 
about the great efforts and accomplishments of the Universal workers in pursuing 
their labor dispute, there should be much more attention paid to the very exten-
sive network of labor movement organizations that “propped us up” and made it 
possible to go to court, to pursue union-managed production, and to organize ef-
fective collective actions. In these early days, help was immediate and took many 
forms, all of them concrete in terms of resource sharing, advice, and mobilization 
of networks. Young workers from affiliated unions came to work at Universal, 
2. Sohyo, the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions, took an active role in supporting labor 
disputes even in small and medium-sized industries. It was dissolved in 1989 when it joined the 
newly organized Rengo, or Japanese Trade Union Confederation. This newer organization now 
represents nearly 70 percent of Japanese unions.
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federation personnel came to help organize the Joint Struggle Committee, net-
work lawyers were brought in to handle legal cases, and organizational resources 
were made available. 
As is common in disputes of this nature, the “Joint Struggle Committee,” 
made up of representatives from the most important affiliated unions, political 
groups, and legal advisors, worked with the Universal leadership to plan their 
dispute actions and help lawyers plan their legal strategies. In addition, there were 
many other support committees (shienkai), organized by many different groups 
that joined in the network of protest for Universal. These included representatives 
from national level labor federations, the union organizations for shoe and leather 
manufacturers, Tokyo area labor union networks, Socialist Party organizations, 
neighborhood activists, and a wide range of progressive lawyers, academics, and 
social activists. They also joined the Tokyo Sōgidan, an organization made up of 
all companies undergoing labor disputes, which organized large-scale demonstra-
tions and actions by joining forces and scheduling multiple site demonstrations 
over a single day. This extensive network of support integrated this small com-
pany’s workers and their legal and political struggle into networks of labor that 
reached far beyond their own workplace.
Throughout the years of the Universal struggle, the organizations in this net-
work continued to be involved in planning and execution of collective action as 
well as in production and sales. There were always people working on the shop 
floor who had been sent by one of the network organizations. Some of these peo-
ple were there to help when additional human resources were needed, but more 
often they were workers engaged in either individual or very small disputes who 
needed employment while waiting for their own court cases to settle. Raw materi-
als for Universal’s production and all of their sales of the finished products were 
handled through union networks that stretched across Japan. I was interviewing 
a union president in a large electronics company, and when I mentioned I had 
worked previously with the Universal union, he cheerfully pointed at his Uni-
versal made shoes, telling me how much he liked them and how well made they 
were. He had purchased them from one of the lunchtime sales that his company 
authorized. Universal sold all their products by delivering or sending them to 
unions nationwide for sale to their members. 
In addition, these networks conveyed in every interaction with Universal 
workers the increased potential for their struggle to be successful as well as the 
broader significance of their cause. The strategies Universal could pursue were of 
course constrained by their small size, but with the help of their supporters they 
kept up an ongoing series of actions ranging from large demonstrations in down-
town Tokyo at the financial institutions backing Custom, weekly picketing of the 
Custom’s Tokyo factory, and weekly pamphleteering in Custom’s neighborhood.
Workers who felt “small” and largely invisible came away from demonstra-
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tions excited about what to them were “unbelievable” numbers of workers who 
came to demonstrate with them. Just before their first experience at one of the 
largest demonstrations (a day of coordinated demonstrations with thousands of 
workers) in which they participated, many rank and file worried about how insig-
nificant their small company would be when they showed up in front of the banks 
and companies in downtown Tokyo. By the time they came back from that collec-
tive action, however, conversation was animated and excited about the extensive 
network of Japanese workers within which they had a place. One worker who had 
been dreading the event conveyed how surprised she was by the absolute num-
bers. “It was the first time for me, so putting on that thing [she motioned toward 
where the chest sign where their union demands were written] was something I 
was dreading. But you’re not alone doing that, and even if something is unpleas-
ant when you do it alone, when you do it with everyone else it is all right. There 
were so many people there yesterday. I didn’t realize. It was amazing.” 
Even if the legal cases technically could have been carried out without these 
political actions and networks of extensive ties, it is unlikely that they would have 
been successful. Workers themselves claim that their dispute could not even have 
begun without this extensive network of protest supporters, much less could it 
have reached a satisfactory conclusion. These groups provided financial resourc-
es, expertise, experience, and credibility that pushed the parent company Custom 
and the financial institutions backing them to take seriously the cases against them 
and eventually to negotiate and work toward settlement. In addition to the tangi-
ble resources shared within these labor movement networks, there is an intangible 
experience of connection in the physical sharing of activities with one another. 
These networks conveyed a sense of being part of something larger than their 
own struggle, an experience of collective purpose that embodied the arguments 
made by union leaders and the legal team, arguments claiming that the Universal 
struggle was a more general struggle for Japanese workers’ rights as well. The 
decade-long history of the Universal dispute is one not only of collective action 
and union victory but of a transformation in the rank and file’s understanding 
of concepts of legal rights and political power made possible only through their 
shared experience of both the social movement and its related legal cases.
The seTTlemenT and iTs significance
The irony of the Universal workers’ struggle is that the legal case was about 
rights as employees and responsibilities of employers for the livelihood of their 
workers, while the political battle was ultimately to lead the Universal union to 
reopen as a workers’ cooperative company, to become its own employer, and to 
take responsibility for its own future economic viability and thus the livelihood 
of its workers. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the legal cases could have been 
Turner
122
settled in as advantageous a way as they were had the labor movement actions 
not continued to demonstrate the power of this union and the network of social 
movement activism into which it had embedded itself. The assets won in the final 
settlement went to establish a cooperative company in which all the employees 
owned shares. 
The final settlement of the Universal dispute was reached in negotiations at 
the Tokyo Labor Relations Board. Its wording carefully avoided any attribution of 
blame, any fault, or any conclusions about right and wrong. It included the agree-
ment for both sides to withdraw all cases in Tokyo District Court and Yokohama 
District Court, and it specified that they would do so without further comment. 
It transferred substantial capital assets, land, and machinery to the Universal 
union—enough to pay all back wages and to reopen a factory able to employ all 
involved workers. The Universal Workers Cooperative Company operating today 
is the result. Its legal history lies in the liberal legal framework and precedents of 
Japanese case law favoring the right of workers to fair treatment and good faith 
efforts by their employers to do all they can—even in times of economic hard-
ship—to preserve their employment and to engage in consultations and achieve 
some measure of agreement before restructuring the enterprise or moving to dis-
solve it. Their political and cultural history lies in what the union proudly and ide-
alistically called “tiny socialism,” a local practice of worker control with roots in 
the ideologically idealistic and strategically effective Japanese labor movement of 
the immediate postwar period. This history continues to frame progressive models 
aimed at moving Japan and Japanese labor relations toward a future founded on 
more “human-centered” values. 
Assessing the significance of this small struggle and its contributions to sig-
nificant social change is a complex task that generates equivocal conclusions. I 
think the actions of this small group of workers were important both as social 
movements and as court cases, and their achievements suggest the power that lies 
in this combination. As a labor movement action, Universal was one of the first 
struggles to oppose liquidation and loss of employment due to economic “ratio-
nalization,” or gōrika. It became one of several model struggles in the 1980s and 
1990s (see Totsuka 1978). Most of these had some measure of success in recover-
ing assets, and several succeeded in reopening factories and reemploying work-
ers. Many are still in business. For the workers involved in these struggles, the 
short-term impact was great, and it is easy to call them successful and to see ways 
in which they influenced grass-roots social change in Japanese labor relations 
practices. They clearly established models of protest with successful track records 
in the courts that became available for emulation by workers in the increasingly 
large number of small and medium-sized companies that fell into bankruptcy dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s as the Japanese economy fell into recession. Through 
the networks of labor and social movement actors that supported them, they also 
Becoming unforgeTTaBle
123
provided inspiration for agency for many other activists trying to grapple with the 
social changes that accompany economic change. In settings as diverse as medical 
activism, established labor unions at large stable corporations, and small citizens’ 
movements, I have been surprised to hear people refer directly to these antibank-
ruptcy struggles in general and to the Universal struggle in particular. It is possible 
that these cases may provide models for combining legal cases with social move-
ments to create particular local solutions to particular social problems. 
As a court case, Universal’s success in enforcing labor laws through the 
courts demonstrates the power of law to frame and to legitimize labor movement 
action. The Universal court cases and those that followed contributed to the body 
of case law that defends employees against unfair dismissals by dealing directly 
with the problem of job loss through bankruptcy dissolution. There was an ex-
plicit intention on the part of Universal workers to force Japanese capitalists to act 
“responsibly” toward their workers when rationalizing or reorganizing their pro-
duction in response to economic crises. These goals were clearly met in the final 
successful settlements and in the broader evaluation of their struggle within the 
labor movement, and beyond that in the world of social activism and civil society. 
Yet there were unintended consequences of their struggle that stemmed from 
the accumulated pressures on employers as these and other labor disputes involv-
ing employment security proliferated during this period. Union leaders and work-
ers alike comment now, with appreciation for the irony, that their struggles taught 
capitalists “how to go bankrupt” while avoiding worker initiated legal action and 
disruptive dispute actions. This too has contributed to efforts by employers to 
find more flexible ways of dealing with their work force and their networks of 
subcontractors and subsidiaries. In other words, the legal settlements of cases like 
Universal’s helped to define the limits to employment elimination, dismissals, 
liquidation, plant closings, and bankruptcy for employers, subsidiaries, and sub-
contractors. Corporations learned the legal limits to their actions. Certainly, say 
the labor movement people, employers learned what they had to do to cut back 
their workforce without facing massive labor movement action and lengthy court 
battles. Foote generalizes about what he labels the “ongoing dialectic” process in 
the history of employer-employee legal struggles over dismissal practices: “busi-
nesses have devised new strategies designed to maintain flexibility, to which the 
courts have responded by developing the doctrine further” (Foote 1996, 638). 
One obvious consequence of restrictions on the dismissal of workers has 
been the pressure for proliferation of new categories of employment beginning 
in the 1980s. Since the case law has tended to place more restrictions on regular 
full-time workers than on other categories of employment, businesses have 
responded by trying to create more flexibility in managing their work forces 
through reductions in the relative number of regular employees and increases 
in the number of workers in so-called “nonstandard” categories like temporary, 
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contract, and part-time. Businesses can take precautions and show good faith 
efforts to protect jobs for the more protected regular work force and increase the 
nonstandard workers for whom employment security is less regulated. In recent 
interviews, in fact, Rengo officials readily admitted their frustrations about the 
increasing weakness of organized labor in the face of work-force restructuring. 
It is no longer, they say, a climate that favors radical action. In fact, their new 
efforts are focused largely on coping with the proliferation of new categories of 
employment created by employers trying to replace a large portion of the regular, 
full-time work force with more flexible categories of workers who are structurally 
kept in relationships without full protection of employer-employee relationships 
as customarily and legally defined. 
Ironically, the success of cases like these in the 1980s and 1990s undoubtedly 
influenced the economic and political reform efforts aimed at reducing the record-
breaking number of employment disputes, which ushered in the new millennium 
and set the stage for Japan’s economic restructuring. The social activists involved 
in Universal’s labor movement and their allies in related social movements lament 
that social recovery has not yet followed economic recovery. They see social ills 
and loss of meaning and value to be a continuing threat to Japanese workers and 
an important set of issues to be addressed by movement activities as marketiza-
tion and its associated economic upheavals challenge the ability of people to find 
stable work, secure a reasonable livelihood, and understand their position in a 
rapidly changing social world.
economic uncerTainTy, employmenT sTaBiliTy, and social change 
In one sense these social movement activities were not so much about going to 
court to change things as they were about leveraging the law to keep things from 
changing. Of course, in the area of employment, because of its constitutive role in 
daily life itself, stability is a primary goal for workers. In times of economic crises 
the use of collective action and court cases to further the cause of employment 
stability resonates with the histories of both legal and social activism in Japan. 
Judicial activism around employment security began in the early postwar period 
to establish the case law that is still used to address “economically motivated dis-
missals” during the most recent “new wave” of economic upheaval (Foote 1996). 
Bankruptcy struggles used this body of law to their advantage. Safeguarding the 
livelihood of Japanese workers during economic restructuring is a complex prob-
lem. The Universal dispute and others that followed it in the 1980s and 1990s 
aimed to set limits on employer actions during times of economic crisis. The 
Universal workers, their union leadership, and federation allies did not set out 
to change Japanese labor law, but to benefit from and expand the application of 
those already in existence. They meant to force capitalists to be responsible for 
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workers even in times of gōrika—or rationalization of production. They meant to 
enforce limits on dismissals, liquidations of production facilities, and elimination 
of jobs associated with the economic crises that were lining up off Japan’s shores 
as globalization ushered in unprecedented demands for marketization in this “new 
wave” of economic upheaval. 
Throughout the struggle, the language of the social movement emphasized 
both the particular issues reflected in the court cases and larger issues of what the 
union called “social responsibility.” This echoes, in friendlier language, the legal 
concept of “social rights,” but it shifts the balance to the more powerful side of a 
relationship with a nod toward paternalistic assumptions about moral action within 
institutional hierarchies. They accused Custom of being irresponsible and claimed 
that the company was responsible for the livelihood of the Universal workers and 
their families. The particular justice they demanded was summed up in the slogans 
like “Custom! Take responsibility for Universal’s bankruptcy!” “Custom! Take re-
sponsibility for the livelihood of Universal workers!” Greater labor movement jus-
tice was imagined in “Big capital! Stop destroying small and medium-sized com-
panies!” In a time when enterprises were trying to find ways to increase flexibility 
in their work forces, this was an important challenge, resonating with the resistance 
within larger companies of their regular, full-time workers asking for limits to be 
placed on offshore production and increases in nonstandard employment.
Much of Universal’s legal battle was directed at establishing workers’ rights 
as employees, at recovering lost wages and benefits, and at opening negotiations 
about a reestablishment of employment. Whereas the arguments regarding Japa-
nese labor law were particular and exclusively context bound, avoiding, even in 
settlement, generalizing about right and wrong, or good and bad, the local disrup-
tions of the social movement were infused with the discourse of broad national 
and international social change to improve the welfare of workers in Japan and 
around the world. The issues addressed in framing the local labor movement ac-
tions resonated with the tone of national legislative, business, government, and 
labor federation debates, as well as broader social discourse concerned with re-
forming Japanese social institutions in the context of marketization and economic 
restructuring. Both aimed to enforce existing protections and to advance addi-
tional protections for workers in Japanese society. 
The most idealistic arguments that supported these actions were universal 
ones about rights as workers, employees, and citizens of Japan. The global eco-
nomic change that compelled Custom to take measures to disband Universal was 
met with national legal actions and was supported by local social movement activ-
ity. Universal’s disruptive actions were, of course, aimed in part at demonstrating 
their determination to fight until settlement could be reached in the court cases 
themselves, but they also aimed at a series of loftier goals. These included regain-
ing employment for all Universal workers, reopening a Universal company under 
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worker control of production, and demonstrating to Custom, to other Japanese 
capitalists and employers, and to workers around Japan that workers—even in 
small numbers and in economically vulnerable positions—can exercise power 
and can be at least a modest force for desirable social, economic, and political 
change ensuring safeguards for the livelihood of ordinary workers. None of these 
goals was addressed directly in any legal case and yet, without the legal cases as-
serting the very specific rights of these particular workers as employees, none of 
these goals could have been pursued. The pursuit of these general issues through 
the specific cases acted to legitimize the disruptive actions, especially in light of 
eventual victory in the court cases, and to signal a powerful message of support 
for employee rights to stable employment and a secure livelihood even in circum-
stances of economic crisis.
 This discourse of social responsibility rests on an uneasy intersection of pa-
ternalistic notions of being taken care of by a powerful employer and liberal, even 
radical, notions of employee protection from rash disregard in the course of em-
ployer economic action. Daniel Foote (1996) says of the “abusive dismissal” case 
law that it lies on an assumption of a stronger employer and weaker employee and 
the corresponding necessity of assuring some measure of responsibility on the 
part of the employer and rights to protection for the employee. Fundamentally, he 
argues, in Japanese law employment is seen as a “stable relationship” that carries 
with it both rights and responsibilities. Frank Upham (1987) and William Gould 
(1984) have both written about the importance in Japanese court cases of social 
contracts within long-term relationships. Both argue persuasively that these are 
not traditional, conservative, reactive positions but in fact constitutive of the pro-
cess of defining and protecting Japanese concepts and practices of social relation-
ships and social rights.
Domestic and international economic pressures have led to recent reforms 
in Japanese employment law pushing toward more business flexibility and the 
opening of labor to more market forces. The reforms themselves, however, con-
tinue to use the language of employer responsibility, employee consultation, and 
preservation of the stability of the relationship between employers and employees 
even under conditions of economic stress, enterprise crisis, or organizational re-
structuring. Yamakawa (2001) argues that while revisions in commercial codes 
since 2000 have made it easier for corporations to restructure, revisions in labor 
law “have not touched upon the limitation on the employer’s right to discharge 
established by case law, which is one of the most fundamental elements of the 
Japanese labor law.” Foote concurs and suggests that although in the current 
economic climate erosion of employment security is likely, it will be market pres-
sures rather than any change in judicial application of legal standards that will be 
responsible (1996, 706).




markets, there are many forms of social change in Japan not unlike those in the 
rest of the advanced industrialized world. What is particularly interesting about 
the Japanese response is the way in which economic, legal, and cultural insti-
tutions are being engaged in debate about the reconfiguration of both specific 
economic practices and cultural understandings of the role of work and stable 
employment relationships in constituting social life and identity for Japanese citi-
zens. This debate goes on throughout society. A leader in the government orga-
nization charged with revitalizing Japanese companies recently wrote, “Japan, a 
nation of few natural resources, continues to rely on people as its primary source 
of wealth generation into the twenty-first century. Yet, the system for tapping that 
potential, a twentieth century harmonie preetablie [preestablished harmony] . . . 
is getting old. . . . If we accept this, what kind of system should we create for the 
twenty-first century?” 
The response of activist unions to bankruptcy related loss of employment, 
supported by national federations and networks of social movement actors, con-
stituted an important voice in the process of social adjustment by making de-
mands for reasonable treatment of workers during restructuring or dissolution of 
companies. Because these demands were made both legally through court cases 
and politically in social movement actions, they became powerful enough to con-
tribute to the critical social discourse regarding the consequences of subjecting 
employment to an unregulated labor market, and they have asserted the need for 
appropriate social, cultural, and legal limitations on economic action.
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Suing for Redress: Japanese Consumer 
Organizations and the Courts
Patricia L. Maclachlan
Since the mid-1960s, when “Citizen Nader” first exploded onto the scene, civil 
litigation has been a high-profile political tactic for the American consumer move-
ment. In numerous instances, the courts have forced recalcitrant businesses into 
changing their behavior toward consumers and encouraging national and state 
governments to introduce or amend consumer protection laws and regulations. 
The value of the courts as an avenue for articulating the American consumer in-
terest can be attributed to such factors as a broad standing to sue, liberal class-
action rules, the ready availability of legal counsel, comparatively low court fees, 
and user-friendly court procedures for civil cases, to name just a few. Although 
Americans are quick to find fault with their judicial system, it stands alone in 
terms of its accessibility not only to lone citizens with private grievances, but also 
to organized spokespersons of the public interest. 
In Japan, by contrast, litigation has historically functioned as a tactic of last 
resort for consumers. As others have shown, the reasons for this include a nar-
row standing to sue for most civil and administrative suits, a shortage of lawyers, 
economic and procedural barriers to litigation (see Haley 1978), and the psycho-
logical stigma attached to airing one’s grievances in public (Taniguchi 1984, 34). 
These observations are borne out by statistics. Between 1896, when the Civil 
Code was enacted, and the introduction of the new Products Liability Law in 
1994, the courts ruled on only 150 or so products liability lawsuits; in the United 
States, by contrast, there were approximately 13,000 products liability lawsuits 
before the federal courts in 1991 alone (Hamada 1996, 12). For “public interest” 
suits launched by consumer organizations, the contrast is equally pronounced; 
whereas movement suits against both business and governmental authorities are 
more or less routine in the U.S., Japan’s leading consumer organizations resort to 
the courts only occasionally. Shufuren, the housewives’ organization and a lead-
ing player in the consumer movement, has taken to the courts only a handful 
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of times in its more than sixty-year history; the more radical Consumers Union 
(Shōhisha Renmei) routinely resorts to litigation to publicize its agenda, but its 
cases have attracted far less media attention than Shufuren’s. For both organiza-
tions, litigation usually ends in defeat.
These observations notwithstanding, civil litigation has functioned as a sig-
nificant tactic for Japanese consumer organizations—particularly those with leg-
islative goals, and in ways that may strike some observers as surprising. To make 
this case, I explore consumer movement litigation in three issue areas (antitrust, 
products liability, and information disclosure), and with reference to the follow-
ing questions. How receptive has the postwar Japanese judicial system been to 
consumer action on behalf of the public interest? To what extent does litigation 
serve the interests of consumer activists seeking political change? How do those 
activists relate to their constituents, political allies, and the general public during 
the course of a lawsuit, and what are the implications of these linkages for the 
movement’s long-term development? Finally, how has the relationship between 
the consumer movement and the courts changed since the mid-1990s with the 
introduction of a national information disclosure law, amendments to the Code of 
Civil Procedure and other legal reforms, and what do these changes suggest about 
the future of litigation on behalf of public interest goals?
The anTicarTel crusades
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Japanese consumer organizations are deeply 
concerned about high consumer prices and have targeted lax antitrust enforce-
ment as one of the root causes of that phenomenon. Accordingly, activists cam-
paigned long and hard since the early 1950s for amendments to the 1947 Anti-
Monopoly Law that would lessen the incidence of cartels and other forms of col-
lusive business practices in the marketplace. As might be expected in a country 
where the interests of businesses and their bureaucratic spokespersons had a pro-
found influence on virtually all facets of economic policy, consumer campaigns 
on behalf of Anti-Monopoly Law reform usually fell on deaf ears. By the early 
1970s, however, a confluence of political and economic events opened a window 
of opportunity for expanded governmental discussions on reform that heightened 
the movement’s determination to publicize the law’s importance as a guarantee of 
the consumer’s rights to both product choice at competitive prices and adequate 
administrative redress. Unfortunately, however, advocates lacked the necessary 
inroads into the mainstream policy process to convey that message to both the 
powers that be and the general public. It was against this political and institu-
tional backdrop that a number of activists took to the courts in the so-called “juice 
trial” of 1971–78 and the “kerosene trials” of 1974–89, all of which showcased 
the perceived inadequacies of Japan’s antitrust regime in terms of fulfilling basic 
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consumer rights. As the following pages illustrate, both suits had a significant 
impact not only on public opinion surrounding the issue of Anti-Monopoly Law 
reform but also on movement solidarity and relations with movement allies (see 
also Maclachlan 2002a, chap. 6).
The Juice Lawsuit
In 1968, Shufuren’s product testing center launched an investigation into canned 
and bottled juice products on the suspicion that artificial fruit juices were being 
falsely designated as “100 percent pure.” Completed the following year, the tests 
revealed that of 100 samples marked “100 percent juice,” only 3 percent had been 
accurately labeled; about a fifth of the samples consisted entirely of artificial juic-
es, while the remainder fell within the 10 to 30 percent pure juice range (Nihon 
Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai 1980, 168). To rectify what Shufuren viewed as a case of 
deceptive labeling and a violation of the consumer’s rights to choose and to know, 
the organization appealed informally to the Japan Fair Trade Commission (FTC) 
for the introduction of more stringent labeling standards over the bottled juice 
industry. 
In March 1971, the FTC announced that it had concluded a “fair competition 
agreement” (kōsei kyōsō kiyaku) with juice manufacturers under the 1961 Law to 
Prevent Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations (Futō Keihinrui 
Oyobi Futō Hyōji Bōshi Hō, or Keihyōhō) that was designed to clarify the indus-
try’s labeling standards. Fair competition agreements were usually drawn up by 
industry leaders and then approved (nintei) by the FTC. Although not subject to 
binding arbitration by the FTC, these agreements functioned as informal rules for 
promoting a “fair and competitive” economic order (Shōda and Sanekata 1976, 
213). Shufuren, however, refused to endorse the commission’s 1971 agreement 
with juice manufacturers on the grounds that it did virtually nothing to prevent the 
application of the term “pure juice” to products containing artificial ingredients.
Arguing that the new labeling standards still deceived consumers, Shufuren 
filed a formal “statement of dissatisfaction” (fufuku mōshitate) with the FTC under 
Article 10 of the Keihyōhō (Shufuren 1978, 4). It was the first time in Shufuren’s 
history that it had ever taken such a step. The move conformed to Keihyōhō stipu-
lations that parties—including consumers—whose interests (rieki) were adverse-
ly affected by violations to the law had the right to register such statements with 
the commission and to demand corrective measures (Kaneko 1974, 15)—in this 
case, the abolition of a fair competition agreement that Shufuren maintained was 
illegal under the Keihyōhō.
After thirty months of hearings that movement activists called the “juice 
trial” (jūsu saiban), the FTC ignored the substantive content of the complaint 
and ruled that Shufuren was not qualified to file a statement of dissatisfaction. 
The commission ruled that since the fair trade agreement governing the labeling 
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of juice products had been drawn up with the interests of businesses in mind, the 
consumer interest was not directly pertinent to that agreement. The commission 
also concluded that it could not be established that the agreement had violated the 
consumer’s right to product choice—a position that flummoxed the housewives’ 
association. To add insult to injury, no sooner did the FTC rule on the case than it 
announced that juice manufacturers would have to comply with stricter and more 
accurate labeling standards after all—standards that reflected Shufuren’s demands 
almost to the letter. 
Although Shufuren was pleased that several years of activism had finally led 
to the imposition of proper labeling standards over the juice industry, the commis-
sion’s alleged mishandling of the appeal enraged the organization. Since ignoring 
the ruling would be tantamount to tacitly approving it, the women sought review 
by the Tokyo High Court. Known as the “consumer rights trial” (Shōhisha no 
kenri no saiban), the suit was a test case of the consumer’s right to be heard—of 
the right of ordinary consumers and consumer organizations to appeal administra-
tive decisions pertaining to consumer protection. 
After several months in court and with the financial and moral support of 
other consumer organizations and scores of lawyers and legal scholars who served 
as volunteer counsel, Shufuren lost the case. In its July 1974 ruling upholding the 
Fair Trade Commission’s decision, the Tokyo High Court found that consumer 
protection was an important aim of the Law to Prevent Unjustifiable Premiums 
and Misleading Representations and that consumers did indeed have the right 
to contest administrative decisions that violated the interests of consumers. 
Consumers did not, however, have the legal standing to demand a repeal of the 
“fair competition agreement” that had set the juice industry’s labeling standards, 
since the purpose of such nonbinding agreements was fair competition within the 
industry rather than the consumer interest (Kokumin Seikatsu Sentaa 1997, 97).
Not to be outdone, Shufuren appealed the case to the Supreme Court with the 
backing of forty prominent legal scholars. In 1978, the Supreme Court upheld the 
decision of the Tokyo High Court, holding that neither consumers nor consumer 
organizations were qualified to lodge formal complaints against administrative 
measures designed to protect the “public interest” (kōeki) (Yamane et al. 1998, 
70). Clearly, the “public interest” in this case had been equated with the interests 
of producers.
Shufuren’s defeat in all phases of the juice trial highlighted the judiciary’s 
tendency to interpret the consumer’s standing to sue very narrowly. As such, the 
defeat was a crushing disappointment for consumer organizations, not to mention 
a telling example of both governmental and court efforts to marginalize consum-
ers as citizens in matters relating to the business community. That said, the suit 
had some positive side effects for consumer activists. First, the consumer move-
ment’s broad support for Shufuren’s actions helped soften many of the ideological 
suing for redress
133
differences among its constituent organizations—differences that had hindered 
intramovement cooperation in the past. As the 1970s progressed, “joint action” 
(renkei no purei) on behalf of common goals became increasingly effective 
(Interview, Ono Shōji, Shōdanren, Tokyo, March 9, 1994).
Second, the voluntary participation of lawyers and legal scholars as advisors 
and legal counsel in the case helped forge a relationship between the movement 
and the legal community that is still in place today. This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that lawyers have flocked to the consumer movement. In marked contrast 
to the U.S., where lawyers routinely assume leadership positions in consumer 
organizations, few Japanese lawyers get involved in consumer movement affairs. 
Reasons for this include the dearth of opportunities for consumer-related litiga-
tion in Japan, resource deficiencies within movement organizations, and the tra-
ditionally low level of prestige attached to participation in postwar social move-
ments. Also significant are the lack of a “public interest law” tradition in Japan 
and the country’s perennial shortage of lawyers, although this is slowly changing. 
Although there are no statistics on this issue, based on personal observations and 
interviews with consumer activists, I would estimate that only twenty to twenty-
five lawyers were regularly providing pro bono services to consumer campaigns 
by the early 2000s. Motivated in part by altruistic concerns for individual rights 
and the interests of Japanese consumers, these lawyers exhibited an entrepreneur-
ial spirit insofar as they forged relationships with consumer organizations in their 
efforts to create broader legal and organizational opportunities for advancing the 
consumer interest.
Lawyers’ contributions have been enormously important to the consumer 
movement. Unlike their American counterparts, Japan’s cash-strapped consumer 
organizations consist almost entirely of volunteer housewives, few of whom have 
formal legal or other advanced academic training. They therefore have no choice 
but to rely on volunteer legal counsel for guidance on the finer points of the law. 
In the juice case, lawyers would assemble observers after every hearing to explain 
the legal significance of the day’s proceedings; this practice continues today not 
only in the context of consumer litigation but also during complicated legislative 
campaigns. Without this logistical and educational support, it is highly unlikely 
that the movement would have accomplished as much as it has politically over 
the past three decades.
Last but not least, the juice trial helped galvanize the movement to reform 
the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Fair Trade Commission. By symbolizing the 
FTC’s lack of accountability to consumers, the issue helped raise the public’s 
consciousness of their rights as consumers and of the commission’s frequent 
inability—if not unwillingness—to uphold them. The timing of the Tokyo High 
Court’s ruling, moreover, proved highly propitious for Anti-Monopoly Law 
reform; handed down just as the FTC was fielding its own proposals for reform, 
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the ruling attracted extensive media coverage and increased public support for the 
burgeoning legislative movement that eventually culminated in the amendments of 
1977. In sum, the juice trial may have ended in legal defeat, but it was nevertheless 
an effective avenue of interest articulation for a politically marginalized social 
movement intent on reforming the legal system.
The Kerosene Trials 
Another landmark consumer campaign that overlapped with and fed into the 
movement to strengthen the Anti-Monopoly Law involved three lawsuits against 
Japan’s powerful oil cartel. Like the juice trial, these cases highlighted the dif-
ficulties confronted by consumer organizations within the court system and ulti-
mately ended in defeat. More significantly, the cases had a major impact on public 
opinion vis-à-vis antitrust—at least during the early stages of litigation.
The primary trigger behind the kerosene trials was sharp increases in con-
sumer prices following the 1973 oil shock and a concomitant drop in the supply of 
such basic consumer necessities as paper, soap, sugar, and toilet paper (Chifuren 
1986, 127). To many activists, the inflationary effects of the oil shock had been ex-
acerbated by an expanding oil cartel that was in turn symptomatic of lax antitrust 
enforcement. Taking their cue from the FTC, which by year’s end had announced 
a decision to launch a formal investigation into allegations of collusion within 
the oil industry, a number of national consumer organizations took steps of their 
own. Their target was kerosene—a clean, relatively safe, and increasingly popular 
fuel for space heaters. In 1974, the Consumers Union (Shōhisha Renmei) took 
the first step by organizing 343 of its members into “The Consumer Association 
for Getting Back What Was Taken Away” (Torareta mono o Torikaesu Shōhisha 
no Kai), a plaintiffs’ group that filed suit against the kerosene manufacturers with 
the Tokyo District Court in September 1974. Two months later, 96 members of 
Shufuren and the Kawasaki Consumer Cooperative filed a similar suit; in short 
order, 1,654 members of consumer cooperatives did the same in Tsuruoka in 
Yamagata Prefecture. The plaintiffs in the two Tokyo cases filed under Article 25 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and the Tsuruoka plaintiffs filed under Article 709 of 
the Civil Code (Kokumin Seikatsu Sentaa 1997, 153). 
These suits marked the first time in history that consumer organizations em-
ployed the legal tactic of “group litigation” (shūdan soshō), the details of which 
are specified by Article 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Group litigation is a 
Japanese version of the American class action suit, but with at least two impor-
tant differences. Like the class action suit, the device enables plaintiffs to avoid 
the inconvenience of suing individually by allowing them to litigate as a group. 
Until recently, however, and in contrast to class action, all members of that group 
had to be specified before the case went to trial. One or more of the plaintiffs 
would be chosen by the rest of the group to represent that group in court (Davis 
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1996, 146 and 191); unlike class action, lawyers were forbidden from acting on 
those plaintiffs’ behalf. The kerosene suits were particularly noteworthy because 
in each case, judges allowed either Shufuren or the consumer cooperatives to 
represent their members in court; normally, the courts do not permit third parties 
to assume such functions (Boling 1997, 471).
In all three cases, the consumers-as-plaintiffs requested no more than 2,400 
yen per person (Yamane et al. 1998, 75). Since the plaintiffs were required to es-
tablish the relationship between their individual rights and the defendants’ actions 
in order to effectively claim damages, they had to prove that they had purchased 
kerosene from cartel members in the wake of the oil shock. The requirement dis-
qualified hundreds of potential plaintiffs who had long since discarded their re-
ceipts. Many of those who requested duplicates were turned down by kerosene 
retailers who feared retaliation from their suppliers (Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai 
1980, 182), a development that simply underscored the extent of the cartel’s con-
trol over the distribution system.
As is wont to happen in Japan, the trials dragged on for years. In 1981, the 
Consumers Union’s case was settled via conciliation (wakai); after a series of ap-
peals that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, the other cases ended in defeat 
by 1989. In the Tsuruoka case, the Sendai High Court ruled in favor of the plain-
tiffs in a landmark decision in 1985; the Supreme Court subsequently overturned 
that decision. 
Like the juice trial, the kerosene trials highlighted how difficult it can be in 
Japan to obtain compensation for alleged violations of consumer rights and inter-
ests through the court system, a problem that is at least partly attributable to the 
legal ambiguities and requirements of the statutes under which most consumer-re-
lated suits are filed. Article 25 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, for example, is unclear 
about the circumstances under which consumers can sue for damages; nor, for 
that matter, does it specify the meaning of “damages.” Not surprisingly, few suits 
have been filed under these provisions. Between 1947 and 1984, for instance, only 
seven suits were filed under Article 25 of the Anti-Monopoly Law; in the United 
States during the early 1980s, by contrast, over one thousand private antitrust 
actions were filed each year (Iyori 1986, 75n21). To complicate matters, Article 
709 of the Civil Code requires that the alleged victims of business behavior prove 
business negligence—an onerous task before the mid-1990s given the weak dis-
covery provisions and the strength of measures to protect business secrets. Small 
wonder, then, that most consumer-related suits ended in legal defeat.
In politicized suits involving large numbers of plaintiffs who have suffered 
severe bodily damage at the hands of corporations, the courts have been known to 
suspend the plaintiff’s burden of proof and to allow public opinion and moral con-
siderations to influence their rulings. This was certainly the case in the Big Four 
environmental lawsuits of the late 1960s and 1970s (see McKean 1981) and suits 
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involving large-scale damages caused by tainted foods and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts like thalidomide. In lawsuits involving questions of political principle and 
small amounts of damages, by contrast, the courts leaned toward conservatism. 
That said, litigation has been an effective tactic for educating citizens about their 
rights as consumers and attracting both media and public attention to consumer-
related political issues. As one consumer activist once put it, consumer organiza-
tions will file suits that are destined to fail simply because there is no better fo-
rum for publicizing the status of consumer rights in Japan (Interview, Nishikawa 
Kazuko, Consumers Union, Tokyo, March 22, 1992).
During the mid-1970s, the use of the courts for political purposes was further 
legitimized by a number of progressive local governments that passed consumer 
ordinances permitting local government subsidies for consumer lawsuits. In the 
kerosene case filed by Shufuren and the Kawasaki cooperatives, for example, 
Shufuren received a total of 1.8 million yen—a significant amount in the 1970s—
from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to help cover some of their legal ex-
penses (Shufuren 1998, 55). These measures can be interpreted as an official ac-
knowledgement of the almost insurmountable barriers to litigation, an assertion 
of local governmental authority in the consumer realm, and the tacit rejection of 
national governmental efforts to control the extent of citizen litigation in Japan.
suing for safer ProducTs
Unlike the movement to amend the Anti-Monopoly Law, consumer movement ac-
tivism in support of new products liability legislation did not involve direct use of 
the courts. Instead, activists allied with members of the Japan Federation of Bar 
Associations (Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai, or Nichibenren for short) to amass data 
on nearly one hundred years of products liability litigation and to publicize the fate 
of plaintiffs in contemporary suits in an overall effort to create a climate of public 
opinion that favored reform. Their efforts, in many ways, were very successful.
In the past, the victims of accidents caused by defective products had access 
to several avenues of recourse, including one-on-one negotiations with manufac-
turers (a procedure known as aitai kōshō), conciliation services administered by 
semigovernmental consumer centers at the local level, or ministerial compensa-
tory schemes (see Maclachlan 1999). Consumers who were dissatisfied with these 
procedures, however, could sue the manufacturer in question for damages. 
As proponents of reform were quick to point out, litigation under the pre-
1994 products liability system was an almost impossible undertaking. For one 
thing, plaintiffs in most cases had to file suit under Article 709 of the Civil Code, 
which stipulates that plaintiffs must prove: (1) that manufacturers were negligent 
in the planning or manufacturing of the products in question; and (2) that the 
damages incurred were the direct result of product defects. To fulfill these legal 
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obligations, plaintiffs required detailed information about the planning and manu-
facturing processes pertaining to those products. But neither the Civil Code nor 
consumer-related statutes provided for access to this kind of information; nor did 
the court system, which lacked adequate discovery mechanisms. As a result of 
these constraints, the vast majority of victims of defective products avoided the 
courts altogether by relying on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs, 
or, failing that, by simply “crying themselves to sleep” (nakineiri) in frustration. 
Consumer activists saw in this dismal state of affairs an opportunity to educate 
the public on the deficiencies of Japan’s system of consumer redress. Shufuren, 
for example, joined forces in 1991 with Nichibenren to carry out an annual three-
day telephone service designed to solicit consumer feedback on consumer redress 
mechanisms. Established by the bar association the previous year, the service, 
which was known as the Defective Products Hotline (Kekkan shōhin 110 ban), 
collected data from over thirty locations around the country. The hotline was an 
ingenious idea that accomplished at least two goals. First, since the annual event 
was well covered by both the national and regional newspapers, it proved to be 
an effective mechanism for reaching the citizenry and educating them about both 
strict liability and their rights to safe products and adequate redress mechanisms. 
This function was particularly important given the complicated legal technicali-
ties surrounding products liability reform and the resulting tendency for average 
citizens to ignore the issue altogether. Administering the hotline was also one of 
several tactics that enabled consumer leaders and their allies in Nichibenren to 
gather rough but compelling statistics about the perceived inadequacies of the 
judicial system in products liability cases—statistics that were disseminated to 
politicians and bureaucrats within the policy-making process.
The most prominent lawyer in the movement to enact a products liability 
law was Nakamura Masato. Nakamura first got involved in consumer litigation in 
1975, when he helped represent the plaintiffs in suits involving damages incurred 
by a tainted antidiarrhea medicine (the SMON case). He participated in a number 
of products liability suits after that time and achieved national prominence as 
Nichibenren’s leading spokesperson for consumer issues. An eloquent speaker 
and highly trustworthy activist, Nakamura was frequently asked by newspaper 
editors to review articles on products liability before they went to press (Interview, 
Nakamura Masato, Nichibenren, Tokyo, February 9, 1994).
Nakamura and a number of other lawyers joined forces with consumer lead-
ers to publicize the results of their surveys on the state of Japan’s products liabil-
ity regime. One such survey revealed that of the 250 cases involving defective 
products handled by lawyers in 1989, 166, or 66 percent, never made it past the 
consultation stage. Of the remaining 84 cases, most were resolved through concil-
iation; only 4 lawsuits—many of them launched years beforehand—had resulted 
in victories for the plaintiffs (Nakamura et al. 1992, 26–30).
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Finally, the alliance with Nichibenren contributed to an informal dialogue 
between the movement and the legal community that helped educate the general 
public as well as movement members. During private conversations and tactical 
planning meetings for those participating in the products liability reform cam-
paign, lawyers frequently provided information on pending products liability 
suits—information that was in turn disseminated to other movement members 
through movement literature, lectures and symposia, and the National Consumer 
Rally (Zen Nihon Shōhisha taikai) held each November in Tokyo. The national 
and regional dailies, which occasionally reported on these developments, served 
as a link between intramovement discussions on products liability reform and the 
general public. 
In June 1994, after several years of campaigning, consumer activists and 
their Nichibenren allies achieved their ultimate goal: the enactment of products 
liability legislation based on the concept of strict liability. Under the new system, 
plaintiffs in products liability suits are only required to prove the existence of 
a product defect and the cause and effect relationship between that defect and 
damages incurred. Theoretically, the new law facilitates access to the courts by 
loosening the consumer’s legal burden of proof. In practice, however, consumers-
as-plaintiffs are being encouraged to settle their disputes in an expanding net-
work of nonstatutory ADR programs administered by both business associations 
and local governments (see Maclachlan 1999). These procedures can be a mixed 
blessing. For the aggrieved consumer, they are far less costly and time-consuming 
than formal lawsuits. For consumer advocates, however, they are nothing short 
of disappointing. The emphasis of ADR procedures on compromise solutions 
rather than the “winner-take-all” approach of the courts has enabled many corpo-
rate defendants to escape their legal responsibilities as stipulated under the new 
law. ADR procedures also tend to be quite opaque, thereby preventing valuable 
information about consumer protection and consumer rights from reaching the 
public at large (Maclachlan 2002a, 229). As such, products liability ADR proce-
dures help privatize potentially controversial cases of consumer-related damages 
in much the same way that local governments helped privatize environmental 
disputes following the pollution crises of the 1960s and early 1970s (see Upham 
1987). For those who view the courts as a nation’s most effective arbiter of con-
sumer rights, bureaucratic and corporate dominance of products liability redress 
has dampened the movement to strengthen consumer voices within the Japanese 
political economy.
The disclosure cases
Since the early 1990s, a new kind of consumer movement has been materializing 
in Japan. While the postwar movement was centered in institutionalized advocacy 
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organizations led primarily by women and, to a lesser extent, the consumer coop-
eratives, this new branch of the movement is situated primarily at the grass-roots 
level and is far more fluid in terms of its membership and political objectives. 
Consisting of relatively young, often college-educated women and men, these new, 
local groups and single-issue networks champion such issues as environmentalism, 
good governance, and citizenship, as well as traditional consumerism. As such, 
they resemble local wings of the contemporary American consumer movement. 
Many of these groups were involved in a movement to enact a national 
information disclosure law that was fueled by a widespread determination to 
guarantee the consumer’s professed right to know (see Maclachlan 2000). These 
groups are particularly significant for our purposes because many were involved 
in litigation in the context of loose, prodisclosure alliances with both lawyers and 
national consumer advocates. The activities of this alliance constitute a fascinat-
ing case study of the changing relationship between social movements and the 
judicial system and the capacity of the latter to serve as a harbinger for political 
change.
Between 1982 and the mid-1990s, most Japanese prefectures and many 
city and town governments had enacted disclosure ordinances that authorized 
the limited release of local bureaucratic documents to local residents. While 
those ordinances served very positive functions for the advancement of citizen-
government relations at the local level, they were far from perfect; users frequently 
complained of sloppy procedures, lengthy delays, and bureaucratic denials of 
formal requests on legally dubious grounds. To highlight these deficiencies, 
bands of citizens requested various kinds of information under local disclosure 
ordinances—information that they never expected to receive: safety data on 
controversial consumer products, information on the conduct and results of school 
entrance examinations, data on the entertainment and travel expenditures of local 
officials and heads of government, and the like. When local bureaucrats refused 
to comply with those requests, citizens had access to two avenues of recourse: 
first, they could appeal the decisions to local governmental inspection committees 
(fufuku kansa iin) established to deal expressly with disclosure cases; or, they 
could file suit at the district court level. By 1996, there were approximately sixty 
suits before the courts, and many were ultimately resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor. 
Some cases even went as far as the Supreme Court, although few of these resulted 
in victory for the plaintiffs (Boling 1997, 128).
Many of these local litigants were linked to lawyers and national advocacy 
groups in nationwide networks such as The National Liaison Council for Citizen 
Ombudsmen (Zenkoku Shimin Ombuzuman Renrakukai) and The Citizens’ 
Network to Demand the Establishment of an Information Disclosure Law (Jōhō 
Kōkaihō no Settei o Motomeru Shimin Nettowaaku). National advocates rein-
forced the activities of these local litigants by conducting surveys of their own 
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on the weaknesses of local disclosure ordinances. All told, their efforts had a 
profound impact on public opinion in the movement to enact national disclosure 
legislation, as well as on the willingness of local bureaucrats and politicians to 
reform their disclosure ordinances.
In May 1999, the Diet finally enacted the Information Disclosure Law af-
ter almost two decades of public debate, thereby opening national bureaucratic 
documents to systematic scrutiny for the first time in history. What is significant 
about the law is that it outlines procedures for appealing bureaucratic denials of 
disclosure requests to the country’s eight High Courts. This provision—which 
was introduced as a concession to opposition parties in the Diet—is a significant 
guarantee of citizen supervision of Japan’s national administration, not to mention 
a stunning expansion of judicial functions in ways that may deter governmental 
efforts at social control in the future. Consumer and citizen activists at both the 
national and local levels, meanwhile, remained partially mobilized and worked 
hard to encourage average citizens to test both the national and local disclosure 
systems not only to ensure bureaucratic accountability, but also to obtain infor-
mation that could be used in citizen campaigns on behalf of anticorruption, safer 
products, and a host of other issues (Interview, Ohta Yoshiyasu, Nisseikyō, Tokyo, 
June 29, 1999). In contrast to past examples of environmental and consumer liti-
gation, lawsuits relating to information disclosure requests have the potential to 
spark new types of litigation in the future, as opposed to a clamp-down on this 
method of interest articulation by governmental authorities interested in localiz-
ing and privatizing conflict.
consuMers as PlainTiffs: The PosTwar record
While financial, legal, and procedural constraints have rendered litigation a politi-
cal tactic of last resort for both consumers in general and the organized consumer 
movement, the above case studies indicate that the tactic can provide movement 
activists with a significant opportunity to accomplish a number of political objec-
tives. First, litigation can effectively highlight violations of the consumer’s rights 
to information, product safety, product choice, and political representation in 
ways that legitimize the political objectives of the movement. Second, and related 
to the first point, litigation is often instrumental in galvanizing public opinion in 
support of long-term legislative objectives. What is ironic about the outcomes of 
these lawsuits is that plaintiffs did not have to win in order to accomplish their 
political aims. In fact, defeat actually worked to the advantage of consumer advo-
cates by stoking a sense of outrage among movement members, their allies, the 
general public, and even erstwhile opponents of consumer causes; these senti-




Litigation also served as an effective instrument for forging a sense of soli-
darity within the organized consumer movement. From the movement’s incep-
tion during the early Occupation period, cooperation between the ideologically 
diverse groups of the movement was at times next to impossible. Shufuren’s juice 
trial, however, raised an issue that all consumer activists could agree on, namely, 
the importance of guaranteeing such basic consumer rights as the right to informa-
tion (“the right to know”) and the right to be heard in both governmental and busi-
ness circles. Galvanized by Shufuren’s mission, erstwhile rivals banded together 
in support of a common cause and helped build the interpersonal networks that 
proved so instrumental to political cooperation in later years.
Finally, these consumer trials helped build a mutually beneficial alliance 
between consumer activists and legal professionals. This alliance has been an 
invaluable one over the years for consumer activists, the vast majority of whom 
are poorly versed in the fine art of lobbying politicians and bureaucrats. In many 
of the single-issue political campaigns of the past two to three decades, promi-
nent lawyers accompanied consumer advocates in their visits to Nagatachō and 
Kasumigaseki, serving as eloquent spokespersons of the consumer interest. 
While the alliance with lawyers certainly has its advantages, it also reflects 
one of the movement’s most glaring weaknesses: its lack of political and legal 
expertise. This in turn can have far-reaching implications for the movement’s 
standing among the general public. As one consumer law expert once noted, ex-
cessive reliance on lawyers and other outside specialists as the movement’s chie-
bukuro (fountain of wisdom) may actually diminish the movement’s credibility 
in the eyes of ordinary consumers and hence its overall impact on public opinion 
(Interview, Shōda Akira, Sophia University, Tokyo, December 8, 1993). But for 
as long as the movement lacks these internal resources—and this will no doubt 
remain the case for as long as the movement struggles to attract younger talent—
dependence on the legal community may constitute the only logical option for 
activists seeking to influence the direction of political events in Japan.
signs of change
In September 1996, on the heels of the implementation of the Products Liability 
Law and in anticipation of a national information disclosure law, the Japanese Diet 
passed the first series of comprehensive amendments to the 1890 Code of Civil 
Procedure since 1926. The amendments, which went into effect on January 1, 
1998, were in part a response to mounting public criticisms of the judicial system 
in the wake of a series of controversial lawsuits. Among those lawsuits was a 
group action suit filed in 1989 by a number of hemophiliacs who had contracted 
HIV from the nation’s blood supply as a result of negligence on the part of the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. The plaintiffs in the case had successfully secured 
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a court order for the ministry to release pertinent documentation during the early 
stages of the trial. Ironically, after the ministry refused to comply with that 
order, the plaintiffs obtained the necessary documentation through the American 
Freedom of Information Act. For many onlookers, there was no better proof of the 
court system’s inaccessibility to ordinary Japanese citizens. 
From the perspective of consumer rights and consumer movement access 
to the courts, the new code includes at least four significant features. First, it 
establishes a more streamlined pretrial procedure that enables both parties in a 
dispute to clarify points of contention and the applicability of those points to 
pertinent bodies of law. This represents a marked improvement over the more 
haphazard pretrial procedures stipulated by the old code—procedures that often 
contributed to confusion and unnecessary delays during subsequent stages of the 
trial (Mochizuki 1999, 295). Second, the new code provides for a small claims 
court for damages less than 300,000 yen. In the past, small claims suits with dam-
ages up to 900,000 yen were heard at the summary court level, where complicated 
procedures and lengthy delays were usually the norm. The new system is not only 
simpler but also less time-consuming, since most small claims cases must now be 
settled within one day. In theory, at least, this provision assists plaintiffs in prod-
ucts liability lawsuits involving small claims.
Third, the new code loosens the requirements for group action. While in the 
past all members of a group action had to be individually identified before a suit 
could be filed, the new code enables plaintiffs to sign on after proceedings have 
begun (Taniguchi 1997, 783). This is a small but important change that facilitates 
group actions in the consumer, environmental, and welfare realms. 
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the new code takes a significant step 
toward correcting one of the court system’s most glaring weaknesses: narrow pro-
visions for the discovery of evidence. In contrast to the highly restrictive system 
that was in place under the old code, all documents are now subject to discovery 
unless they qualify for specific exemptions. Those who fail to comply with dis-
covery orders are subject to more stringent penalties than they were in the past 
(Mochizuki 1999, 297–301). These provisions benefit plaintiffs in all kinds of 
civil suits.
Consumer advocacy organizations and plaintiffs in consumer cases more 
generally also stand to benefit from the 2004 amendments to the 1968 Consumer 
Protection Basic Law. The revised law marks a significant victory for consumers 
by explicitly recognizing the existence of basic consumer rights. The new law 
also provides for the establishment of two organizations that are designed to pro-
mote those rights: the Consumer Policy Conference, a cabinet-level organ led by 
the prime minister that meets yearly to discuss and coordinate national consumer 
policy; and the National Consumer Affairs Center, an independent administrative 
agency that works closely with local governments and consumer centers to carry 
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out ADR functions, information dissemination, and a number of other tasks relat-
ing to consumer protection. Although in practice these developments have yet to 
produce major changes in either the filing or success rates of consumer-related 
suits, in theory, at least, they empower consumers vis-à-vis business interests in 
both the political and judicial spheres.
Finally, Japan introduced a series of changes to the legal profession over 
the past decade that further facilitates access to the courts. These include the 
establishment of professional law schools modeled loosely on the American 
system and a governmental commitment to increase the number of admissions 
to the legal profession (Feldman 2006, 12). The most dramatic result of these 
changes has been a steady increase in the number of attorneys in Japan, which 
rose from 16,731 in March 1999 to 28,789 in March 2010 (Japan Federation 
of Bar Associations 2010, 1). Also noteworthy was the 2004 passage of the 
Comprehensive Legal Support Law that in turn led to the establishment of the 
Japan Legal Support Center, an independent administrative institution that pro-
vides legal advice to Japanese citizens in civil as well as criminal legal matters. 
As Feldman observes, these developments could lead to a “change in public 
perceptions about the desirability and appropriateness of using the courts to 
settle disputes” (2006, 20).
Although the changes noted above promise to open the courts to more mean-
ingful access by ordinary Japanese citizens, a run on the courts is unlikely to 
occur. For starters, while legal aid services for criminal cases have expanded in re-
cent years, comparable services for civil cases remain underdeveloped. Moreover, 
the new Code of Civil Procedure does nothing to lower Japan’s notoriously high 
court-related fees (Taniguchi 1997, 788)—fees that will continue to channel 
would-be plaintiffs into cheaper ADR procedures. Third, products liability plain-
tiffs with small claims will continue to shy away from the courts. In keeping with 
custom, most small claims cases will be settled via aitai kōshō—corporate dispute 
resolution procedures based on one-on-one negotiations between consumers and 
company representations. The vast majority of other products liability cases will 
be diverted toward more user-friendly ADR facilities. While these noncourt pro-
cedures certainly have their advantages, the fact that they are carried out behind 
the scenes is problematic for the fulfillment of consumer rights—a task, many 
analysts argue, that is best carried out by courts (see Maclachlan 2002b).
It is also likely that plaintiffs in civil suits will encounter problems with the 
code’s new discovery provisions. Those who are asked to produce documentary 
evidence to the courts can claim exemptions if disclosure: (a) has the potential to 
incriminate either the holder of those documents or the relatives of the holder; (b) 
violates statutory or judicial secrets; or (c) involves documents that were gener-
ated exclusively for self-use. This last exemption is the most problematic. “Self-
use documents” are those produced by professionals like lawyers, doctors, bank 
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employees or company executives during the routine course of performing their 
professional duties. While it is unclear exactly what sorts of documents fall under 
this category, bureaucrats and corporations have strong incentives to activate this 
exemption to prevent the disclosure of potentially embarrassing information in 
court. As one analyst points out, documents that are “for sole use by the possess-
or” could include intracompany memos or proposals and internal reports covering 
consumer complaints (Mochizuki 1999, 301). Needless to say, this sort of loop-
hole can have very damaging effects on plaintiffs in products liability suits who 
require documentary evidence in order to prove the presence of product defects 
and the cause and effect relationship between those defects and damages incurred.
The courTs, social MoveMenTs, and The QuesTion of social conTrol
From the increasing incidence of tainted imported food products to the consumer-
related implications of the devastating nuclear accident in Fukushima in March 
2011, Japanese consumers and their advocacy organizations continue to grapple 
with challenges that affect basic consumer rights. As they do so, they face a court 
system that is significantly more accessible to consumer litigation than it was in 
the past. The Information Disclosure Law, for instance, is a surprising piece of 
legislation that guarantees access to district courts for consumers/citizens seek-
ing to appeal bureaucratic rejections of disclosure requests. Although the law has 
enough loopholes to prevent bureaucrats from being completely exposed to public 
scrutiny, it nevertheless marks an unprecedented opening of the court system.
The new Products Liability Law and Code of Civil Procedure are also likely 
to expand consumer/citizen access to the courts, but their significance should not 
be exaggerated. For the most part, civil procedures under the new code remain 
costly and time consuming; these features, combined with the presence of low-
cost ADR procedures manned by business and government, continue to deflect 
most aggrieved consumers away from the courts and into venues where pro-
business interests will be able to privatize conflict. The implications of these 
observations for the broader relationship between the court system and social 
movements in Japan are significant. In his landmark 1987 study, Frank Upham 
explained how the state managed to divert social and political conflict away 
from the court system by creating alternative bureaucratic venues for dispute 
resolution—venues that enabled the state not only to privatize conflict but also 
to control the direction of future social and political change (Upham 1987). The 
history of consumer and consumer movement access to the courts suggests that 
while the state’s grip on society has loosened since the mid-1990s following the 
downfall of the 1955 system and the passage of pertinent legislation, it still retains 
the upper hand in many instances. The beneficial effects of the Products Liability 
Law on the relationship between the victims of defective products and the court 
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system, for example, have been offset by a sophisticated network of nonstatutory 
ADR programs, while the failure of the Code of Civil Procedure to remove many 
of the financial barriers to litigation will act as a deterrent to potential plaintiffs 
in a host of civil cases. For consumer activists, the partial opening of the courts 
to Japanese citizens may not be enough to motivate the movement into accessing 
the courts more regularly. Now, as before, the courts will constitute a tactic of last 
resort for activists with a political mission to fulfill.
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Chapter 6
No Voice in the Courtroom?
Deaf Legal Cases in Japan during the 1960s
Karen Nakamura
Many foreigners puzzle as to why Japanese activist and minority organizations 
do not seem to use the court system to engage in social and legal change as prof-
ligately as their American counterparts. This was not always the case. As other 
chapters in this volume attest, the 1960s was a particularly dynamic period for 
Japanese courts. This chapter focuses on the history of one organization, the Japa-
nese Federation of the Deaf (JFD), as it shifted from prewar passivity to postwar 
litigation in the courts. It looks at the emergence of the first deaf lawyer for the 
organization, as well as early court cases in which the organization engaged. Ul-
timately, however, the organization changed strategies to engage in legislative 
and bureaucratic lobbying in the 1980s, working more cooperatively with the 
government. 
Background to Postwar deaf activism
There was not much political activism by deaf people in Japan before the war. 
The Japanese Federation of the Deaf, the main social and political organization 
of and for the deaf in Japan, describes the period from 1900–1940 as an “Era 
of Pleading,” during which deaf groups would have to beg for social services 
from government officers or other people in power. This radically changed in 
the decades after the war as a new generation of activists took over the organiza-
tion. This new cohort was active both in the courts and outside of them—filing 
lawsuits, organizing trial support groups, pushing their cause to newspapers, and 
running petition drives.
Why was there such an explosion of deaf activism in the postwar period? I 
do not believe that that deaf activists were politically repressed in the prewar and 
wartime period and were simply bouncing back after the change in government. 
The historical record shows that deaf groups were not particularly politically 
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active before the war, and, as with most other groups, there is evidence of willing 
government cooptation into the war movement.
Nor was it the case that the situation facing the deaf in Japan became worse 
after the war and during reconstruction, forcing more political mobilization. Inter-
views with informants born before in the first half of the twentieth century almost 
unilaterally show that the situation improved after the war: more social rights, 
more employment opportunities, better education, better social mobility, and so 
forth (Nakamura 2006a). If anything, deaf people should have been happy with 
their higher quality of life in the postwar period.
As was noted in other chapters in this volume, the general social and political 
milieu of postwar Japan is critical for understanding the ability of minority groups 
in Japan to articulate new forms of activist politics. Steinhoff (this volume) has 
shown that after the end of the American Occupation in 1952, there was both 
a resurgence of the left amid strong government repression and violent internal 
political struggles among groups. Indicative of the growing enmity between the 
Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Bura-
ku Liberation League split in 1955 from the JCP-affiliated National Council for 
Buraku Liberation (Davis, this volume). The conflict surrounding the U.S.-Japan 
Joint Security Treaty (more commonly known in Japan as Anpo) in 1959–60 
heightened the general sense of political crisis within the left, especially among 
student groups such as Zengakuren, the national student organization, which split 
into JSP and non-JCP affiliated (New Left) factions just before the Anpo crisis. 
This student activism continued well into the 1960s and early 1970s, creating a 
broader frame (Snow and Benford 1988) for leftist political activism during this 
period that created a contextual frame for organizing protest in Japan.
The Social Demographics of Postwar Deaf Cohorts
The fervent social context of the postwar period itself does not fully answer how 
a new generation of deaf political activists was able to take advantage of new 
framings made possible by the New Left. We also need to explore the special 
demographic characteristics of the deaf cohorts that emerged in this period. The 
deaf youth that emerged as leaders in the 1950s and 1960s were qualitatively and 
physically different from their prewar counterparts. Part of this shift was caused 
by changes in the epidemiology of deafness and part by changes in the education 
system (for deaf social movements sparked by similar shifts in other cultural con-
texts, see Christiansen and Barnart 1995; Baynton 1996; Monaghan 2003).
Immediately after the war and into the early 1950s, there was a mass migra-
tion of the population towards urban areas at a time when the physical, medi-
cal, and social infrastructures were still rebuilding. The birthrate skyrocketed, but 
so did various epidemics, some of which (such as rubella or meningitis) caused 
pre- or postnatal deafness. Compounding this, the Occupation under the Supreme 
no voice in the courtroom?
149
Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) brought in powerful new antibiotics, 
such as streptomycin, which could cure many infectious diseases but which were 
for children ototoxic; that is, one of the drugs’ side effects in young children was 
deafness. The combination of the rising birthrate, epidemic disease, and the use 
of ototoxic antibiotics caused the number of deaf children to increase dramati-
cally in the turbulent postwar period. This was a mixture of both prelingually deaf 
children (those who were deaf at birth and thus never learned a spoken language 
as their native tongue) and those who were postlingually deaf (those who became 
deaf in childhood, after they had already acquired spoken Japanese as a primary 
language).
In 1948, SCAP instituted compulsory education for all citizens including the 
disabled, who had been excluded from general education up to then. Schools for 
the deaf (and other disabilities) sprang up in every prefecture in Japan. Because 
of the very large numbers of deaf children, the schools were crowded and tumul-
tuous. Forty or more students to a single classroom were not unusual, according 
to my informants. Because transportation systems were quite poor, most of these 
new schools were residential in nature, and the dorms were similarly packed with 
students of all age groups.
Somewhat surprisingly, public schools for the deaf in Japan at that time (as 
more or less now) shared the same curricula as their hearing counterparts. In both 
hearing and deaf schools, students used the same textbooks, teachers emerged out 
of the same training programs with the same (lack of) qualifications, wrote the 
same things on the blackboards, and gave the same lectures. The only difference 
was that in schools for the deaf, no one could hear the teacher speaking. And when 
teachers had their backs to their classes, writing on the blackboards, no one could 
read their lips.
Sociologist Julian Dierkes (2003) explains this as a direct result of pressure 
by postwar leftists teachers organizations to guarantee equality of education in 
Japan. Under this mantra, egalitarianism was only possible by ensuring that every 
Japanese child in the public school system received the same lecture using the 
same textbook, regardless of social class or geographic region—or ironically, dis-
ability. While on the surface it would seem a laudable goal, ensuring that children 
would not be treated differently based on class status or school district, it entirely 
failed to accommodate the special education needs of deaf children by preventing 
them from using curricula based upon visual methods or bilingual programs (such 
as a mixture of sign language and spoken Japanese).
This pedagogic inflexibility under the mantra of equality created inequality 
in the classrooms. Compared to their prelingually deafened classmates, students 
who were postlingually deafened because of streptomycin injections as young 
children had a huge advantage under this regime; they already had a base of spo-
ken Japanese on which they could build their lip-reading and speech skills, as well 
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as general academic skills such as reading and writing since they had attended 
regular schools until they had become deaf. 
Those who became deaf later in childhood were able to speak Japanese and 
lip-read with greater ease than their other counterparts. These students, with a 
strong base in Japanese language, rose to the top of the school system. In the land 
of the deaf schools, those who became deaf later in childhood were kings (Naka-
mura 2006b; 2010). For instance, one of these students would later on become the 
first deaf lawyer in Japan and a leader within the JFD.
 
Matsumoto Masayuki: First Deaf Lawyer in Japan
In 1939, Matsumoto Masayuki was born in Osaka with normal hearing, but in 
his third year of elementary school in 1948, Matsumoto contracted epidemic ce-
rebrospinal meningitis and was deafened as a result. He was not allowed to re-
sume schooling in his regular neighborhood school due to his deafness, and he 
was transferred to the Osaka City School for the Deaf, where he (of course) did 
extremely well. He recalls in his memoirs that in those days there was still a lot 
of signing used within the Osaka School for the Deaf, and he picked up signing 
rather naturally (Matsumoto 1997, 1). 
After elementary school, Matsumoto ended up taking most of his junior high 
and high school classes at a regular (hearing) school. However, most of his friends 
remained at the school for the deaf, and he remained close to them. After high 
school, he entered Kyoto University and graduated with a Bachelor’s in Law in 
1963, passing the bar exam the same year. He spent two years (1964–65) at the 
Judicial Research and Training Institute, finally registering with the Osaka Bar 
Association in 1966. 
During his college years, Matsumoto became politically active within the 
Kyoto regional association of the deaf. He became friends with some of the youth 
group leaders who would later stage the silent coup (pun intended) of the late 
1960s that would change the direction of the JFD. These leaders had backgrounds 
very similar to Matsumoto in that they had also been deafened in childhood 
and then later attended Kyoto University. They also had strong leanings toward 
Marxist-Leninist ideals, a political dimension that they largely kept hidden from 
public view. That these deaf leaders were centered in Kyoto is significant for 
another reason—the Kyoto-Osaka area was also a central battleground for Buraku 
organizing and mobilization as well as a center of JCP and student movement 
organizing. Kyoto was a hotbed for multiple types of protests.
deaf Protest activity in the 1960s
Kyoto School for the Deaf Protests (1965)
In November 1965, the year before Matsumoto registered with the Bar Associa-
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tion, high school students at the Kyoto Prefectural School for the Deaf started to 
organize around the issue of high school education. The so-called “3.3 Move-
ment” held a strike at the school on March 3 of the following year. One of the 
protest leaders, Ooya Susumu, described the motivations for boycotting school:
We students talked with each other [about what we wanted]: we didn’t 
want classes where there was favoritism toward the students with 
proper enunciation skills; we wanted classes where everyone could 
understand; we wanted a school [environment] that everyone could 
enjoy. We looked closely at the reality of our situation: [that the idea 
of] entering college was considered a silly fantasy. We weren’t even 
given the option of looking for employment at large corporations; we 
were expected to work like machines without hope until the end of 
our lives. We eagerly wanted to meet with all of the teachers to ask 
the question, “What are we studying for?” (Zenkoku Shuwa Tsūyaku 
Mondai Kenkyūkai 1994, 14 [translation mine]).
Deaf activist Itabashi Masakuni contextualized the 3.3 Movement in the mi-
lieu of post-1960, post-Anpo Japan. He notes that the framing of the high-school 
student movement was clearly about discrimination from the very beginning. He 
recalls turning on the TV or opening the newspaper and having the following 
questions perpetually raised by other social activists in Japan (1991, 360):
• What is democracy?
• What are basic human rights?
• What does it mean to protect our dignity as equal human beings? 
It was clear that questions being pushed by leftists and Buraku activists were 
affecting how deaf students also thought about their role in the new Japan. Un-
der the heading “Why Did These Problems Occur,” the Chōkaku Shōgai Kyōiku 
Kyōto Fōramu (Kyoto Forum on Deaf Education) wrote:
The social environment surrounding the school for the deaf at 
the time was one in which the problems caused by the nation’s rapid 
economic growth and environmental pollution were increasingly chal-
lenged by local movements and other movements fighting for the pro-
tection of various rights.
The Kyoto Prefectural School Board published its Dōwa [Bura-
kumin] Education Guidelines in 1963. In the year that the [3.3 Move-
ment] “Student Strikes” occurred, the [school board] was making its 
first steps in the civilized advancement (bunmeika) of [equal] educa-
tion based on the Constitution and the Fundamentals of Education 
Act. The Kyoto School for the Deaf established its first committee for 
Dōwa education in 1965. . . . The attitude toward signing was [becom-
ing] stricter, and one week before the Strike, the principal announced 
at the morning assembly that “I would like you to stop that gesturing 
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with your hands and speak [with your lips].” (Chōkaku Shōgai Kyōiku 
Kyōto Fōramu 1996, ii–iii)
In an environment where the rights of the former Burakumin were being 
espoused while at the same time as the linguistic rights of the deaf were being 
denied, deaf students felt they had no choice other than to strike. Although the 3.3 
Movement resulted in some minor changes at the Kyoto School, the situation in 
schools for the deaf did not improve appreciably. The most significant impact of 
the 3.3 Movement was perhaps in its broader appeal to Japanese society. The story 
was picked up by the major newspapers as well as local and national newsletters 
for the deaf. Deaf activists described this and other incidents that occurred in the 
same year as clarion call for a “Deaf Human Rights Proclamation” (Itabashi 1991, 
360). Deaf organizations around Japan galvanized at the idea of these students 
protesting to improve their situation. This led to a new sentiment within the gener-
ation emerging out of the postwar context: challenging law enforcement and court 
systems was an essential next step in the development of their political acumen.
Deaf Ears at the Police Station
In order for people who are deaf to defend themselves adequately in the criminal 
justice system, there need to be provisions made for sign language interpreta-
tion. The first mention of interpreters for the deaf appears in the Meiji Civil Pro-
ceedings Act of 1891, which was based on European legal codes: “When those 
pleading before the court do not understand the Japanese language or are deaf or 
otherwise mute, an interpreter shall be present. However, questions may be posed 
through writing, and written statements may be obtained from those who are deaf 
or mute” (Article 134 of the Civil Proceedings Act of 1890, cited in Zenkoku 
Shuwa Tsūyaku Mondai Kenkyūkai 1994, 12 [translation mine]).
Itō Shunsuke, one of the founders of the Japanese Sign Language Interpreters 
Association, recalls the first time he was called to interpret: 
In 1949, I became a teacher at the Kyoto Prefectural School for 
the Deaf. I started to learn how to sign and how to be an interpreter. 
The first time I used my sign interpreting skills in public was when I 
was called to the Kyoto City “N” Police Station one day. A young man 
had been arrested for theft. He was uneducated and couldn’t read or 
write. Even his signing was difficult to understand. I’m not sure if I 
was really acting in the role of sign language interpreter at the time. I 
put my signature [on the statement] and listed my role as the “sign in-
terpreter.” (Zenkoku Shuwa Tsūyaku Mondai Kenkyūkai 1994, 12–13 
[translation mine]).
Japanese Deaf News (JDN), the monthly newspaper of the JFD, reported 
with increasing frequency criminal cases involving the deaf in the postwar pe-
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riod. This was likely a result of the increased numbers of people who were deaf 
mentioned earlier, the economic and social devastation of the country at the time, 
returning veterans with war injuries, growing urbanization, and weakening family 
support systems that had previously helped to shelter the disabled. I use the JDN 
archives as a primary source to understand how the nascent organization came to 
use the judicial system in Japan, first defensively and then offensively, in order to 
mobilize social change.
Early on, the JFD was relatively passive in reacting to court cases. For exam-
ple, in the February 1952 issue, the Deaf News noted the final outcome of the trial 
of four deaf men arrested in 1948 for armed burglary. In this incident, the victim 
reported to the police that burglars told him to “Be quiet!” “Where’s the money?” 
“Open the [bureau] drawers from the bottom!” “Shut up!” etc. As the arrested 
suspects were all reported to be “deaf and mute,” there was some question about 
whether this was a case of mistaken identity. In the trial, which took four years 
to come to conclusion, two of the indicted men were found guilty while the other 
two were found innocent (JDN 1952 [February 1], 3). There was no mention of 
any trial support groups or of special legal aid rendered in this case, and the local 
deaf association did not mobilize to help them. 
In the same month, the Deaf News also reported the murder of a mother and 
daughter by a deaf family of four in Gunma Prefecture (JDN 1952 [February 1], 
2). Three schoolteachers from the Gunma Prefectural School for the Deaf appar-
ently served as interpreters (JDN 1952 [March 1], 3). Again, in this case there is 
no mention of any special support groups or legal aid from the local or national 
deaf association. These two cases are typical of criminal suits in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. While the Deaf News questioned if the police and prosecutors under-
stood the special circumstances of the deaf, larger issues of human rights had not 
yet been foregrounded. This was to change by the mid-1960s.
Janome Murder Incident (1965)
The year 1965 was a tumultuous one for the deaf community, and the issue of 
human rights was very much in the forefront. As mentioned earlier, the students 
at the Kyoto School were striking while the national deaf association was butting 
heads with bureaucrats over control of a welfare center for the deaf. There was 
also a pivotal court case: two deaf men stood accused of murder in what came to 
be known as the Janome Sushi Restaurant Incident. 
Witnesses said the two defendants, Satō Yoshikazu (age 29) and Kido Ta-
kashi (age 32), had been provoked into a brawl at the Janome Sushi Restaurant in 
Tokyo by three hearing men who had been making fun of their deafness and use of 
signs. Trying to stop the potential fistfight, the owner of the sushi restaurant tried 
to reason with one of the deaf men. Unfortunately, the deaf man could not read 
the owner’s lips, and further miscommunication ensued. Frustrated, the owner 
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raised his thick wood geta sandals and struck one of the young men in the face. 
The young man fought back and knocked the owner to the ground. The owner 
apparently struck the back of his head on his way down and subsequently died. 
The two deaf men were arrested on charges of assault and bodily injury resulting 
in death (Kawai 1991, 380).
No sign interpreters were provided during their police interrogations, and 
Kido later signed a confession detailing his role in the incident. The defendants 
were not provided with any effective way of communicating with their (hearing) 
lawyers. Although under the constitution defendants in Japan are guaranteed the 
right to meet with their lawyers without police surveillance, the police held that 
the sign language interpreters were not legal counsel (bengonin, i.e., officers of 
the court) and insisted on monitoring any meeting with lawyers where interpreters 
were present. In addition, it was questionable whether the defendants understood 
their rights (of silence, for example) and were fully aware of the legal proceedings.
The issue of awareness of legal rights, especially the right to silence and 
non-self-incrimination, has proven to be a problem in the United States as well. 
Deaf defendants with minimal schooling may not understand the basic concept of 
“rights” as used within the court system. For example, in a murder case in Mary-
land in 1975 the defendant signed a Miranda waiver as well as a confession, but 
there were suggestions that he understood the sign interpretation of “you have the 
right to an attorney present” as meaning. “it is all right to have an attorney pres-
ent” (Lane et al. 1996, 354–55). The charges were later dropped. Unskilled court 
interpreters have interpreted “the right to silence” as “the right to peace and quiet” 
(i.e., silent as in silent night) and not as “the right to not say anything using sign or 
any other form of communication in response to questioning.”
In the case of the two Japanese deaf men, a trial support group named The 
Group to Protect Satō and kido was immediately formed in their defense (see 
Steinhoff in this volume for the importance of trial support groups in Japan). 
The Deaf News reported that a fundraising campaign by deaf persons, teachers at 
schools for the deaf, relatives, other civic organizations, ordinary citizens, school 
students, and others collected ¥120,000 toward their defense costs (JDN 1966 
[August 15], 6). Unfortunately, they quickly came across an unforeseen roadblock.
 According to one of the members, the support group went to all of the law 
firms in the area in order to hire a private defense team, but one by one all of 
the lawyers they asked declined the case after they heard that it involved deaf 
defendants. Finally, the group found one firm that would accept deaf defendants 
as clients. The support group had similar problems finding qualified interpreters, 
and then they realized that their problems involved not only injustices within the 
court system but larger social prejudices and institutional barriers against the deaf 
as well (Kawai 1991, 381).
Kawai noted that when the parents of one of the defendants visited him in 
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jail, she had to ask a classmate of the defendant to translate what was being said 
in sign. In those days, parents were told not allow their deaf children to use sign 
nor to learn it themselves. As a result, many deaf children had very little lingual 
skills—in both sign and written/spoken Japanese. Of the two defendants, one had 
graduated from a deaf middle school, while the other had only finished third grade 
in Taiwan and was functionally illiterate (1991, 381–82).
The Tokyo District Court ruled that Satō was guilty and sentenced him to 
ten months imprisonment with hard labor, suspended for three years. Kido was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment with hard labor without a stay of execution 
(JDN 1966 [August 15], 6). The Deaf News reported that, as a result, the trial 
support group changed its name to “The Group to Support Kido’s Appeal.” The 
JFD decided at its annual national meeting to lend its full support to this group. 
In Osaka, a general support group, “The Group to Protect Deaf Persons’ Human 
Rights” was planned. One of the deaf activists involved in the 3.3. Movement re-
calls that the group eventually formed under the name “The Group to Protect the 
Legal Rights of Deaf Persons” (Itabashi 1991, 360).
Matsumoto Masayuki, who had just recently joined the bar association, ral-
lied to the cause of the defendants and filed an appeal in late 1966. This was 
Matsumoto’s first appearance as a lawyer for the deaf. His appeal questioned the 
qualifications of the interpreters provided by the court, especially in regards to 
whether they properly informed the defendants of the right not to have to provide 
self-incriminating testimony (e.g., Kido’s signed confession). The trial support 
group protested under the banner of “Give Deaf Persons Justice in the Court-
room!” (JDN 1966 [December 15], 4). 
According to Kawai Yohsuke, who was involved in the case, the case went to 
the Appeals Court. Kido submitted numerous personal appeals on his own behalf, 
but the justices were not able to understand the rather incoherent contents of these 
letters. The appeal justices affirmed the decision of the lower court but found Kido 
to have diminished mental capacity. They ruled the sentence be reduced (slightly) 
from five to four years hard labor (Kawai 1991, 382). 
The lawyers were reportedly greatly disappointed at the shallow level of dis-
ability awareness shown by the justices. As Kawai points out, the justices did not 
realize that if Kido was functionally illiterate (as evidenced by his incoherent let-
ters to the justices), there is no way that he could have understood and signed the 
written police statement/confession that condemned him. Kawai notes that when 
Kido communicated in sign with Matsumoto, his deaf lawyer, he showed intel-
ligence and full comprehension (1991, 384). 
The lawyers thought that, if the judges were able to understand sign language, 
they would have seen that Kido’s mental and linguistic capabilities were normal 
and would have ruled on the basis of the actual appeal claims, thus setting 
precedence for the handling of deaf defendants. Instead, they had a pyrrhic victory 
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based on a prejudicial view of Kido as mentally retarded because signing was 
his native language. Resigning themselves to the situation, the team did not file 
further appeal (Kawai 2002).
In 1966, at the First National Debate Meeting of the Deaf Youth, there was a 
panel debate on discrimination, and from the discussions that followed the Youth 
Section of the JFD was formed. Matsumoto’s compatriots, the young Marxist-in-
fluenced leaders from Kyoto, took control and steered the JFD onto a new course. 
The Deaf News headline read, “Protecting the Human Rights of the Deaf” (JDN 
1966 [August 15], 6). The following year, a new age was declared, “The Era of 
Fighting for Our Rights” (JDN 1967 [February 1], 1). One of the principal rights 
to receive attention on this new front was the right of deaf people to hold driver’s 
licenses. This battle was first fought in the courtroom and, when that did not suc-
ceed, through administrative channels.
Taking the State Head On: The Case for Driver’s Licenses for the Deaf
The original postwar Japanese Traffic Code prohibited driver’s licenses to those 
who were “deaf, mute, or blind, and so forth.” The first mention of driver’s licens-
es in the postwar Deaf News was a very small article in 1957 enviously noting that 
a Swedish deaf man had won an automobile in a lottery. He had already obtained 
his driver’s license, so he was excited by his prize (JDN 1957 [November 15], 3). 
In the October issue the following year, the Deaf News had a front-page ar-
ticle on a Japanese deaf man who had successfully obtained a “Light Vehicle 
Driver’s License” and had driven around the entire Japanese mainland. The article 
noted that in an “age of rocket ships” and “artificial satellites,” it was ridiculous 
for deaf persons in Japan to have to use bicycles to relay information to each 
other. Even “the modern convenience of telephones” was not available to the 
deaf, despite having been invented by Alexander Graham Bell whose wife was 
deaf (JDN 1958 [October 15], 1). The article noted that deaf people in America 
were treated just like everyone else and were allowed to have driver’s licenses. It 
was time, the author wrote, for Japanese deaf persons to claim their right to drive.
In the October 1960 issue, the Deaf News optimistically reported that the 
traffic law had changed in June of that year so that those who were not totally 
deaf were now able to obtain driver’s licenses. However, in the November issue, 
the Deaf News noted that local prefectural offices had not yet received the proper 
information from the prime minister’s office regarding the new regulations. 
For example, Nagano Prefecture was apparently unwilling to issue automo-
bile licenses but would grant moped licenses to deaf individuals who passed the 
test. The metropolitan police agencies (Tokyo, Osaka, etc.) were all reportedly 
unwilling to grant driver’s licenses, citing the traffic problems found there. When 
the newspaper asked about those deaf people who had already obtained licenses 
(such as the aforementioned man who had driven around the mainland), the traffic 
agency reportedly replied that there might be some individual variation based on 
each person’s hearing level, or that that man had simply been lucky. The news-
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paper was very unhappy that the situation was unequal based on location and 
individual circumstances (JDN 1960 [November 1], 3). 
The January 1961 issue of the Deaf News brought more clarity. New driving 
regulations had been issued as of December of the previous year. Drivers would 
be required to undergo visual examinations as well as to be tested for their re-
sponse to the sound of a car horn with a loudness of approximately 90 decibels at 
a distance of 10 meters (JDN 1961 [January 1], 1–2). Unfortunately, even by June 
of the next year (1962), there were complaints that local area offices were still not 
allowing deaf individuals to take the driving test (JDN 1962 [August 1, 5). Other 
test centers were apparently not permitting applicants to wear their hearing aids 
during the hearing tests, which would of course cause them to fail. Op-ed pieces 
compared Japan unfavorably to the United States and West Germany, where the 
deaf were allowed to drive (1962 [September 1], 2). A 1965 article even noted that 
in the United States, eight deaf persons were able to obtain aircraft pilot’s licenses 
(JDN 1965 [January 1], 7). 
In 1965, the Council on Problems Facing the Deaf announced four major is-
sues that they wanted to see resolved (JDN 1965 [May 1], 5):
1. Obtaining driver’s licenses
2. Certified social workers for the deaf
3. Captioning of television programs for the deaf
4. Expansion of employment opportunities for the deaf
In its report, the council conducted a survey and noted that while 787 deaf 
persons had reported that they wanted a driver’s license, up to now, only 13 deaf 
persons in all of Japan had managed to obtain a regular driver’s license, while 36 
had managed to obtain a Light Vehicle License (JDN 1965 [May 1], 5). Clearly, 
the situation was not optimal for the deaf in Japan. 
Frustration was clearly mounting. In late 1967, a young deaf man in Morioka 
Prefecture named Toishita Mitsuo was arrested for riding a motorcycle without a 
license (JDN 1968 [February 1], 1). The interesting thing was Toishita was more 
properly hard of hearing than deaf. That is, with a hearing aid he could hear and 
communicate fairly well. He held a job managing real estate and interacted with 
hearing people regularly (Matsumoto 1997, 110). Unfortunately, he could not use 
a telephone with his type of hearing aid, and thus he had to meet people face to 
face. He had previously applied twice for a driver’s license, but he was not permit-
ted to use his hearing aids and so failed the hearing exam both times. Because his 
job required him to travel all around the city to meet clients, he ended up having 
to ride his motorcycle without a license.
Toishita had already been fined numerous times for riding his motorcycle 
without a license (enough that his legal counsel recalls his company even ended 
up creating an accounting code for traffic code violations for him [Matsumoto 
1997, 111]). But the latest citation was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
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Toishita reportedly came to the conclusion that “this is not only my problem. This 
is a problem that concerns deaf people all over Japan who are not able to obtain 
driver’s licenses” (JDN 1968 [February 1], 1). Rather than accepting the usual 
summary judgment and paying a fine, he filed a claim in the Morioka District 
Court on March 15, 1968 arguing his innocence, for the right to drive, and for the 
invalidation of the law in question. He stated that he was ready to take this to the 
Supreme Court if necessary. 
Matsumoto Masayuki decided to take this case on as Toishita’s legal counsel. 
Matsumoto notes in his memoirs: “This court case was history making in that it 
represented the first time that institutional bias against those who could not hear 
was directly challenged. On a personal level, I will never forget the youthful en-
ergy that burned inside of me at the time” (Matsumoto 1997, 113).
Matsumoto was then only twenty-nine years of age. Court expenses were 
paid by a nationwide fundraising campaign on Toishita’s behalf. Matsumoto ac-
knowledged in an op-ed piece at the time that winning the case (a finding of in-
nocence for Toishita, indicating the unconstitutionality of the law) “would be very 
difficult. However, what is important is to show [the nation] where the problems 
are. In order to unite the Driver’s License Movement, we need to fight in the 
courts” (JDN 1968 [February 1], 1). 
The arguments made by the defense were that: (1) the driving prohibition 
was illegal under the Constitution’s right to free employment as well as equal 
treatment under the law; (2) the definition of “deaf person” in the law was left 
undefined in regards to the level of hearing/audiological ability, which is uncon-
stitutional; and (3) while forbidding automobile licenses was one matter, the law 
also forbade obtaining motorcycle licenses, which was going too far and was 
unconstitutional as well (JDN 1968 [April 1], 1). The defense made the argument 
that given that people who are near-sighted were allowed to wear glasses, deaf 
people should be allowed to wear their hearing aids when taking the hearing test 
(JDN 1969 [January 1], 9).
The JFD created a “Central Headquarters for the Promotion of the Move-
ment for Driver’s Licenses” and organized a fundraising campaign with the mini-
mum goal of raising ¥300,000. The estimated cost of the case was expected to be 
¥500,000 (JDN 1968 [April 1], 1). By June, there was an organized trial support 
group based in Tokyo named “The Group to Support Toishita’s Driver’s License” 
(1968 [June 1], 2). At the third hearing later that month, around twenty deaf per-
sons were in the audience. The Deaf News reported that their presence gave a 
“strong impression” of support for Toishita’s case (1968 [July 1], 7).
By late July, the fundraising goal was raised to ¥1 million although only 
¥108,667 had been donated by then (JDN 1968 [September 1], 1). The central 
headquarters also created petition forms and distributed them to the prefectural 
deaf associations. In an unsigned op-ed piece, the editors noted that there were 
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three requirements for a successful social movement: “(1) That the matter being 
asked for is legitimate; (2) that there is support from the hearing community; and 
(3) that the movement comes from below [i.e., grassroots]” (JDN 1968 [Septem-
ber 1], 1). However, even the Deaf News was pessimistic about the chances of 
winning the case. The editors acknowledged that even if the courts found Toishita 
innocent on an individual basis, it was unlikely that the Court would rule the traf-
fic law unconstitutional. 
The prosecution demanded the maximum sentence of six months imprison-
ment with hard labor for the traffic infraction of driving without a license. On June 
9, 1969, the Morioka District handed down a brief but strict verdict: “The traffic 
law is appropriate. Defendant Toishita is sentenced to six months hard labor with 
a two-year suspension” (JDN 1969 [July 1], 1). The legal team filed an immediate 
appeal to the Sendai High Court.
On the first day of the appeal, November 11, 1969, sixty-five deaf people 
from the neighboring deaf associations showed up at the Sendai High Court. In his 
opening remarks to the court, lawyer Matsumoto referred to the attention the trial 
was receiving all across Japan. He noted that many in the audience were deaf, and 
he asked for sign language interpreters to be present so that the audience could 
understand the proceedings of the court. The justices agreed to his request, and a 
Mr. Takahashi of Sendai City stood up and for the first time in Japanese history 
interpreted the court proceedings in sign for the audience (JDN 1969 [December 
1], 1). Unfortunately, although this was a great advancement for trial support and 
deaf rights in the courtroom, the High Court ruled on July 11, 1972, that “in order 
to protect the safety of the general populace who use public roads, the legal re-
striction forbidding people who cannot hear from possessing driver’s license is a 
reasonable solution” (JDN 1972 [August 1], 1). The legal team filed an immediate 
appeal to the Supreme Court. 
While the appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, the situation outside the 
courtroom was changing due to political pressure from the media attention. The 
Police Agency issued new guidelines that stated if the response to the following 
two questions was positive then the applicant should be considered “not deaf” 
and allowed to take the examination (JDN 1972 [October 1], 7): (1) “Can the 
applicant understand a simple conversation?” (2) “Can they hear a car horn from 
ten meters away?” 
Applicants were also allowed to wear hearing aids during the examination 
for the first time (Matsumoto 1991, 375). Rather than changing the law, the ad-
ministrative definition of deafness was modified to include most (but not all) deaf 
people. This was yet another example of what Frank Upham (1987) has called 
Japan’s propensity toward “bureaucratic informality.”
In January and February of 1974, Toishita Mitsuo obtained not only a 
motorcycle license but also an automobile license under the new administrative 
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guidelines. He mailed photocopies of both licenses to the Supreme Court as 
evidence for his case. A few months later, however, the Supreme Court agreed with 
the lower court rulings: “driving with a hearing aid [was] considered dangerous” 
(Matsumoto 1997, 123). This final ruling, however, was essentially mooted by the 
change in administrative practice by the police.
While the courtroom battle was lost, as the deaf political strategists had pre-
dicted, the case served to focus broader social and political attention on the right 
of deaf people to drive, as well as to unify the community around institutional 
injustices. And on a pragmatic level, it was clear that social change through leg-
islative or bureaucratic action was more efficacious than seeking remedy through 
the courts.
new strategies in the 1970s
The courtroom experiences of the 1960s were important stepping-stones for deaf 
activists in Japan. They learned that they needed to react quickly to potential in-
cidents, making sure that sign language interpreters were provided early during 
police interrogations and that defendants knew their rights under the law. They 
also became aware of broader institutional barriers to their full participation as 
citizens. In addition, the numerous high profile cases helped build up their com-
petence in handling these cases as well as consolidating their central role in the 
community.
Even with limited voice in the courtroom, the 1960s were an extremely im-
portant growing and learning period for the newly reconfigured JFD. A new gen-
eration of leaders had emerged with a different set of values and a vocabulary 
of “human rights” and “discrimination.” While they fought their first battles in 
the courts, they quickly realized that the public relations value of the courtroom 
drama was just as important as the actual cases themselves. Political alliances and 
mass mobilization were key strategies. Not only would they have to awaken the 
deaf community to what they believed was a class-based struggle, but they would 
also have to alert greater (hearing) Japan to the problems that deaf members of 
society were facing.
However, just as changing contextual frames and demographics caused the 
rise in legal activism in the postwar period in the first place, changing social cir-
cumstances led to a shift from the courts to political and administrative realms. 
The number of incidences of abuse within the police/judicial system dropped at 
the same time people realized that true power (and resolution of discrimination) 
would be found in changing the actual legal and administrative framework itself. 
The JFD realized that this sea change was occurring as early 1969 in the Toishita 
case. One leader wrote in the Deaf News: “The courtroom trial is a weapon in our 
fight to get a driver’s license. But however important that weapon is, you cannot 
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change the law through the courts. The [only] way to change the law is through 
the Diet” (JDN 1969 [January 1], 9; emphasis added).
The leaders of the Japanese Federation of the Deaf found the battleground 
shifting from the judicial system to politics. In 1975, the president of the JFD 
addressed the National Diet. In 1979, the JFD challenged the Incompetence Law, 
which held that all deaf and mute people were financially incompetent (i.e., were 
legally minors). 
The 1980s and 1990s yielded a new era of “cooperative welfare” with ad-
ministrative bureaucrats in the Ministry of Welfare (Nakamura 2002; 2006a). In 
this struggle, deaf leaders were forced to balance the fruits of closer cooperation 
with the government against the co-optation of the movement. They resolved it in 
part by bifurcating their organizational structure into two: local deaf associations 
functioned as nonprofit service providers in close cooperation with prefectural 
welfare offices while the national association kept a more activist stance toward 
the government, lobbying for legal and political change when possible. It is clear, 
however, that they would not have been able to gain this moral authority vis-à-vis 
the state without the significant structural frameworks they had established in the 
previous decades.
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Cause Lawyering in Japan: Reflections on the 
Case Studies and Justice Reform
Daniel H. Foote
Each of the case studies presented in this volume is an important and fascinating 
story in its own right. Taken together, the case studies enrich our understanding of 
cause lawyering and the relationship between law and social change in Japan. De-
spite their rather disparate subjects, the studies dovetail exceptionally well. They 
show numerous commonalities in the use of law to further social causes, as well 
as some important differences. They reveal a truly impressive level of creativity in 
the use of law, and they disclose several common barriers to successful litigation 
to promote social causes in Japan. As discussed below, a number of recently in-
troduced reforms seek to ameliorate some of those barriers. As these case studies 
so eloquently show, however, the goal of socially oriented litigation at times is not 
victory in the court battle itself, but rather victory in the court of public opinion. In 
short, although this book is entitled Going to Court to Change Japan, the courts 
are only one locus in a much broader battle. 
Law and SociaL change
For many years, the prevailing stereotypes in the West were that the Japanese 
people lacked rights consciousness, their courts were invariably passive, and 
their law played little role in social change. As Patricia Steinhoff observes in 
her introduction to this volume, the image of nonlitigious Japanese, culturally 
predisposed not to pursue claims in court, was set forth most notably by 
Kawashima Takeyoshi in a 1963 essay in English (Kawashima 1963) and 
later works in Japanese, and that image took firm root in the United States. 
In his path-breaking 1978 work “The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,” John 
Haley took direct aim at Kawashima’s assertion of a cultural predisposition, 
pointing instead to numerous systemic factors as the primary explanation for 
low litigation rates in Japan (Haley 1978). Numerous subsequent studies have 
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explored and elaborated on the impact of systemic factors. If the appearance of 
Haley’s article was not enough, one might think the above stereotypes would 
have been laid to rest in 1987 with the publication of Frank Upham’s outstanding 
book, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan (Upham 1987). Through four 
case studies, that book provided seemingly irrefutable evidence of a deep 
relationship between law and social change. Other works (before and since) 
have explored that relationship in fields as diverse as health law, tobacco, labor, 
and even financial regulation. As with so many other stereotypes, however, the 
stereotypes of nonlitigious Japanese and of a legal system unresponsive to and 
with little influence on social change have proven deep-rooted, despite strong 
evidence to the contrary.
Needless to say, the authors included in this volume are all deeply familiar 
with Haley’s and Upham’s work. Many of the case studies refer prominently to 
Haley and Upham, and the authors of the studies contained here evidently have 
been influenced and inspired by their works. In these studies, the authors have 
extended the examination to several new fields and have offered many new in-
sights into how social activism utilizes and influences the legal system in Japan. 
If there was ever any doubt, these studies should finally put to rest the notion that 
Japanese lack rights consciousness.
creative USe oF Law
As Steinhoff and others have observed, the movements discussed in these case 
studies share a number of organizational characteristics, including use of hotlines, 
provision of legal assistance, creation of volunteer support groups, and wide-
ranging media campaigns. The legal strategies employed in the cases, though, 
vary widely, and those strategies display a level of creativity that would likely 
impress even renowned U.S. litigators. 
In the consumer cases discussed by Patricia Maclachlan, the various meth-
ods employed included civil lawsuits against manufacturers, formal and infor-
mal administrative challenges, and efforts to bring about legislative change at 
both the local and national levels. The union’s efforts to combat the employer’s 
bankruptcy, examined by Christena Turner, included no fewer than eight separate 
cases filed in two district courts and the Tokyo Labor Relations Board, all pursu-
ing separate claims based on numerous different theories (including a lawsuit 
against the company president in his personal capacity). As discussed by Karen 
Nakamura, the Japanese Federation of the Deaf and other deaf activists pursued 
a number of different strategies, including boycotts, protests, and courtroom ar-
guments aimed at educating the judges, as well as efforts at the administrative 
and legislative levels. In the Sayama case, as discussed by John Davis, Jr., the 
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efforts of the Buraku Liberation League have extended to the international level, 
through appeals to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, in addition to 
petitions for retrial (including demands for full disclosure of all evidence held 
by the prosecution) at the domestic level. The karōshi efforts, examined by Scott 
North, included administrative challenges, civil lawsuits, and legislative efforts. 
Notably, the litigation strategy included what were, at the time, regarded as novel 
theories regarding causation of death (including the claim—ultimately recognized 
by the courts—that even suicide might be caused by excessive work). Finally, my 
personal favorite example of a creative legal strategy is the use of adult adoption 
in the Hannichi bombers case, discussed by Steinhoff, as a means for achieving 
access, by family members, for visits to prisoners. That the prison authorities re-
jected the attempts and then rewrote the regulations to explicitly exclude adopted 
family members from visitation rights does not make the strategy itself any less 
impressive as an example of creative lawyering. 
The example of adult adoption, in particular, brings to mind two other exam-
ples of creative legal strategies in social movements in Japan: the so-called “one 
share” and “one tree” strategies. The “one share” strategy was used most promi-
nently in the infamous case of Chisso, the corporation primarily responsible for 
the mercury pollution in Minamata. Victims and their supporters each purchased 
one share of stock in Chisso, so as to entitle them to attend the annual sharehold-
ers meeting, file a motion modifying a management-supported resolution, and 
voice their protest in person. The chairman of the shareholders meeting responded 
by declaring the meeting open, submitting the management resolution, declaring 
it passed by a majority vote, and then declaring the meeting adjourned—all in the 
course of four minutes, while ignoring those seeking to speak. 
The “one tree” strategy also related to environmental issues, in the context of 
blocking development. In this strategy, each opponent of a development project 
purchased one tree on land proposed for development or on neighboring land, 
thereby forcing the developer to negotiate separately with each opponent and 
also ensuring each opponent a direct personal economic stake sufficient to confer 
standing to sue in an effort to enjoin the project. Of course, by agreeing to sell 
trees separately from the underlying land, the landowner greatly reduced his or 
her ability to manage or dispose of the property. Hence, adopting this strategy 
required the existence of landowners so deeply opposed to the development in 
question they would be willing to encumber their land in that way. 
A similar strategy is the so-called “one tsubo landlord” campaign adopted by 
those opposed to U.S. military bases in Okinawa. In that strategy, owners of land 
being used, over their opposition, for bases agreed to transfer very small parcels 
of their land (in many cases even smaller than the “one tsubo,” a Japanese mea-
sure equal to approximately 40 square feet, referred to in the name of the move-




The adult adoption, one share, and one tree strategies each pursued specific legal 
aims, but all three also aimed at a broader common objective: achieving solidarity 
among supporters. That in turn ties to a broader commonality among all the case 
studies in this volume: all involve movements. 
As the case studies reveal, solidarity plays a wide range of roles in these 
movements. One role, noted by nearly all the authors, is in overcoming the social 
stigma attached to filing lawsuits. With reference to the pollution and thalidomide 
cases of the late 1960s and 1970s, in “Myth of the Reluctant Litigant” Haley 
pointed to social stigma as one barrier to filing lawsuits, mentioning as causes for 
such stigma “a sense of ‘shame’ for physical and mental deformity, constraints on 
individual initiative and ‘selfish’ behavior imposed by the demands of community 
unity and group consciousness, and hostility against an association with . . . a left-
ist, antigovernment cause reflected in the politics of the lawyers who dominated 
the conduct of these trials” (Haley 1978, 367). 
To a greater or lesser degree, the concern over potential stigma must have 
arisen in virtually all the cases discussed in this volume, as well. Toishita Mitsuo, 
for example, must have felt considerable trepidation when he elected not to take 
the easy route of simply paying a fine for driving without a license, but rather suing 
to invalidate the law prohibiting deaf persons from obtaining driver’s licenses—in 
the process publicly highlighting his own disability. One can easily imagine that 
support from the Japanese Federation of the Deaf, providing the imprimatur that 
Toishita was acting not just so he himself could keep his job, but was represent-
ing the interests of the entire deaf community, greatly helped in overcoming that 
stigma. Similarly, if individual consumers had brought claims seeking damages for 
mislabeled “fruit juices” or overpriced kerosene, they might have been branded by 
the media and the general public as overly sensitive, selfish kooks. But when the 
claims were brought under the auspices of Shufuren, representing the interests of 
consumers from throughout Japan, the image shifted dramatically, from selfishness 
to upholding the public interest. To offer a parallel from the United States, when a 
single consumer sued McDonald’s for burns suffered because her coffee was too 
hot and was awarded nearly three million dollars in damages, she was promptly 
labeled by the media as a greedy example of the excesses of the U.S. civil justice 
system. Had the claim been brought under the auspices of a major consumer orga-
nization, with public relations efforts highlighting the hundreds of other customers 
who reportedly also had suffered severe burns from scalding coffee, many to their 
genital areas, as was the case with the plaintiff in that case, the public reaction—
and the resulting stigma—might have been far different. 
In some of the other cases, it is more questionable whether the perceived 
stigma would have deterred lawsuits even if there had been no support groups. In 
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both the karōshi and bankruptcy cases, for example, one of the reasons employees 
worked without protest in the first place was fear over the stigma of protesting 
publicly coupled with the concrete fear of loss of job. Once the employee had died 
(in the former case) or the company had expired (in the latter), the stigma presum-
ably would have been greatly attenuated; there inevitably would be a great sense 
of outrage and there would also be far less to lose from bringing a lawsuit. To 
again offer a parallel from the United States, a number of years ago it was reported 
that, after a major meat-packing plant announced it was going out of business, 
over a quarter of the employees filed workers compensation claims, primarily re-
lating to carpal tunnel syndrome. The employer sought to portray these claims as 
an abuse of the workers compensation system. At least equally plausible, though, 
is that the workers had been suffering in silence, fearing that filing claims might 
endanger their continued employment. Once the factory announced it was clos-
ing, they had little to lose from filing claims.
Needless to say, solidarity plays countless other roles in addition to lessening 
stigma. Among the notable other roles reflected in nearly all of these case stud-
ies are: providing financial support for litigation and other activities, assembling 
information (and thereby to some extent trying to fill the hole left by the dearth 
of effective discovery mechanisms), and offering mutual support through what in 
almost all cases were very long trials.
Litigation onLy part oF Broader Strategy
This collection of case studies is entitled Going to Court to Change Japan. Yet 
the court proceedings were part and parcel of much broader strategies. In all the 
cases, efforts were aimed at administrative agencies or the legislature in addition 
to the courts. In every case, though, the ultimate target was the general public—or, 
in many of the cases, various “publics.”
The activities on behalf of the Hannichi bombers and Red Army defendants, 
for example, were aimed in part at the community of other radicals and poten-
tial radicals, in an effort to give them heart and perhaps stir them into action. 
That objective presumably is the reason the Japanese authorities were so adamant 
about keeping the testimony closed in those cases; the Japanese government did 
not want to provide the defendants with a public forum. As examples of other 
“publics” to which the cases were aimed: The bankruptcy case was in part a call 
to other unions, in an effort to build union solidarity. The karōshi cases were an 
appeal to other victims, potential victims, and workers suffering long overtime 
hours in silence, as well as their families. And for decades, the Sayama case has 
served as a rallying cry for Buraku residents. 
In all the cases, however, the ultimate objective was to reach beyond these 
narrow “publics” and influence the views of the public as a whole, and thereby to 
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change Japan. The movements recognized that winning individual court battles, 
or even winning new administrative policies or new legislation, would be of lim-
ited value in achieving true reform unless accompanied by a shift in people’s 
thinking and in society as a whole. At the same time, they recognized that one 
of the best ways to assure success at the judicial, administrative, and legislative 
levels was to bring about a shift in public views and demonstrate that shift to 
the relevant authorities. In short, public attitudes and meaningful legal reform go 
hand in hand. With this in mind, each of the cases involved coordinated efforts to 
raise consciousness and understanding, of which the court battles were one part.
As the case studies reveal, the movements utilized a broad range of tools in 
their efforts to influence public opinion. Hotlines not only served as a vehicle for 
gathering information, but the publicity surrounding them also helped to raise 
awareness of the relevant concerns among the general public, and coverage of the 
results of the hotlines helped to establish the gravity of the issues. Other direct 
means of spreading information included newsletters, letter-writing campaigns, 
public education sessions, and the like. By far the most important tool for influ-
encing public opinion was the mass media, and the movements undertook a broad 
range of efforts to persuade the mass media to take up their causes. With respect 
to the trials themselves, each court session throughout the long proceedings pro-
vided a new photo opportunity—a chance for large crowds of supporters to appear 
with banners and placards in front of Tokyo District Court, the Supreme Court, 
or some other courthouse—and each session afforded a new opportunity for the 
lawyers and other representatives of the movement to appeal to the mass media 
for coverage and thereby keep the dispute in the public eye.
To these movements, the courts were just one part of the overall struggle. In-
deed, there are striking indications that the courts were regarded as just another 
element in the policy-making structure, to be treated in much the same way as the 
other branches of government. In her chapter on the consumer movement, Maclach-
lan states that most consumer activists “are poorly versed in the fine art of lobby-
ing politicians and bureaucrats.” From reading these case studies, however, one 
receives the impression that courts, as well as politicians and bureaucrats, were 
viewed as a proper object for lobbying. In nearly all these cases, supporters un-
dertook demonstrations, sit-ins, and letter-writing campaigns aimed at the courts 
and even at the individual judges themselves. The trial support groups described 
so vividly by Steinhoff are not limited to New Left criminal defendants, but are, as 
she notes, characteristic of all types of Japanese social movements that utilize the 
courts to press their claims. Davis provides one indelible image of these groups: the 
sculpture of Buraku Liberation League protesters hoisting the league’s flag while 
demonstrating before riot police in front of the Supreme Court. And North offers a 
concrete example of efforts to influence judges’ thinking through courtroom actions 
by supporters in a karōshi case: “The unionists attended the trial sessions and could 
caUSe Lawyering in Japan
171
be counted on to mutter and grunt derisively in response to the statements of defense 
witnesses. . . . Mrs. Hiraoka’s lawyers thought that this peanut gallery behavior had 
a beneficial effect on the judges as long as it was kept within reason.”
Judges are human; they are not insusceptible to the powers of suggestion, 
conscious or subconscious. Nonetheless, in Japan, as in the United States, judges 
regard themselves as neutral and impartial; they regard lobbying as highly inap-
propriate; and they view the courtroom as sacrosanct. Many Japanese judges also 
personally experienced disrupted trials in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when 
trial support group activity was at a peak. From this standpoint, it is little surprise 
that, as Steinhoff reports, half the prohibitions listed at the entrance to Tokyo Dis-
trict Court relate to protest activities and protest paraphernalia. 
At the same time, the scope of trial support group activity in connection with 
litigation by all types of social movements in Japan serves as testament to the fact 
that the ultimate battle is for the hearts and minds of the public, which is not nec-
essarily tied to success in any given case. Indeed, when one examines the various 
court cases discussed in these case studies, the losses by the social movements 
substantially outnumber the victories. Yet, when one expands the consideration to 
the role of the court battles in raising people’s consciousness, and to the ultimate 
impact on society, the success rate is more impressive. 
Many of the authors express pessimism about the relative lack of progress. 
Steinhoff, for example, states that, in the face of the protests, the “Japanese crimi-
nal justice system . . . has devised more severe policies to circumvent the resis-
tance of suspects and defendants who use the support system.” North observes 
that, with the current seemingly never-ending stagnation in the Japanese econo-
my, pressure on workers is, if anything, intensifying. He points to business efforts 
to water down or eliminate many of the legal provisions that limit working hours, 
and he reminds us that, “in the absence of strong unions, it is widely believed 
that . . . revisions [to the Labor Standards Act], carried out in the name of gender 
equality, will put women in the same unprotected position [with regard to long 
working hours and karōshi] as men.” “Union leaders,” reports Turner, “. . . com-
ment … that their struggles taught capitalists ‘how to go bankrupt’ while avoiding 
worker-initiated legal action.” And efforts to obtain a retrial for Ishikawa Kazuo, 
the defendant in the Sayama case, have been rejected yet again. 
Even in these respects, though, one should not underestimate the impact the 
movements have had. In the criminal context, suspects today enjoy greater rights 
to meet with counsel than in the past, and, as discussed further below, important 
recent reforms have expanded access to publicly provided counsel and access to 
discovery. As North observes, the current economic climate has left many work-
ers happy just to have jobs and unwilling to risk their employment by protesting 
over working hours. Yet, as he also observes, the karōshi movement has achieved 
major successes at the administrative level, with steady relaxation of the standards 
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for recognizing karōshi, along with a great change in public attitudes. As Turn-
er notes, employers may have learned how to go bankrupt without facing legal 
claims by workers, but in order to do so the employers have to meet certain legal 
standards, including showing good faith efforts to protect jobs. In this respect, 
union struggles of the type she discusses have helped to place limits on employer 
behavior. And, while Ishikawa has not won acquittal or a retrial, one can easily 
imagine that the mass protests may have played some role in the commutation 
of his death sentence and his release on parole. Given the lack of transparency 
regarding criminal investigations, one can only hope that targeting of Buraku resi-
dents as suspects for major crimes, as reportedly occurred in the Sayama case, is 
a thing of the past; there can be no doubt that the protests surrounding the case 
focused widespread attention on that issue.
Thus, even when the court cases themselves have ended in defeat, the move-
ments frequently have achieved successes in administrative or legislative settings 
or in other ways. And the publicity surrounding the court cases often has played an 
important role in those other successes. Paradoxically, on occasion failure in court 
may be more effective in the long run than victory. As Maclachlan observes in con-
nection with consumer litigation, “litigation is often instrumental in galvanizing 
public opinion in support of long-term legislative objectives. Plaintiffs do not have 
to win in order to accomplish their political aims. In fact, defeat may actually work 
to the advantage of . . . advocates by stoking a sense of outrage among movement 
members, their allies, the general public, and even erstwhile opponents of . . . 
causes; these sentiments can in turn translate into pressure on the political system 
for comprehensive legislative reform [tense changed].” A striking example from the 
consumer context is the juice trial, in which the courts’ rejection of the suit out of 
hand helped to galvanize the movement for legislative reform. Similarly, in the con-
text of the deaf discussed by Nakamura, Toishita’s conviction for driving without a 
license, upheld by the courts in brief and seemingly unfeeling opinions, generated 
media attention and political pressure that led the National Police Agency to change 
standards for granting licenses. In sum, the court battles in these case studies had 
great significance, regardless of victory or defeat in the litigation itself.
BarrierS to Litigation and reFormS
As mentioned earlier, in “Myth of the Reluctant Litigant” Haley noted the impact 
of social stigma as one factor discouraging litigation in some contexts, but the 
primary focus of that article is on systemic and structural factors that function as 
barriers to litigation in Japan. Each of the case studies in this volume confirms the 
impact of such systemic and structural barriers. Accordingly, in closing it may be 
worth reflecting on some of the common barriers to litigation faced by movements 
in the past, together with the likely impact of recent reforms. 
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Barriers
Each of the movements faced similar hurdles to pursuing litigation. These in-
cluded, most notably, barriers to access to the litigation process, lack of legal and 
other technical expertise, and lack of information. 
Barriers to access included difficulties in establishing standing and the lack 
of a class action mechanism. In the cases discussed in this volume, those concerns 
were especially problematic in the consumer context, but class action, standing, 
and other limitations on qualification to bring suit affect many other potential 
challenges to administrative and corporate actions. The single greatest barrier to 
access, however—and one that affected all the cases—was the cost of litigation. 
Even though legal counsel offered their services on a pro bono basis in nearly 
every case, pursuing litigation involved a host of other expenses. In each of the 
cases, the network of supporters provided contributions to help defray the costs 
of the legal battles, and some movements were able to tap into support from other 
sources, such as the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in connection with the kero-
sene litigation. Yet cost was a major concern in each of the cases.
A second common hurdle was lack of legal and technical expertise. Victims, 
defendants, and movement members, for the most part, had little knowledge of 
or experience with the legal system. The movements depended heavily on the in-
volvement of committed lawyers. The lawyers not only helped plot legal strategy; 
they also educated supporters about the law, their rights, and other matters. In 
many of the cases, including karōshi cases and various consumer and deaf legal 
cases, medical or other expert knowledge also was essential, so the involvement 
of other experts was crucial. Locating lawyers and other experts willing to take 
on the causes—usually on a pro bono basis—sometimes was a matter of fortu-
ity, as when Mrs. Hiraoka found attorney Matsumaru Tadashi when she placed a 
call to a karōshi hotline. But in many of the cases it must have been much more 
difficult to find committed lawyers. Moreover, one can easily surmise that many 
other movements were far less fortunate in finding competent and committed le-
gal representation. 
A major reason for this situation has been the scarcity of lawyers in Japan. 
Until 1991, only approximately 500 candidates per year passed the bar exam; of 
that number, between 100 and 150 became judges and prosecutors, leaving un-
der 400 new practicing lawyers each year. The number of successful candidates 
gradually increased thereafter, but even as of 2003 fewer than 1,200 candidates 
passed the bar exam. As of that same year, Japan, with a population of over 130 
million, still had fewer than 20,000 practicing lawyers, most of them located in 
the Tokyo and Osaka areas. Under those circumstances, finding lawyers willing 
to take on new causes was not easy. With broader access to legal representation, 
it seems likely that many more movements might have pursued litigation in their 
efforts to change Japan.
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A third common hurdle for litigation was lack of information. In all of the cases, 
one of the great struggles was to obtain information necessary to prove claims or 
to refute claims of the other side. The Hiraoka karōshi case was unusual, in that 
Mr. Hiraoka had kept, in his own home, records of his working hours and duties, 
his medical records, a personal diary, and other documents. These alone would not 
have been sufficient to prove death from overwork, but they were instrumental 
in structuring the case, in pointing the way to other relevant information, and in 
refuting many of the company’s allegations. In most of the other cases reported here, 
the litigants did not have access to such a treasure trove of information, but instead 
had to assemble information from a wide range of sources. Hotlines served as one 
means of collecting information, albeit largely anecdotal information. Supporters 
aided in providing information to which they had access and in searching for 
information from other sources. And lawyers and other professionals undertook 
extensive research, as well. Notably, the tool for collecting information that would 
be at the very top of the list in the United States—demanding disclosure of relevant 
information from the other side, through the discovery system—did not play a 
significant role in any of these case studies. Even after recent reforms, the civil 
discovery system in Japan remains limited in scope, and the criminal discovery 
system is even narrower. Indeed, expansion of access to information is itself one 
of the causes espoused in two of the case studies reported here: consumer groups 
were among the groups behind the push for information disclosure laws and an 
expansion in civil discovery, and one of the major objectives of the Sayama case 
movement has been an expansion of criminal discovery.
Reforms
Recent reforms affect all three of the above hurdles. As Maclachlan reports, 
amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1996 expanded civil discovery, 
and the Information Disclosure Act, enacted in 1999, greatly expanded access to 
government information. Over the past dozen years, broad reforms to many other 
aspects of the justice system also have been undertaken. The prime reform agent 
was the Justice System Reform Council, a special advisory panel convened in 
1999 by then-Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō, which undertook a comprehensive 
reexamination of the entire justice system. With the case studies in this volume 
in mind, it bears special note that the thirteen members of the Reform Council 
included Yoshioka Hatsuko, Secretary-General of Shufuren, and Takagi Tsuyo-
shi, at the time the Vice President (and later President) of Rengo, the Japan Trade 
Union Confederation. In the council’s deliberations, they served as effective ad-
vocates for the interests of consumers, labor, and other social causes and sought 
to ensure proper attention was given to these types of concerns. 
In its final recommendations, issued in June 2001, the Reform Council called 
for major reforms to civil justice, criminal justice, the legal profession, and other 
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aspects of the justice system (Shihō Seido Kaikaku Shingikai 2001). The pro-
posed reforms related to all three of the hurdles mentioned above, along with 
many other aspects of the justice system. 
With regard to access, the Reform Council called for reductions in filing fees, 
the expansion of court services in the evenings and on holidays, and other mea-
sures to increase convenience of the courts. In addition, to provide greater access 
to legal services for those with limited means, the Reform Council recommended 
a major new system for provision of legal assistance. To facilitate the pursuit of 
claims in cases involving many victims, each with low individual damages (prime 
examples of which are the juice and kerosene consumer cases), the Reform Coun-
cil called for consideration of introducing the right of group action, whereby an 
organization would be permitted to represent the interests of victims. In another 
broad set of reforms designed to make the justice system more accessible and ef-
fective, the Reform Council called for various measures to speed up trials. 
Expanding the availability of competent legal services was another major 
aspect of the Reform Council’s recommendations. With the goal of increasing 
both the size and quality of the legal profession, the Reform Council called for a 
major expansion in the number of lawyers, together with a fundamental change in 
the legal training system. On the former point, the Reform Council recommended 
increasing the number of passers on the bar exam to 3,000 per year by about 
2010. At the same time, the Reform Council called for establishing a new tier of 
law schools, three-year professional schools at the graduate level bearing strong 
similarities to the U.S. law school system, intended to ensure better training for 
the legal profession and to enhance diversity of the profession (at least in terms of 
diversity in academic disciplines pursued at the undergraduate level and diversity 
in societal experience). 
With regard to access to information, the Reform Council recommended 
further expansion in methods for collection of evidence for civil cases and im-
provements in access to experts for medical and other cases entailing technical 
knowledge. In the criminal context, the Reform Council called for expanded dis-
closure of evidence, with the adoption of rules clearly setting forth the timing and 
scope of discovery. Another important reform recommended for the criminal jus-
tice system was expansion of the right to publicly provided counsel for suspects 
upon issuance of a detention order (as opposed to upon indictment, as in the prior 
system). 
In addition, the Reform Council recommended various measures to enhance the 
openness of the justice system and popular participation in it. The recommendation 
that received the most attention was the call for introduction of a system for lay 
participation in judging criminal cases. The Reform Council also called for greater 
participation by the people in a wide range of matters relating to the justice system 
as a whole, including the appointment of judges and the management of the courts, 
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public prosecutors’ offices, and bar associations, and for expanded disclosure of 
information by the courts, prosecutors offices, and bar associations. 
One could easily imagine that proposals for reform of this scope would with-
er and gradually recede to a distant memory. That, after all, is essentially what 
occurred with the last prior major effort at justice system reform in Japan, the Pro-
visional Justice System Investigation Committee. That twenty-member commit-
tee met for two years, from 1962–64, and issued a final set of recommendations 
that bore many similarities to the Reform Council’s recommendations of nearly 
forty years later, including a recommendation for a major increase in the size of 
the legal profession. Most of that committee’s recommendations soon faded into 
oblivion. Such was not the fate of the Reform Council’s recommendations. To 
the contrary, Koizumi Shin’ichirō, who was Prime Minister at the time the Re-
form Council issued its recommendations, endorsed the recommendations; and 
the Cabinet promptly established a Headquarters for Promotion of Justice System 
Reform, along with twelve expert advisory committees for each of the major areas 
of reform, together with a detailed timetable for passage of essential legislation 
and implementation of the reforms. 
Reform of legal training and the legal profession was deemed fundamental to 
the success of many of the other reforms, so that project was placed at the top of 
the agenda. The new system of legal education commenced in April 2004, and a 
new bar exam was instituted beginning in 2006. In the face of growing resistance, 
especially from members of the Japanese bar (many of whom are concerned over 
increased competition), the goal of increasing the number of passers on the bar 
exam to 3,000 per year by about 2010 has not been attained. After reaching some-
what over 2,000 passers in 2008, the number of passers has remained at that level 
ever since (and, as of this writing in 2014, there is considerable pressure to reduce 
the number of passers). Even so, by 2014 the total number of lawyers had risen to 
over 35,000—twice what it had been at the turn of the century. 
Since the Reform Council went only so far as to recommend further study of 
the group action and class action systems, it is perhaps unsurprising those reforms 
have not yet been undertaken. Yet a very broad range of other reforms recom-
mended by the Reform Council have been implemented. These include expan-
sion in civil and criminal discovery, expansion of the right to publicly provided 
counsel for criminal suspects, establishment of a new nationwide legal assistance 
network, enactment of an act aimed at speeding up trials, establishment of a new 
system for handling individual labor disputes, and various reforms to the admin-
istrative litigation system, including some expansion in standing, increased access 
to evidence, and expanded rights to preliminary relief. In what is without question 
the single reform that has attracted the most attention, the new lay participation 
system for judging criminal cases—the so-called saiban’in system—went into 
effect in mid-2009. Under that system, mixed panels consisting of three profes-
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sional judges and six lay members are responsible for judging serious criminal 
cases, with their shared responsibility extending to sentencing as well as determi-
nation of guilt. In another significant difference from the U.S. jury system, use of 
the saiban’in system is mandatory for cases subject to it; neither the prosecution 
nor the defense has the right to opt out. Taken as a whole, many of the reforms, 
especially those to the criminal justice system, reflect the desire to foster a more 
robust adversary system in Japan (Foote 2010, 35–40). It should be noted that 
even the above list of reforms is only partial. For an overview of the Reform 
Council and summary of the major reforms, see Foote (2007). 
As the above list reflects, the past decade or so has witnessed a very wide 
array of reforms to the Japanese justice system, which touch in various ways on 
each of the case studies in this volume. These reforms seem certain to have a 
major impact on Japanese society and on the future of cause lawyering in Japan. 
In closing I might briefly address two of the developments that I regard as most 
significant: the push for greater transparency and the expansion in the legal 
profession.
The initial promise of the expanded civil discovery mechanism has been 
muted by highly restrictive judicial interpretations, such as decisions giving 
corporations broad leeway to refuse to disclose documents if they were drawn up 
only for internal use and “disclosure might impair the decision-making process.” 
In addition, the new criminal discovery system is subject to numerous conditions. 
Nonetheless, the very enactment of these discovery systems reflects an important 
shift in thinking, and it is noteworthy that in an early decision interpreting the 
criminal discovery provisions, the Supreme Court construed the discovery duty 
rather broadly (Foote 2010, 35–36, 39). Furthermore, the Information Disclosure 
Act has proven to be a valuable tool for gaining access to government information. 
It—together with the change in public views it reflects—has resulted in greater 
transparency and has helped reduce the sense of unreviewable administrative 
discretion. Increased disclosure of information by the courts, prosecutors’ offices, 
and bar associations and greater popular participation in the management of 
those institutions reflect and reinforce the same trends toward transparency and 
accountability.
The trend toward greater transparency is by no means absolute. As its title 
implies, the Personal Information Protection Act, passed in 2003, provides im-
portant protections for personal information. At the same time, its provisions are 
sufficiently broad to provide justification for refusals to disclose a wide range 
of information. In a more recent development, the so-called State Secrets Act 
(Act for the Protection of Special Secrets), passed in late 2013, has come under 
widespread criticism by the media, academics, transparency advocates and many 
others, as a vehicle that may allow the government of Japan to hide important or 
embarrassing information from the public.
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Although fewer than 2,500 cases per year are subject to the saiban’in system, 
the introduction of that system has focused tremendous public attention on the 
criminal justice system. And, despite steadfast resistance by the police and pros-
ecutors, in late April 2014 a major government council recommended mandatory 
taping (video or audio) of interrogations of detained suspects in two categories 
of cases. The debate that led to this recommendation arose in part from revela-
tions of improprieties by police and prosecutors, including fabrication of evidence 
by a high-ranking prosecutor, in evident efforts to induce confessions support-
ing scenarios they had already concocted. The reform recommendation has been 
criticized for not going far enough. Still, in view of the past adamant resistance by 
police and prosecutors to anything smacking of transparency, achieving the taping 
of the interrogation process would be a major development indeed.
The increase in the size of the legal profession is itself closely connected 
to these same trends. The Reform Council positioned that increase as an essen-
tial step in a fundamental shift in Japanese society, from an “advance control/
adjustment type society,” premised on extensive administrative discretion, to “an 
after-the-fact review/remedy type society,” with clear, publicly announced rules 
and a transparent decision-making process. The increase in the size of the bar has 
important implications for many other aspects of Japanese society, as well. While 
raising the number of lawyers will not ensure even distribution of legal services 
nor access to legal services for all who need them, the increase will help to allevi-
ate the dearth of legal professionals. Moreover, the reforms in legal education had 
been expected to help bring broader perspectives into legal practice by facilitating 
entry into law school and thereafter into the legal profession for those who have 
specialized in fields other than law. As of mid-2014, the promise of facilitating 
entry into the legal profession by those who majored in fields other than law at 
the undergraduate level is in danger of being lost. To date, the pass rate on the 
new bar exam by those who majored in fields other than law has been only ap-
proximately half as high as the pass rate for those who majored in law, and on the 
2013 bar exam, the pass rate for the nonlaw cohort was a mere 16.6 percent. Not 
surprisingly, given those statistics, applications to the graduate level law schools 
by nonlaw majors have plummeted. In part due to pressure to focus on bar exam 
subjects, the new law school system has not yet lived up to initial hopes in other 
respects as well, including clinical education and internationally oriented offer-
ings. For detailed discussions of the legal education reforms and the challenges 
those reforms have faced, see Foote (2011; 2013).
Although the reforms have not fully achieved their initial promise, one might 
assume these developments, coupled with improvements for access to experts 
in technical fields, should help litigants involved in social causes in obtaining 
necessary expertise. Some members of the legal profession have suggested that 
just the opposite result might occur. The rationale for this view runs essentially as 
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follows: “The relatively limited competition in the Japanese legal profession in 
the past has afforded lawyers with an assured livelihood. This, in turn, has helped 
foster cause lawyering. Lawyers concerned with social causes have enjoyed the 
wherewithal to undertake representation relating to those causes on a pro bono 
basis, without worrying about remuneration; the abundance of other well-paying 
work has afforded them that freedom. With the increase in competition resulting 
from expansion in the bar, however, that freedom will be lost. Even lawyers who 
are deeply concerned about social causes will feel that they have little choice but 
to devote themselves to paying clients and will be reluctant to undertake activities 
on a pro bono basis.” 
I have always felt these fears were vastly overblown, if not completely un-
warranted. To the contrary, I have assumed, expanding the legal profession should 
lead to an increase in the number of lawyers committed to social causes. And, as 
one who has been heavily involved in the legal education reform process, I like to 
think the new system of legal education has much to offer, as well. 
It remains too soon to offer a definitive assessment on this issue, but I believe 
the early returns vindicate my views. As one would expect given the magnitude 
of the recent increase in the size of the bar, legal services have become more 
widely available. As one example, the past few years have witnessed a substantial 
rise in the number of lawyers practicing in areas of so-called “lawyer scarcity.” 
Developments with perhaps more direct relevance to cause lawyering include the 
following: In recent years a number of bar associations, including the Osaka bar 
association and all three of the Tokyo bar associations, have introduced man-
datory pro bono requirements for lawyers registered in those associations. The 
number of lawyers taking on responsibility as publicly provided counsel in crimi-
nal cases has risen substantially. In addition to the government-established Japan 
Legal Support Center (the new legal aid network commonly referred to as Hō 
Terasu in Japanese, which has offices in every prefecture and branch offices in 
many additional locations), the bar associations have fostered the establishment 
of so-called kōsetsu jimusho (literally “publicly established law offices”). These 
offices actually are established under the auspices of and with financial support 
from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations or local bar associations in many 
locations throughout Japan. Most of these kōsetsu jimusho are located in areas 
of lawyer scarcity, but a recent development has been the establishment of urban 
kōsetsu jimusho specializing in criminal defense. In another recent development 
with potential significance for cause lawyering, some recent graduates of the new 
law schools have begun work at nongovernment organizations. 
As a final note, legal education appears to be making a contribution to cause 
lawyering. Many of the new law schools have established special programs, clin-
ics, or classes in such fields as human rights, environmental law, labor law, health 
and welfare, consumer rights, and pro bono lawyering. Here too, some of the 
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initial impetus has been dissipated by the pressure to focus on bar exam subjects. 
Still, a number of lawyers who have been heavily involved in cause lawyering 
themselves—including lawyers who have worked on karōshi, enzai (miscarriage 
of justice), information disclosure, and consumer rights issues—are teaching at 
the new law schools. It seems safe to assume they are imparting to their students 
not only a broad range of skills needed for successful advocacy, but a sense of 
passion and commitment. 
In sum, overall the reforms hold considerable promise for cause lawyering. 
The reforms do not go as far as many advocates would have wished, and they 
certainly do not guarantee success in litigation, but they should facilitate future 
efforts to go to court to change Japan. 
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